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OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
This thesis is a discussion of how the public sector can be modelled
within the theoretical framework of a Walrasian general equilibrium
system. In the elementary textbook model of general equilibrium, there are
usually only two economic agents, the producer and the consumer. The
public sector is either not present at all, or it is perhaps seen as just
another firm or household. The question posed here is whether it can be
argued that the public sector is an economic agent different enough from
the two others to warrant its own theoretical formulation. Although by no
means definitive, the analysis in Chapter 2 of this thesis suggests that
the answer is yes.
At this point one could argue that there are many models and theories of
public economic behaviour, and that the whole field of public economics
(not to mention macroeconomics) is indeed concerned with just that
public economics. This is true. But still the literature may be said to
leave the impression that the public sector is in some sense an exogenous
phenomenon in the economy and not an independent agent that can be given a
rationale along with the consumer and the producer. Furthermore, many
existing models of the public sector are of a rather partial nature,
analysing tax policy, public production efficiency, privatization and
provision of public goods etc. as separate questions. There seems to be
less widespread agreement on how the public sector should be modelled if
the level of abstraction is that of Walrasian general equilibrium.
- 6 -
Following a short philosophical essay in Chapter l, Chapter 2 is an
attempt to rationalize the formulation of the public sector as a third
economic agent after the consumer and the private producer. There are two
arguments, both of which are quite simple. First, it is argued that the
distinguishing characteristic of the public sector is authority, i.e. the
abi lity to enforce economic transactions by law. This is not a great
surprise in itself, of course, but authori ty is here seen as the only
reason for considering the possibility of defining the public sector as a
distinct economic agent. Secondly, it is argued that placing production
activi ties in the public sector is rational if the use of authori ty
results in lower total production costs than would be the case if the
goods or services in question were supplied by private firms. Chapter 2 of
the thesis is an elaboration of these two arguments.
One of the implications of the discussion in Chapter 2 is that in a
Walrasian general equilibrium model the provision of public goods and the
level of public consumption should be regarded as exogenously given
results of the political decision process. (The level of public production
may sti11 be determined by first-order conditions from economics, of
course.) This in turn implies that economists may have more to say about
the financing of public expenditures than about the composition and level
of public consumption. Chapter 3 thus takes up some aspects of optimum
taxation formulae in a general equilibrium context. Special attention is
devoted to the common assumption in optimum taxation theory that producer
prices are constant, with the conclusion that this assumption is not
strictly necessary. (What is important, is to assume constant returns to
scale in all firms.)
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Another issue in Chapter 3 is how optimal tax rates change when the level
of public production rises or falls. In most articles on optimal taxation,
public expenditures are simply assumed to be a fixed, exogenous number. In
a Walrasian general equilibrium model, however, it seems more natural to
define such expenditures as the total costs of providing public goods.
Normally, the consumers' preferences are defined over both private and
public goods, and there may be an impact on the demand for private goods
from an increase in the supply of public goods. This leads to the
following chain of effects: If the exogenous level of public production is
increased, total public production costs rise,l) and the increase in the
public revenue requirement leads to a higher general level of taxation.
But optimal, relative tax rates may be altered as well, because producer
prices and/or demand elasticities are likely to change. In Chapter 3 such
effects are analysed briefly in order to identify some of the variables
which determine whether each optimal tax rate rises or falls.
A question neglected so far is why the Walrasian general equilibrium is
interesting. There are several reasons, in spite of the observation that
very few real economies, if any, are perfectly competitive. First, most
models of real economies are general equilibrium models in the sense that
they consist of a system of equations with some exogenous and endogenous
variables and, hopefully, a solution. Among these, the Walrasian scheme is
quite general and flexible. Secondly, the traditional optimum taxation
formulae are directly applicable only to a perfectly competitive economy
with constant returns to scale in all firms. Therefore, if one wants to
analyse simple, but general optimal taxation, the Walrasian model seems to
be the choice al ternative. A third reason may be that the analysis of
1) It is assumed that the public sector minimizes costs at given market
prices in all its production activities.
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change is often at least as interesting as the characterization of a
static equilibrium. Then the Walrasian model is useful to the extent that
it captures the effects of changes in exogenous variables in a better way
than it describes each static equilibrium.
Comparative statics with taxation is more commonly called tax incidence in
the literature. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to look into the incidence of
taxation in general equilibrium. In the first part of the Chapter. it is
argued that firm. analytical conclusions about tax incidence are extremely
hard to come by in a general equilibrium model. unless one is willing to
make rather strong assumptions. The reason is simply that the model is
"too" general; it has very few a priori predictions about the direction of
change in equilibrium prices. Instead. comparative statics results depend
on the actual magnitudes of demand. supply and substitution elasticities.
factor intensities. initial endowments and so on. General equilibrium tax
incidence is therefore illustrated by three different numerical simulation
models in the second part of Chapter 4.
In the first simulation model. tax rates are exogenously given. and not
necessarily optimal. The most interesting result here is perhaps that a
Laffer curve is easily generated. showing that total tax revenues first
rise and then fall as the tax rate in one (factor) market is increased.
The second simulation model has the same parameters and structure in
utility and production functions as the first. but now taxation is
optimal. In the abscence of a Laffer curve the most interesting resul t
from this simulation is that producer prices remain constant when public
production increases. whereas relative. optimal tax rates change because
demand elastici ties do. It turns out. however. that the constancy of
producer prices is merely a numerical coincidence: The third simulation
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model has optimal taxation. but a slightly different utility function. and
there producers I factor prices change with the public production level.
This model thus shows that producer prices are not necessarily constant in
comparative statics. even if taxation is optimal.
Numerical examples only demonstrate what is possible and not what is
probable. To say something about the likely effects of optimal taxation.
we need a model with empirically plausible estimates of the parameters in
utilityand production functions. In Chapter 5. which is the final chapter
of the thesis. the model GEMPS (Qeneral ~quilibrium Model with a fublic
§ector) is presented. GEMPS is very far from describing the true condition
of the Norwegian economy. but it has the same parameters. exogenous
variables and production structure as a model that does. viz .• MISMOD (see
references in Chapter 5). So GEMPS may be seen as a large. comparative
statics "exercise" where the exogenous tax system of MISMOD (and Norway in
1984) is replaced by optimal taxation. If we believe that a Walrasian
general equi librium model is a good description of the economy. GEMPS
tells us what the Norwegian economy would have been in 1984 had taxation
been optimal. Focussing. more prudently. on the change from one system to
another. the most striking result is the effect on production efficiency:
marginal costs in GEMPS are about 50% of the marginal costs in MISMOD.
very much due to the lack of intermediate goods taxation.
To summarize. the line of thought throughout the thesis is the following:
The state can be defined as a distinct economic agent on the same level of
abstraction as the model consumer and producer. As a consequence of this
definition. the composition and level of public production and consumption
are regarded as exogenously given. and the analysis concentrates on how
publ ic expendi tures can be financed in an optimal way. This analys is
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should end up in an empirical model which takes the theoretical results
into account. since the ultimate scientific aim is to increase our insight
into the real economy.
Chapter 1.
December 1986.
Revised August 1987.
FOREWORD ON INDIVIDUALISM. LANGUAGE AND AGREEMENT
"Andre derimod er videnskabeligt anlagt. Deres evne
til at "tro" er svigtende. hvilket igen har affødt en
anden tendens. nemlig- trangen til at "vide". Sådanne
individer kan ikke suggereres til at finde hvi le i
andres opfattelser. i andres påstande. ligegyldigt af
hvor stort et flertal disse opfattelser og påstande i
forvejen så end er akcepterede Disse væsener
er således i realiteten med hensyn til tænkning frit
stillet og har til basis for deres opfattelse og
tænkning de mere eller mindre intellektuelle faciter.
som de i deres begær efter viden tilsidst søger.
Sådanne væsener kender vi under begrebet
"videnskabsmænd" eller forskere. Og deres resultater
udgør det. vi kalder ..videnskaben.....
Martinus
("Bisætteise")
FOREWORD ON INDIVIDUALISM. LANGUAGE AND AGREEMENT
As the first word in its title indicates. this essay is an introduction to
the models and analyses in the dissertation. As an approach to later
essays. I shall be concerned with some quasi-philosophical thoughts
regarding the research process in a social science such as economics.
One of the main ideas underlying my work is that a society can be viewed
as a collection of individuals. I shall call this idea individualism. An
assumption of individualism is made explici tly or implici tly in most of
the dissertation. It is also the point of departure for a characterization
of science itself considered as a social process. Thus. I start with a few
reflections on individualism and then speculate on how scientific theories
can be regarded as the result of individuals' agreement on scientific
concepts and rules.
Individualism
I assume that a social phenomenon can be modelled as a process generated
by individuals. This does not mean that there is nothing more in the world
than individuals. But social processes are nevertheless seen as an outcome
of individuals' choices. interaction and manipulation of physical things.
Individualism could no doubt be opposed in several ways. One possibility
is to assume that society is a kind of organism of its own. and that the
actions of every individual (if the word is meaningful) are completely
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determined by the social group to which he belongs. Another possibility is
the assumption that human behaviour is governed by conditions which are
exogenous to social processes. e.g. rules for moral correctness. I do not
deny that these assumptions are possible. nor that they could be used for
some theory. But I do not make them - I believe that individualism is a
better point of departure for a theory which sets out to describe or
explain social processes.
Individualism means that a social organization is conceived as an
aggregate of its constituent. individual members. It asserts that social
phenomena can be seen as caused by individual choices and actions. and in
this way focusses on the individual as an autonomous agent in the social
organization. A more fundamental assumption is therefore that every
individual is autonomous and has freedom of choice. defined here as the
ability to choose among the options available to him.
Freedom of choice does not mean that the individual is necessarily able to
define his options or that he is in fact physically or psychologically
free. The point is that the individual is always able to choose another
action than the one he actually chooses. and that in this sense he is
responsible for his choice. In other words. I assume that in a theory
about social phenomena the responsibility for an individual's actions and
thoughts may be placed with the individual himself. I reject the viewpoint
that since his behaviour may be influenced by a social organization. he is
not to be made responsible for his choices.
In a more philosophical or perhaps psychological perspective, the
assumptions which I call individualism and freedom of choice rest on the
identification of each individual with a self which is the basis of
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individual worth. Thus, each individual has a responsible self, capable of
choosing. It is recognized that the self is influenced by and probably
determined by the socialization of the individual. But this does not mean
that he is not responsible for his own actions, since the self may
criticize itself by inquiring into all those past experiences which
established it.
As a digression I wish to emphasize that these assertions are intended as
assumptions for a theory and not as a complete description of how people
ordinarily behave or think. First. it seems unreasonable to require
children to be personally responsible for everything they do. In most of
their social roles. children do not conform very well with my concept of
an individual. Second, rather few adults seem to be willing to take the
full responsibility for all their actions. Much energy is instead devoted
to blaming others or the circumstances. Third, it is an important research
project in psychology to find out how the self is established and how it
is influenced by social interaction.
I regard social science in general and economics in particular as social
phenomena, and apply the ideas of individualism, freedom of choice and
individual worth to characterize them as social processes generated by
scientists. (The proliferation of science among non-scientists is
ignored.) The most important part of such a characterization is the
concept of a scientific language as a subset of language in general.
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Language
Although no precise definition will be attempted here. language may be
seen rather triviallyas a collection of concepts conveying information.
together wi th a set of rules for how the concepts may be used in a
meaningful way. In addition. however. language is a social phenomenon and
thus results from individuals' actions and interaction. There are two
important aspects of language in this context. First. I believe that every
individual has his own version of the language and that each individual
version is unique. Second. I believe that concepts cannot reside elsewhere
than in individual minds. Therefore. a new concept cannot be discovered.
it must be invented by someone. Logical implications can be discovered.
but not the names of the results. Although one discovers by mathematical
methods that there "should be something there" in quantum mechanics. one
cannot possibly discover that this something has the name "quark".1)
One reason why individual versions of language are unique. is that the
individual is unique: the meaning of each concept he knows depends on the
whole set of thoughts and connotations it invokes in his mind. and this
set in turn is determined by his particular historyand experiences. It
would perhaps be possible to define concepts objectively if there existed
a type of defini tion which did not use concepts that had to be defined
themselves. I do not believe that such definitions exist. and I doubt that
they can be found. Metaphorically speaking. language is a self-supporting
chassis.
l)There may be a distinction between a concept and its name. but it will
not be discussed here.
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The individual uniqueness of language should not be exaggerated. For a
surprising lot of words, the degree of commonness in meaning is apparently
very high across the members of the society in question, and seems to
depend - among other things - on the concept's level of abstraction. To
illustrate, most of us know very precisely what a table is, because we can
see and touch it in order to test whether the thing we have in front of us
is what we were once taught to call a table. It is more difficult to be
sure that we have a correct interpretation of abstract concepts like
nothingness and infinity. The physical symbol 00 does not demonstrate the
properties of infinity in the same way as a table displays the features of
a table. So the individual aspect of language is probably less important
in everyday life than in science, since science requires greater precision
and scientific concepts are often more abstract.
Agreement
I believe that a major force of social coherence is agreement. Indeed,
with an individualistic view of the world one hardly avoids seeing some
kind of agreement on language, social conduct etc. as a prerequisite for
the very existence of a society. In this context, agreement is a relation
between two individuals A and B such that if A communicates some concept
to B, and B acts in a way which A perceives as consistent with his own
understanding of the concept, then they agree as far as A is concerned. If
the same applies to B, then they agree. Agreement (thus "defined") does
not guarantee that A and B really act according to the ~ concept. They
only behave consistently from each other's point of view.
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Agreement is important because it is closely related to the extent to
which theories are accepted as fruitful, interesting, explanatory or good.
I do not believe that much else tban this can be said in general about how
science evolves. The next section is confined to a few subjective remarks.
Some remarks on social science
In my opinion there is no great difference between a scientific and an
ordinary manner of thinking. The difference is mainly the willingness in
science to comply systematically with the rules of logic. Superficially,
scientific knowledge may be regarded as a set of scientific concepts and a
set of scientific rules for how the concepts should be used. (The rules
must include logic.) In this respect scientific knowledge is a subset of
language - a scientifically structured subset, so to speak. But then
scientific knowledge also has an individual aspect. In particular, there
2)is no absolute objectivity, and no assertion is necessarily true. Truth
is just what follows from logical manipulation and analysis, and even this
is not quite without qualifications, since there has to be agreement on
the use of logic.
Given the use of logic in scientific reasoning, there is not much interest
in objections to the implications of a set of assumptions. Assumptions, on
the other band, are very interesting. Somewhat drastically one could even
identify a theory with the explicit and implicit assumptions on which it
rests, because deductions cannot be disputed as long as one agrees to the
use of logic. Then it is intriguing to observe that the judgement of a set
2)1 do not discuss whether science is objective or not here, but allude to
the distinction between assumptions and their implications.
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of assumptions is not based on criteria within the theory itself; the
criteria must lie on the outside. Although there are such criteria in the
phi losophy of science.3) I think that in practice the evaluation of
theories is markedly individual. and in the last resort. it must be.
I assume that this does not matter to any individual who decides what to
think about some theory. To be more specific. I find it meaningless to
doubt one's own thinking; provided that it is logical. To deny the
validity of one's own thoughts seems to defy the existence of one's
self.4) What I do doubt. on the other hand. is that two individuals'
thoughts are the same. We can be less certain of social or aggregate
phenomena than we can be of individual observations. Therefore. when it
comes to judgement. the opinion of each individual is as valid as the
opinion of any or all other individuals. because all individuals are of
equal worth.
It would be mistaken to conclude that there is no point in discussing
assumptions. Quite to the contrary. I consider it an important task to
justify and criticize assumptions in order to find more general or
fundamental axioms from which they can be deduced.5) But I believe that de
facto and at a given point of time the main indicator of better and poorer
theories is the greater or lesser agreement among scientists as to the
usefulness of their assumptions.
3)An example is the falsifiability criterion by Popper (193411980). which
roughly says that it should be logically possible to determine whether the
predictions of a theory are false.
4)This idea partly resembles the notion of being advocated by Descartes
(1637/1966. p. 60): "Je pense. done je suis."
5)This does not mean that logical analysis of the implications of a set of
assumptions is a task of minor importance.
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Popper's falsifiability criterion, which was briefly mentioned in footnote
3), is rather obvious. If it is not fulfilIed, then it is impossible to
know whether a theory or its predictions are false and the theory may be
just a tautology with no substance. Falsification can be regarded as an
alternative to verification, which may be interpreted as a confirmation
that the predictions of a theory are true. Of course we have to define
"confirmation" precisely in such an interpretation, but in most cases
verification will be hampered by the well-known problem of induction. In
short, the induction problem is that one cannot infer from a finite set of
observations to a possibly infinite universe. Induction is illegitimate in
a truly infinite universe, whereas if the universe is finite, induction
produces hypotheses for further testing. To illustrate, let us suppose
that 99 black ravens have been observed, whereupon the assertion is made
that all ravens are black. If we know that there are 100 ravens, we then
have to test the assertion by finding the last one. If the number of
ravens is infinite (or possibly so), the assertion cannot even be tested
for a firm conclusion.
The problem of induction seems to be widely ignored among economists.
Inferences from a finite (and in some cases small) set of observations are
often presented as indisputable facts called empirical "evidence", and
much would be gained by a more critical attitude towards econometric
results. On the other hand, I believe that social science would have a
dismal future if we were to avoid induction altogether in every scientific
activity. Inductions are made all the time by scientists who observe some
phenomenon in a limited social group and infer from this group to society
as a whole, and induction is therefore a major source of perspectives and
hypotheses for the development of new theories. Induction generates ideas.
This is an important reason why language and concepts matter: induction
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often boils down to inventing a name (a concept) for a social phenomenon
and bringing it to scientific attention in a new and original way. Whether
or not the new concept wi 11 be regarded as fruitful and interesting
depends on its appeal to the imagination of individual scientists.
A final word on the analysis in the thesis
In the above perspective. chapter 2 and to some extent chapter 3 of the
thesis are discussions of assumptions underlying certain economic models.
Chapter 2 presents a few. common formulations of the public sector in
economics and tries to provide a rationale for modelling the state as an
autonomous economic agent in general equilibrium models. Chapter 3 is
concerned with the interpretation of the traditional formulae for optimal
taxation in public economics. Hopefully. these chapters shed some light on
some of the numerous difficult questions arising when one tries to
understand the complex relationship between authoritative. collective
action and decentralized. individual choice.
What is left to the reader. is to agree or disagree.
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TOWARæ A WALRASIAN MODEL OF THE STATE
"La Nation ne fai t pas corps en France: elle reside
ent ter-e dans la personne du roi. L 'Etat, c' est moi."
Louis XIV
TOWARDS A WALRASIAN MODEL OF THE STATE
PART 1: OVERVIEW
Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to introduce a fundamental concept of the
state. The discussion is neither very detailed nor a thorough survey of
the literature, but concentrates on the general framework for analysis of
public economic activity. Hopefully, the essay still serves to point out
some of the many interesting problems in the theory of public action. A
few of these problems will be taken up in other parts of the dissertation.
In the first part four strands of economic literature wi11 be sketched
with the emphasis on their implicit view of the state: the theory of the
social welfare function, the theory of public choice, game theory and the
theory of clubs, and optimum taxation theory. No attempt is made at a
thorough review of the literature. The point is rather to provide a
background for a theory of authority, and part 1 should not be read as a
critique of existing models.
One of the conclusions in the essay is that economists are not obliged to
take the economic state's existence as given, and that relatively little
can be said in general about what productive activitites the state should
undertake. The state is seen as the execution of authority, which is a
social construct. In this respect the state can be compared with the
microeconomic firm, which is a way to organize the transformation of
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resources into consumption goods. Analogously the state is a way to
organize the solving of certain economic problems that cannot or would not
be solved equally well by private agents. The theory of authority may be
broken down into three parts: an outline of the kind of problems the state
can solve; recommendations of how these problems should be handled; and a
description of institutions needed to handle them.
Part 1 of this chapter contains a discussion of the defini tion of the
state where the fields of economic Iiterature mentioned above represent
four important aspects of public behaviour. The second part is an attempt
at synthesis of these and other characteristics of the state, and leads to
a formal (but fairly abstract) definition of the state as the application
of a set of legal rights and duties which regulate the enforcement of
social and economic measures. Part 2 also presents some thoughts on how
the set of rights and duties may be established as well as an analysis of
some of the reasons why public economic activity may be warranted.
The state as a social welfare function
The rationale of a social welfare function was given by Bergson (1938) and
Samuelson (1947). Bergson's main argument is that the fundamental economic
problem of how to allocate scarce resources to al ternative ends can be
solved by maximization of a social welfare function. Bergson defines an
optimal allocation as an economic situation where the total differential
of a properly formulated welfare function is zero, whereupon he deduces
the standard marginal conditions for efficient production and consumption.
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The first basic welfare theorem says that these efficiency conditions are
fulfilled in a perfectly competitive economy (Debreu. 1959. ch. 6). so it
seems that the government needs no social welfare function if only
competition is perfect. But one of the main implications of Samuelson's
analysis (1947. eh. VIII) is. that this is not so. There may be several
Pareto efficient allocations in an economy. corresponding to the different
sets of general equiIibrium prices at which trade and production take
place. Therefore. a social welfare function is needed to pick one of the
allocations in a set of Pareto optima.
Mathematically. a Bergson-Samuelson individualistic social welfare
function may be written as W = W(U1(X1) •..•• uI(xI)J. where ul. i = 1,
I are the utili ty levels of I individuals given the consumption
bundles xl. If W is defined so as to be increasing in all its arguments.
then maximization of W will obviously lead to a Pareto optimal situation
where it is impossible to increase ul by reallocation of resources without
decreasing uJ• for all i and some j. It may be worth noting that the
converse does not generally hold: Even if the allocation xl. i = 1.
I. is Pareto optimal. W is not necessarily maximal. (If it necessarily
were. then this would mean that the social welfare function left society
indifferent to all Pareto optima.)
The social welfare function is primarily needed for the selection of one
Pareto optimum from a set of efficient allocations. since this set itself
can be established by enumeration of all perfectly competitive equilibria.
These Pareto optima differ in the interpersonal distribution of utility
levels. and the maximization of W therefore inevitably involves some kind
of interpersonal comparison. (Samuelson (1947. p. 244) : "...without
assumptions concerning interpersonal comparisons of utility. it is
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impossible to decide which of these [Pareto optimal] points is best.") A
rather obvious way to make such interpersonal comparisons is to assume
that all utility functions ul(.) are cardinally measurable and comparable.
Although analytically helpful. this does not seem to be a very good
solution in practice. since cardinal utility functions are as yet rather
difficult to observe. Only an approximate measure of ordinal utility can
be obtained through observation of individual demand and a test of whether
the individual conforms with the generalized axiom of revealed preference
(Varian. 1984. pp. 141-143). Every cardinal representation of approximate
utili ty measures would imply an implicit interpersonal comparison when
used in a social welfare function. In the absence of observed cardinal
utility functions the comparison could never become explicit. and this
fact could perhaps be critized on philosophical grounds.
A social welfare function can be interpreted as a theory of the state
because it points out that there may exist economic problems which are not
automatically solved by individual. decentralized actions. In a perfectly
competitive economy it is not enough that each consumer's utility is
maximized; we must also determine the interpersonal distribution of
utility levels. But viewed as a description of the state's behaviour a
social welfare function sti11 has its shortcomings in that it leaves
several interesting questions unanswered: Are there important public
economic activities in the real world that cannot be described by a social
welfare function and the implications of maximizing it? What are the
political objectives for which a social welfare function is an adequate
expression? What are the inherent costs of the procedure of selecting a
preferred Pareto optimum? And most important of all: How is W itself
determined? Some of these questions have found their answer in the
literature on public choice.
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The state as a public choice
According to Mueller (1979, p. 1), "Public choice can be defined as the
economic study of nonmarket decisionmaking, or simply the application of
economics to political science. The subject matter of public choice is the
same as that of political science: the theory of the state, voting rules,
voter behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The
methodology of public choice is that of economics, however. The basic
behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an
egoistic, rational utility maximizer." Mueller thus regards public choice
and economics as two separate scientific activities with certain
methodical elements in common. As an example of this relationship between
public choice and economics a brief presentation of the median voter model
may be illustrative.
The median voter model is based on an idea from Hotelling (1929) and
describes the electoral support of two poli tical parties in a
representative democracy. It is assumed that all individuals vote for one
of the parties, and the problem is to predict the winner of the election.
A party's winning chances obviously depend on its politics. Let us assume
that the issue at stake, the political action a, can take on any real
value from O to I, i.e. a € [0,1]. Suppose further that the electorate's
attitudes towards a are continuously distributed according to some
symmetric density function like the one, e.g., in Figure 2.1, and that a
voter's satisfaction with an alternative a is u(la* - al), where u is an
increasing, real-valued function and a* is the preferred alternative. A
partyoffering ai would receive the votes from individuals favouring any
policy in the interval [O, ~(ai + a2)]: the rest of the votes would go to
the party offering a2. The latter would win the election since a2 lies
Density
o 1
Figure 2.1. A distribution of political attitudes.
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closer to the median policy than al does. With repeated elections the long
run winner will be precisely the partyoffering the median policy.
Therefore, all we need to finally determine the mode I's outcome is an
assumption that any political party aims at maximizing its electoral
support.
It seems somewhat farfetched to classify a theary as "economic" as soon as
it contains some agents with maximizing behaviour, so if the median voter
model deals with economics, it must be because the policy action can be
interpreted as an economic variable. For instance. it could be defined as
the general degree of taxation in the economy, and the median voter model
could then be used to predict the likely future level of taxes. Although
the real political world is often more complicated than the median voter
model (see Mueller. 1979), the model still represents a theory of the
state: The state is identified with that political party which offers the
policy favoured by the median voter, and the state's behaviour is the
median pol icy. In economic terms the level of taxes is such that the
median voter' s utili ty is maximized. given a certain democratic
constitution.
The median voter model is a theory of the consistency between preferences
and governmental action rather than an explanation of the existence of the
state itself. The political parties are taken as given, and the model does
not tell us why there is a state in the first place. An interesting step
towards remedy of this weakness has been taken by Brennan and Buchanan
(1977).
In the Brennan-Buchanan model the political issue towards which the median
voter must determine his attitudes is the tax consti tut ion or the laws
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that regulate the levy of taxes. This is an issue because of the state's
behaviour: "The characteristic assumption of our Leviathan-type model is
that. in each post-consti tutional budgetary period. the government wi 11
attempt to maximize total revenue collections (and hence total spending).
within the consti tutiona 11y-appo inted regime." (p. 260). In addi tion to
this behavioural assumption Brennan and Buchanan make the supposition that
the government's purpose - from the voters' point of view - is to provide
public goods. but at the same time individuals' and the state's interests
are in conflict over the level of taxation. Brennan and Buchanan.
apparent ly on the individuals' side. consequently deduce the advice that
individuals vote for tax consti tutions that put bounds on the state' s
abi li ty to tax.
Brennan and Buchanan do not elaborate on their assumptions about the
state, but it is possible within the framework of their model to imagine
the state as a set of consumers who receive their income from public tax
revenues. It is not clear whether these consumers are also voters. Another
question is why the voters accept the state at all; it is not self-evident
that a state is the best social device for producing publ ic goods.
Finally, the assumption that tax revenues are maximized may be criticized
for being too simple. It may be true in some countries, but undoubtedly
there are other objectives politicians could pursue. A slightly different
approach is to assume that the state undertakes productive activities with
increasing returns to scale.
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The state as a producing coalition or club
It is well known that for a perfectly competitive equilibrium to exist.
the aggregate production set should be convex (Debreu. 1959. section 5.7);
there should be constant or decreasing returns to scale in production. If.
on the other hand, there are relatively large producers with increasing
returns. the production set may be non-convex. and the equilibrium may be
upset. Boiteux (1956), Baumol and Bradford (1970) and others before them
have argued that this situation calls for public action.
Game theory is well suited for analysis of firms with increasing returns
to scale (Littlechild, 1970; Faulhaber, 1975; and Sharkey. 1982). In such
analyses a theory of the state may be said to emerge from an application
of the theory of multi-player cooperative games.
Suppose that the consumers in the economy unanimously agree that any
production activity should be efficient. given a set of factor prices.
This means that total production costs are to be minimized at every level
of demand. Consider a firm producing one good. let y be the production
level and c(y) the minimum production cost (given factor prices). The cost
game of the firm is a cooperative game where each unit of the product is
defined as a player whose objective is to avoid having cost shares
allocated to him.1) If there are increasing returns to scale a decrease in
production will induce a less than proportionate decrease in costs. and
the cost function will be subhomogeneous:
l)The introduction of a cost game is an analytical trick with the
effect as assuming that the consumers themselves are players.
demanding one unit of the good. A consumer demanding more than one
must be modelled as a coalition in the cooperative game.
same
each
unit
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c(oy) ~ oc(y), O < o < 1.
Let yJ be the production of firm j, y total demand (at some prevailing
price), and define oj > O such that oJy = yJ and ~joj = 1. Then
c(oJy) ~ oJc(y) Vj
=>
~J c(yJ) ~ ~J oJc(y) = c(y).
Thus, when the cost function is subhomogeneous, total production costs are
lower when one large firm produces alone than when there are several
smaller firms. The cost function supports a natural monopoly. Identifying
each unit of the good with a consumer, the basic assumption now is that a
coalition of consumers is needed to set up the production of y. These
consumers try to minimize the total amount of pooled resources which are
transformed into y. The inequalities above then mean that any single
coalition member can obtain a better position (i.e. a lower imputed cost
share) in the grand coalition including all individuals than in any
subcoalition, since total costs can always be distributed according to the
o's. The first inequality implies that an individual will lose if he
breaks out of a coalition. The second inequality implies that all members
of a coalition will gain from an increase in the coalition's size. Thus,
increasing returns to scale imply that the only stable coalition is the
one with all consumers included.
The authors mentioned earlier; Littlechild, Faulhaber and Sharkey; do not
explici tly argue that their theories are theories of the state. The
question they try to answer is: What should the price of a publ icly
produced good be if no subset of consumers is to subsidize any other
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subset of consumers? The line of argument seems to be that if there is a
public firm with increasing returns to scale. then it can be described as
a coali tion of all consumers in the economy pooling their resources to
achieve an efficient production of their total demand. A theory of the
state emerges implicitly by the way the problem is posed; the state is the
coalition of all consumers.
In club theory the state has been defined explici tly as a club with all
consumers as members (Sandler and Tschirhart. 1980). The essential point
in club theory is that a club is formed to benefit from economies of scale
in production. and membership size is determined by the condition that
marginal crowding costs equal the marginal reduction in average production
costs. The theory of clubs roughly corresponds to the situation discussed
above if we interpret the cost function c(·) as production costs plus some
kind of crowding costs (which may be zero). The state may be defined as a
club where every citizen happens to be a member.
This theory of the state is of course open to cri ticism. Two rather
trivial objections are that the model does not tell us how coalitions are
formed. since the rationale of a coali tion is merely the outcome of
forming it; and that empirically. coali tions of consumers rarely supply
their own demand for a good in full. but only small parts of it. (The
latter point does not apply to Sharkey's article (1982). where the matter
of interest is precisely this problem.) A more serious weakness is that
the definition of the state as the coalition of all consumers is rather
arbitrary: If there were I = 1 000 000 individuals. and the technology was
such that the core coalition contained I - 1 members. would it not be
natural to call ita state despite the exclusion of one person? More
generally. how large must a coalition be before it is defined as a state?
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This is an important question. since any firm size (and. in an imperfect
market economy. any firm's size) may result from the game theoretic
analysis. The model does not explain the difference - if there is any -
between a public and a private firm.
A possible difference between a public and a private firm. both with
increasing returns to scale. is that the latter often sets monopolistic
prices. whereas the former. belonging to the public sector. may cover its
costs through taxation. This difference is analysed in the theory of
optimal taxation.
The state as public consumption and a set of tax rates
The state appears as an economic agent in almost any model in
macroeconomics and very often in public economics. In mos t cases itis
represented by a set of exogenous tax rates and an exogenous level of
public expenditures. To illustrate one such formulation of the state it is
instructive to sketch the very simplest model of taxation in a perfectly
competitive economy as presented by Sandmo (1976).
Assume that there are constant returns to scale so that producer j' s
profit-maximizing production plan yJ yields zero profit if producer prices
p are given: pyJ = O. all j. Let there be only one consumer. whose maximum
utility is v(q) if consumer prices are q. q is normalized by setting one
consumer price. e.g. qQ. equal to 1. The state's tax revenues in terms of
the numeraire are given by T = tXt where t is a vector of tax rates and x
is the consumer's net demand (i.e. consumption less endowments) at q. The
tax rates drive wedges between consumer and producer prices. q = p + t.
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Our problem is: If T is given exogenously, and lump-sum taxation is
infeasible, what is the optimal structure of consumer prices? It turns out
that the solution to this problem also yields formulae for optimal tax
rates:
maximize v(q) subject to tx = T and qo = 1,
q
yields first-order conditions which can be expressed as
(1) A - I-L= - Xn
Il
where A is the consumer's marginal utility of income and Jl is the shadow
price of the restriction tx = T. This formula wi11 be interpreted in
closer detail in Chapter 3. To characterize the optimum taxation economy,
however, it is useful to state Walras' law:
T = tx = (q - p)x = -px = p(y - x),
where the facts that qx = O and pyJ = O are used together with the
definition y == };JyJ. Walras' law says that if private supply equals
private demand in all markets, then public tax revenues are always zero,
no matter what the tax rates are. What the state collects in taxation, it
redistributes as subsidies. If the assumption of private general
equilibrium is made, the state has no other purpose than to distort
prices. This is simply inefficient, so the optimal state is no state.
Let us now assume that the state buys goods in private markets for public
consumption, g. so that the general equilibrium is x + g = y. This raises
a few questions which are not explici tly dealt with by Sandmo (1976).
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Which set of prices does the public sector face - do public firms pay
taxes to the public sector? How can g be determined so as to be consistent
wi th equilibrium? If tax revenues depend on the pattern and level of
public expenditure. how - if at all - does this affect the optimal tax
rates?
One simple way around these questions is to assume that the tax rate of
the numeraire is equal to zero and that net tax revenues are expended on
this good alone. The optimum taxation formula of course continues to hold
in the version written above. and we have a model of the state: The state
"is" the vector Et. TJ. where t is optimal and T is exogenous.
As in much of public choice theory. the state's existence is taken as
given in models of optimum taxation. The theory does not attempt to
explain or model the state as such. Instead. its main view seems to be
that if there is an empirical state that wants to confront allegedly
competitive consumers and producers with optimal taxes. then it may find
out about these taxes in the model's formulae (like (1». The theory does
not question the state's existence. but rather is a calculation of the
best set of general equilibrium prices given that a certain amount of real
resources is to be removed from the private sector.
The state as an autonomous economic agent
Two recurring questions in the previous paragraphs have been: What is the
justification of the state's existence. and what is the difference between
private and public institutions? The theory which comes closest to
answering these questions. seems to be the Brennan-Buchanan model of tax
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consti tutions for Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977). However, in
their model, the state seems to be something of an inescapable evil, and
the consumers must act so as to hamper its behaviour. This is a rather
pessimistic view of the world, and it is also implausible that no more
reasonable justification for the state should exist, in view of the
empirical observation that the public sector is the most important
economic agent in the greater part of the industrialized countries.
It is proposed here that the sole distinguishing feature of the state is
authori ty. Authori ty is the essential characteristic that separates the
state from a private economic agent (even though consumers can be said to
exercise authority over their initial endowments). Thus, a description of
the state must be a description of authority and the process of executing
actions which are made pOSSible by application of authority.
In an abstract sense. authority may be defined as a set of legal rights to
enforce social measures. In an economy, one of the most important legal
rights is the right to tax, but of course there are others, like direct
price regulation. the right to expropriate. confiscate inheritance. print
money. etc. The list may be made arbitrarily long. But considering the
right to tax, we realize that au thority very easily makes the state an
extremely powerful economic agent. Taxation - or application of the right
to tax - is to force others to pay for something they may not desire or
even get. Therefore. it is almost trivial to find behavioural assumptions
(e.g. maximization of tax revenues) which make the state an adversary of
consumers and producers.
Authority is analogous to technology. Just like the producer's application
of technology, formalized by a given production set. the state appl ies
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authority. formalized by a set of given legal rights and duties. Like the
producer. the state is impersonal and has to be run by consumers. It may
also be observed that the state does not have more or different
information about the economy than private agents have. nor does it
command a technology which is necessarily inaccessible to the private
sector.
A step towards explanation of the state's existence is to justify the
application of authority. Hence. the key to analysis of the state is to
look for economic problems that may be solved by applying authority. and.
preferably. better so than by decentralized private actions. Whether or
not authori tative action is warranted of course depends on the economic
problem considered. but nevertheless a few general remarks can be made:
It will be postulated that there is a preference for decentralized
decision-making in the economy. Then authority is not appropriate when
private agents can and do achieve optimal solutions to economic problems
by decentralized action. This is what happens when every possible
transaction which is beneficial to both sides of a dyadic relation is
carried out. so that there is no conflict of interests impeding the
decentralized solution; and when the costs of collective decision-making
are not prohibitive. As an example. consider a small park. a public good
to the people living in the neighbourhood. Decision costs could hardly
prevent these few consumers from coming together. agreeing to hire an
economist to reveal true preferences for the park and then build it if the
project turned out to be profitable. In other words it is not a principle
or necessity that public goods should always be provided by the state (as
the theory of clubs clearly demonstrates).
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However. when the interests of two or more private agents are in direct
conflict and the agents are unable to solve this conflict on their own.
authori ty may have a task to fulfil. It is precisely when universally
beneficial decisions are not possible that authority is needed. Indeed.
this is the rationale of the concept of authority. for. if no economic
decision could be made to the detriment of anyone. then it is hard to
imagine what the significance of authority would be.
Authority may also be warranted when collective action is prohibi ted by
high decision or transaction costs. For instance. the customers of a
monopolist may be too numerous to meet and compensate the producer for the
profit he loses if the product price instead of marginal revenue is set
equal to marginal cost. More precisely. even if there is a positive
difference between the efficiency loss under monopoly and monopoly
profits. the costs of coordinating consumers' actions towards the
monopolist may exceed this difference. Authority may then be applied to
the effect that price equals marginal cost by regulation.
It is also interesting to ask how the authority set (the set of legal
rights and duties of the state) is or can be established. If a legislative
source is defined very broadly as all legal rights and duties a state
could possibly have. then the authority set in a particular economy can be
defined as a subset of the legislative source. In a representative
democracy this subset is the outcome of some process of aggregation of
individual preferences. a process which will in general be extremely
complicated. For instance. if each individual's preferences are
represented by a utility function u1(.) with consumption bundles as
arguments. then such a process ideally determines an authority set which
will guarantee that individual consumption levels are socially optimal. In
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some cases it is impossible to construct a social decision process that
will yield such a result (Arrow, 1963). This problem will be further
discussed in part 2.
Examples
The literature of course contains many examples of how authority mayor
should be applied to solve economic problems. Three such examples will be
presented here.
1. Optimum taxation.
Maximization of economic welfare in a perfectly competitive economy
usually involves a choice of one Pareto efficient allocation among several
Pareto optima which differ in the interpersonal distribution of uti li ty
levels. Although elementary theories of social welfare functions are not
always explicit on the point, this choice is often imagined as being made
by lump-sum taxation of consumers' incomes. A social welfare function thus
offers a place for authority: authority institutes lump-sum taxation. More
precisely, the authority set has as one of its elements the legal right to
tax, which is applied to the private economy in order to maximize economic
welfare.
Optimum taxation theory may be interpreted as a second best version of
this kind of au thoritative action. It is second best because lump-sum
taxation is assumed to be inf~sible and the al ternative - commodi ty
taxation - entails an efficiency loss in the private sector. Optimum
taxation theory has more to sayabout the way authority should be applied.
however, by presenting formulae for welfare-maximizing tax rates. In
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addition the theory goes some steps towards an explanation of the
existence of the state, since we must believe that there is a good reason
for the tax revenue requirement (T). The state is "explained" by the
purpose of taxation, and the authority set contains the right to tax and
the duty to tax optimally.
2. Natural monopoly.
It was shown in the discussion of firms with increasing returns to scale
that if the production is set up by a coalition of consumers, the only
stable coalition is the one including all individuals. In technical terms
this is because economies of scale imply a non-empty core in the cost game
where consumers coalesce to minimize the total cost of supplying their
demand for a good. When costs are subhomogeneous, application of authority
consequently cannot outdo what the consumers achieve on their own
(assuming that decision costs are zero).
There is, however, an important difference between subhomogeneity and
subadditivity of the cost function. Subhomogeneity is defined as
decreasing average costs: c(oy) ~ oc(y) for all o € ]0,1[. Subadditivity
is a weaker property: ~Jc(yJ) ~ c(~JyJ), saying that total costs do not
fall when a given production is split up among several producers. With
subhomogeneity a non-empty core always exists; with subadditivity this is
not necessarily so. As long as the cost function is subadditive, total
production costs are minimized in the grand coalition. But the gains from
forming this coalition may still not be sufficiently large that some
smaller coalition could not do better by going it alone, so a grand core
may not exist. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.2, which is taken
from Baumol (1977). The total cost of producing y (at given factor prices)
is c(y), and marginal costs are infinite at y'. It is easy to see that
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Figure 2.2. A subadditive cost function for production level y.
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average costs are lower at y' than at y; that is. a subcoalition producing
y' would achieve a lower imputed unit cost than the grand coalition which
produces y. Assuming for simplicity that each consumer demands one unit of
the good. we realize that the grand coalition will tend to break down. If
this happens. and there are two coalitions; one producing y' with costs
c(y') and the other producing y-y' with costs c(y - y') = c(y'); the
total cost of providing y will not be minimized since c(y') + c(y - y') =
2c(y') > c(y). Both y and (y'. y - y') are Pareto optimal production
schemes. since at both points it is possible to improve the situation of
some consumers only at the expense of others.
Au thority may be applied here to choose one Pareto optimum. just like
maximization of a social welfare function would do. If it is a general
social value that production should require a minimum of resources. then
authority may be needed to establish and sustain a grand coalition which
produces y. The authority set A contains the right to control the
production of y and the duty to minimize total production costs.
In concluding it is worth noting that natural monopoly is defined as a
firm which can produce the total market demand with a subaddi tive cost
function (Baumol. 1977). In view of the discussion above this definition
implies a choice of Pareto optimum in those cases where the subadditivity
is not "strong enough" for a grand core to exist. If no core exists. the
competitive conditions of a natural monopoly may be rather complicated. as
is evidenced by Panzar and Willig (1977). In particular. no sustainable
product prices may exist if the firm must recover its costs. The argument
raised in this paragraph is that authoritative action may be warranted in
such cases.
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3. External effects.
The role of authority in dealing with external effects is described in the
classical article by Coase (1960). Coase makes two main points. First, he
observes that the identification of those liable for the economic
consequences of external effects is not always an indisputable matter.
When a firm pollutes the air, it is not obvious that it should pay for
this; it may be instead that neighbours who are harmed should buy units of
clean air from the firm. The conflict of interests arises because nobody
owns the air, and the external effects can therefore be interpreted as the
result of lack of markets. Coase's second point is that one reason why a
market is missing is that transactions costs are prohibitive: "In order to
carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up
the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the
terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are
often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many
transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing
system worked without cost." (Coase, 1960, p. 15). In response,
alternative structures are formed: "It is clear that an alternative form
of economic organisation which could achieve the same result at less cost
than would be incurred by using the market would enable the value of
production to be raised. As I explained many years ago, [Coase (1937)J the
firm represents such an alternative to organising production through
market transactions." (Coase, 1960, p. 16). In today's terms, this would
perhaps correspond to the method of internalizing external effects.
However, it is not the only possibili ty: "An alternative solution is
direct Government regulation .... Such authoritarian methods save a lot of
trouble (for those doing the organising). Furthermore, the government has
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at its disposal the police and the other law enforcement agencies to make
sure that its regulations are carried out. It is clear that the government
has powers which might enable it to get some things done at a lower cost
than could a private organisation (or at any rate one wi thout special
governmental powers)." (p. 16 - 17).
PART 2: A THEORY OF THE STATE
Part 2 of this essay is intended as a synthesis of part 1 and restates in
a more precise and detailed manner the arguments raised there. The aim is
to construct a theory of the state which can be used as a description of
some aspects of real-world governments. The perspective will be to
formulate the theory so as to provide a framework for analysis of whether
the state or the private sector ought to take care of certain economic
activi ties.
The distinguishing characteristic of the state
We seek a definition of the state that will work in general equilibrium
models. where the state is viewed as an autonomous economic agent like the
consumer and the producer. If the state is not simply a consumer or a
producer. it must be because the state has some characteristic which
distinguishes it from private agents. As observed in part 1. this
distinguishing characteristic of the state is authority. and. moreover.
nothing but authority. To define the state we therefore need a definition
of authority. It will be useful to separate between the legal basis or
source of authority and the authoritative regulations to which an economy
is subjected. since we shall then be able to take account of legal rights
and duties which could be but are not in use.
Let the legislation set L be a set containing all known rights and duties
that might conceivably be part of a legal basis for authority at a certain
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point of time. Some rights which belong to L are: to form dictatorship
(enlightened or not), to be king or queen, to rule by democratic
representation, to tax, to expropriate real goods from consumers and
producers, and to regulate prices and production. Some duties in L are: to
maximize collective or individual welfare, to maximize the welfare of the
least favoured individual, to use resources and endowments efficiently, to
avoid environmental damage, to secure absolute and relative justice, and
to guard the liberty of individuals and groups. The legislation set is
analogous to technology, and the distinction between L and authority is of
the same kind as that between technology and the production technique used
in a particular firm.
An authority set A can now be defined as a subset of the legislative
source L. Among all conceivable legal rights and duties, those which are
in fact applied in a given economy constitute the authority set, and will
be called rules. This leads to a formal definition of the state:
The state is the application of authority, a set of
legal rules which regulate the enforcement of social
and economic measures.
It should be emphasized that this concept of a state is quite analogous to
the microeconomic model of a producer. The parallel between the state's
authority set and the private production set has been indicated both here
and in part 1. The analogy also extends to the definition of the state,
which points out that the significance of authority lies in its
application to the economy. It is only physically that the state consists
of consumers who maximize their individual utility. The state is
authori tative action, regulated by the authority set and executed by
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consumers; just as the firm is productive action. regulated by the
production set and executed by consumers.
Formation of an authority set
An important question is how the authority set is established in a given
economy. One possibility. which. in spite of its frequent empirical
occurrence. will not be discussed here. is to seize power by violent
means. Another possibility is that the formation of an authority set is
due to a peaceful collective decision process. Unfortunately. Arrow's
possibility theorem (Arrow. 1963) implies that in general. there is no
acceptable social decision process which yields a rational social ordering
of given alternatives. depending on what the individualorderings of these
alternatives are. Arrow describes a social decision process by the
following 7 assumptions:
(1) The social ordering is defined over a given choice set of
mutually exclusive alternatives.
(2) All elements in the choice set are ordered.
(3) The social ordering is transitive.
(4) If individualorderings change. and the change is only that a
certain alternative a rises in every individualordering; then
the new social ordering ranks a before all those alternatives to
which a was preferred in the original social ordering.
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(5) If individualorderings change. and the change is such that every
individual preserves his ordering of those alternatives which are
relevant to the social choice. then the social choice is the
same.
(6) There is no pair of alternatives the social ordering of which is
independent of all individualorderings of those alternatives.
(7) There is no individual whose ordering of all alternatives is the
social ordering irrespective of other individuals' orderings.
Assumptions (2) and (3) define rationality in Arrow's model. assumption
(4) is called positive association of social and individual values. (5)
independence of irrelevant alternatives. (6) citizens' sovereignty. and
(7) non-dictatorship. Arrow's possibility theorem states that if we are to
construct a social decision process in keeping with (1) - (7). we must
have some information about individual preferences. In other words. (1) -
(7) are inconsistent with the following assumption of unrestricted domain:
Any individual ordering of the alternatives is
admissible in the social decision process.
There is no restriction on what individuals are allowed to think about the
alternatives. Unless we postulate something about the structure of
individual preferences. there is then no way to reach social decisions in
accordance with requirements (1) - (7). Arrow also argues (1963. p. 61)
that it is not enough to assume that each individual's preferences are
defined over his consumption set and exhibit local non-satiation. More
severe restrictions are needed.
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The relationship between Arrow's possibili ty theorem and a Bergson -
Samuelson individualistic social welfare function has been the subject of
much discussion and some confusion. An attempt at clarification is made in
Appendix 1; suffice it here to say that Arrow's theorem does not imply
that no Bergson-Samuelson Indivfdua.lt stIc social welfare function can
exist.
The assumption of unrestricted domain-is attractive because it permits the
design of a social decision process to be independent of specific sets of
individual orderings. Thus, we should look for other ways around Arrow's
possibility theorem. For instance, restrictions on the set of alternatives
may prove useful in certain cases. Arrow shows (1963, p. 48) that when
there are only two alternatives, the majority-of-voters rule is a social
decision process consistent with (1) - (7). This is interesting to the
extent that the decision process may be formulated as a sequence of
either-or choices where the voting individuals do not have preferences
over authority sets and there are no more than two mutually exclusive
alternatives involved in each choice. Roberts (1980) has noted that
information about individuals' cardinal utility functions can be used to
avoid Arrow's theorem, which presupposes that individual preference
orderings cannot be compared. Other assumptions, such as independence of
irrelevant alternatives or transitivity of the social ordering, have also
been criticized.
Social decisions with restricted rationality
The core of Arrow's possibility theorem is that when individuals'
preferences are sufficiently disparate, there is no way to aggregate them
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into a well-behaved social preordering. This indicates that we should
investigate the relationship between individuals' preferences and the set
of choice alternatives over which they are defined. One approach to such
an analysis is to bring together Rawls' concept of original position
(Rawls, 1911) and Elster's concept of commitment (Elster, 1919).
Rawls argues that individuals are in a socalled original position behind a
veil of ignorance when they discuss and determine the basic structure of
their society. Behind the veil, individuals do not know what their
position in the economy will be after determination of the basic
structure; nor do they know the likelihood of entering a particular
position. Therefore, their strategy (in Rawls' theory) is to maximize
their welfare, given that the worst positional result obtains. The main
social objective becomes that of maximizing the welfare of the least
favoured individual in the economy (I.e. in front of the veil), since
anyone behind the veil may become that individual. This objective hinges
on the notion of a veil of ignorance, and we must ask why the veil is
there in the first place. Rawls emphasizes that the original position is
imaginative: "It is clear, then, that the original position is a purely
hypothetical situation. Nothing resembling it need ever take place,
although we can by deliberately following the constraints it expresses
simulate the reflections of the parties." (Rawls, 1911, p. 120). A
possible interpretation of this seems to be that individuals deliberately
place themselves behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance.
To place oneself in the original position behind a veil of ignorance is
the same as a redefinition of the choice set. In front of the veil, the
choice set contains allocations in the real economy. Behind the veil, the
choice set contains different constitutions, e.g. different social welfare
- 51 -
functions. By accepting the notion of an original posi tion. individuals
select basic rules for the allocation process instead of choosing economic
allocations. Thereby restrictions on the range of the economic resul t
pertaining to any individual are induced. although their significance will
only be known in front of the veil. Byentering the original position. the
individual binds himself to a choice among those allocations that are
compatible with the basic rules.
Elster (1979) argues that it may be individually rational to bind oneself:
Ulysses. wanting to hear the Sirens and knowing the perilous effects of
their song. had his men bind him to the mast of his ship. In this way. he
took steps ex ante to overcome temporary irrationality and secure overall
rationality. Elster defines this kind of commitment by five criteria:
To bind oneself is to carry out a certain decision in order to
increase the probability that one will carry out another decision
at a later time;
if the first decision changes the set of options available at the
later time. then this does not count as binding oneself if the
new feasible set contains the old one;
the effect of the first decision must be to set up some causal
process in the external world. since the incentives to carry out
the second decision must be enhanced;
the resistance against the first decision must be smaller than
the resistance that would have opposed the second decision had
not the first decision intervened; and
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binding oneself is an act of commission. not of omission.
In his discussion of commitment. Elster questions the meaning of
individual rationality. Ulysses not only orders his men to bind him. he
also orders them to ignore his orders to be released when he hears the
Sirens. The first Ulysses claims priorityover the second. who will
undoubtedly claim priority over the first. and it seems that Ulysses has
more than one self. (In fact. Elster argues that for practical purposes. 3
is a reasonable number of selves.) This philosophical complication is not
important here. however. and it will be assumed that the members of an
economy may pretend to be in the original position when they determine the
authori ty set. Their attitude is rational by defini tIon , so to speak.
because the alternative - being unable to establish any authority set and
consequently having no constitution - is worse.
A formal theory of authority
This section presents an abstract model of the formation of the legal
rules establishing the state's authority and describes the basic structure
of the authority set introduced above. The authority set is a subset of
all possible constitutional rules and is chosen by an assembly of
individuals who participate in a voting process. The rules chosen
influence the public production possibilities as well as the selection of
goods to be produced by the state.
Let L be the finite and non-empty set of all known legal rights and duties
which can belong to a legal basis for public authority at a certain point
of time. Ls is the collection of all subsets of the legislation set L. The
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electorate is also a finite and non-empty set, denoted by E; and contains
the individuals who are to choose a number of rules (which constitute one
of the elements in Ls). Each individual i E E has a reflexive and
transitive preference relation :S1 defined on Ls. P is a profi Ie of all
individuals' preference relations: P = {:Sl}, V i E E. Let Es be the
collection of all subsets of E, and define a set D C Es such that ø f D.
Then the pair (E,D) is a voting game whenever D is the set of winning
coalitions (Nakamura, 1979). Voting under majority rule is an example of a
voting game, where a coalition S is a winning coalition if and only if
lSI ) IEI/2. The social choice is made according to the following concept
of domination (Le Breton and Salles, 1986, Definition 5):
If there exists a coalition SED such that for a E Ls'
(i) a <1 at for all i E S and a E Ls' in which case we
(ii) a :Sl a' for all i E S and all a' E Ls for which
there is a finite sequence {ait} in t., such that
then at dominates a, and we write a < at.
The relation <0 may be called zero-order domination.
definition of domination contains two requirements:
Intuitively, the
First, at must
dominate a to the order of O. Second, there must exist no other
alternative a' to which a is preferred by some individual in the winning
coalition S and which eventually dominates at, even if this happens
through an arbitrarily long, finite sequence of zero-order dominations. If
such an alternative a' did exist, then the decision process would exhibit
the well-mown paradox of voting. Thus the definition of domination is
designed so as to prevent voting cycles, no matter how many alternatives
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are involved in a cycle. In the special case where any sequence has only
one term (i.e. when a~ = a', which we may call first-order domination and
write as a <i ai)' Rubinstein (1980) has motivated the definition as
follows: "True. I prefer b to a, but if b is adopted, a situation arises
where the majority prefers c , Since c is worse than a from my point of
view, I will not take any chances and will not vote for b in place of a."
Now we are in a position to define a solution concept for voting games due
to Rubinstein (1980) and Le Breton and Salles (1986, Definition 6):
The stability set is the set of alternatives which are
not dominated by any other alternatives. The stability
set is C(E,D,P) = {a € Lsi ~ ai € Ls such that a < ai}'
According to Le Breton and Salles (1986, Theorem 7), the stability set of
a proper voting game is always non-empty. A voting game is proper if the
intersection of any two winning coalitions is non-empty. (Voting under
majori ty rule is a proper voting game since two winning coalitions must
include more than half the voters each and therefore must have at least
one member in common.) Further details on stability sets are given in
Appendix 2. The formal defini tion of the set of rules establ ishing the
state is:
The authority set A of the economy belongs to the
stability set which results from a proper voting game
over all subsets of the legislation set: A € C(E,D,P),
where E, Ls and consequently A are finite.
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Obviously. A may not be unique in this defini tion. since C(E.D. P) may
contain more than one element. The uniqueness of A will not be questioned
here. It seems reasonable to assume that C(E.D.P) contains one element if
the voting game is such that every individual must adhere to only one out
of several alternatives to which he is indifferent and if the rule
selecting winning coalitions is such that two opposing coalitions cannot
win at the same time.
Redefine I to be the finite set of individuals in the whole economy (I
contains the electorate E). and let G be a finite set of goods. G contains
a set of private goods. M. A technological structure is defined for M by a
convex production set Y. M is the set of ordinary private goods which are
inputs and/or outputs in the production processes of private firms. These
private goods are traded in a perfectly competitive part of the economy.
where each agent takes the vector of market prices q as a given parameter.
Furthermore G contains K. a set of goods which are not produced by
private. profi t-maximizing firms. The members of K may be pure public
goods. "impure" public goods (Sandler and Tschirhart. 1980. p. 1487). or
even private goods other than those in M; but every k € K will be called a
public good. (What is of interest here is how commodities are produced.
not how they are consumed.) Some of the goods in K. Kl' are produced by
coalitions (clubs) Sl. S2 •.... of consumers. This happens when decision
costs are not prohibitive for a club which could produce some k € K. Let
the decision costs for good k be the values of a function d:lsx{k} ~m+.
where Is is the collection of all subsets of l. We would normally expect
decision costs to increase with coalition size. so that d(S.k) ~ d(Sl.k)
whenever lSI ~ IS11. Let the total costs of producing k be ck(z~). where
z~ is the amount of k demanded by some coalition S when the coali tion
members must cover the costs ck themselves. Finally. for each i € I. Ud is
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the utility level if i f. S and u~ the utility level if i € S. Then a
coalition procuring a public good k is characterized by a membership
condition and an aggregate budget constraint:
V i € S, u~ ~ uA
~ (i i ki€S q x - w ) + C (z~) + d(S,k) = O
where Xi and wi are individual i's consumption and initial endowments,
respectively, of the goods in M. Denote by Sk the set of all coalitions
which satisfy these conditions, given k. Then Kt can be defined as the set
Kl = {k € KeG I Sk ~ Ø}.
Another subset of K is K2 - public goods which are produced by the state.
Define administration costs by a function a:{k} ~ ffi+. Administration costs
result from the public activities needed to set up the production of k.
Assume first that individual utility levels are observable. Then a public
good will be produced by the state if it would have been produced by a
club had decision costs been equal to administration costs: k € K2 if
there is an S € {Is\Sk} which would belong to Sk if d(S,k) were equal to
a(k). It is possible in such a case to finance the production of k, e.g.
by charging [ck(zV + a(k)]/ISI from each member of S, and the state's
budget will balance. This situation seems too simple, however, mainly
because individual utility levels are assumed to be observable. With
perfect information the state's administration costs are likely to be
approximately the same as a private club's decision costs, and the
difference between public and private production would probably be
negligible.
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In practice individual utility levels are not observable (or at least they
are not observed). A basic assumption will therefore be that the state can
only observe each individual's consumption of private and public goods.
Let [xl.zl] be the vector of consumption levels of private (x) and public
(z) goods for all individuals i € I. The state measures social welfare by
a real-valued function U = U([xl.zl]). The optimal level of public
production results from a maximization of U. although it is not known
whether this moves the economy towards or away from a Pareto efficient
allocation. Whether or not a good k € K will be produced by the state is
determined by the requirement that Uk ~ U-k. where Uk is social welfare
when the state produces k and U-k is social welfare when it does not. It
is important to note that all xl. i € I. as well as all zÅ. i € I. n € Kt.
may change when the state increases its provision of k. The reasons are
that public production must be financed with some kind of (tax) revenues.
and that some consumers may choose to leave their club if it happens to
produce k and they can get it cheaper from the state.
Let the tax revenue function be T = T([xl.zl]). where xl and zl depend on
market prices. q; initial endowments. wi; the production possibilities for
private goods. y; and the cost functions for public goods. ck(.). Prices
of publicly produced goods count as taxes. Suppose that k f K2 initially.
and let zn be the public production of good n. Corresponding to Uk is the
public budget restriction
whereas U-k corresponds to
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The condition for k to become a member of K2 is that Uk ~ U-k under the
restriction that the budget balances in both situations.
The final step is to relate administration costs, social welfare, and tax
revenues to the authority set A. Formally, this may be done by making A
one of the arguments in the functions a(·), U(·), and T(·). The point,
however, is simply that the rules in the authority set must determine
criteria for evaluating social welfare (Le. U), establish the state's
ability to raise revenues (Le. T), and institute the public sector's
administrative framework (i.e. a).
A brief restatement and some remarks
An essential assumption in the model of the state is that the individuals
selecting legal rules have enough information about the voting process
they participate in to avoid voting cycles. This information enables them
to establish an authority set even if their preferences are diverse. The
objective of the state being to increase social welfare, the authority set
should make it possible to raise tax revenue and produce public goods
efficiently. The state may produce a good if a social decision process
involving a large number of consumers and high decision costs would
otherwise be required to set up a private firm or form a private club with
an optimal production level of the good. With observable individual
utility functions social welfare can be increased if the state takes over
the production of goods for which its administration costs are lower than
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private decision costs. If individual utility functions are unobservable.
the state's political and social objectives may instead be expressed by a
welfare function defined over individual consumption levels. Whether a
good is produced by the public or the private sector is then determined by
maximization of this social welfare function.
A few remarks on the formulation in the previous section are perhaps
necessary. First and foremost. the theory is extremely simplified. It does
not consider imperfect competition or asynunetric information at all:
competition is either perfect or production takes place in clubs, and the
only imperfection in the information system is that individual utili ty
levels are unobservable. However, imperfect competi tion and asynunetric
information would not lead to substantial alterations in the essentials of
the theory, although it would undoubtedly become much more complex. The
main point - that authority is the distinguishing feature of the state and
that public behaviour must be based on legal authority - would probably
remain the same.
It could be argued that administration costs should depend on the set of
consumers who receive a good produced by the state. This can easily be
incorporated in the theory above by redefining the domain of a(·) to be
Isx{k}. Another possible objection could be that the separation between
production costs Ck(Zk) on the one hand and decision costs d(S,k) or
administration costs a(k) on the other is artificial. This contention is
to some extent irrelevant, since if d(·) or a(·) were included in ck(.),
there would be no interesting difference between clubs and the state. It
might well be that there is no interesting empirical difference between
clubs and the state, but the possible result that the state produces
nothing (K2 = Ø) is not inconsistent with the theoryas such.
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A public good k may be produced both by clubs and by the state, i.e. the
intersection of Kt and K2 may be non-empty. This poses no problem when
individual uti lity levels are observable, since public production then
leads to a Pareto improvement. With unobservable utility levels the case
is less obvious. As already noted the state does not know whether
maximization of U yields a Pareto efficient allocation, and thus cannot
determine whether leaving the production of k to some private club alone
would lead to a Pareto improvement. It is therefore difficul t to say
something in general about privatization in the model. (This is to some
extent reflected in recent articles on privatization, which for the most
part deal with partial theoretical aspects or empirical examples. See Kay
and Thompson (1986), Yarrow (1986), and Bos (1987).) Even in the full
information case where utility can be observed, the state's efficiency at
production depends on the specific rules in the authority set. Without
knowledge of individual utility its position is worse since it does not
know what the "true" social welfare is. Therefore it must be expected that
public production levels are not necessarily optimal, and in a normative
analysis the true welfare loss due to inoptimality of public production
would have to be weighed against the cost saving d(S,K) - a(k).2)
The problem of existence of general equilibrium in the model has not and
will not be treated in the general case. Instead, it will be discussed
briefly with special versions of the social welfare function U and the tax
revenue function T in the next chapter. There U is defined as the utility
function of a "representative" consumer, as is often done in optimum
taxation theory. Furthermore it is convenient to assume that there are no
2)Of course, private clubs may find it equally difficult to observe the
members' welfare, but they differ from the state in that membership is
voluntary.
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clubs, i.e. every public good that is produced, is produced by the state.
Finally the values of T may be the revenues from sale of public goods,
lump sum transfers from consumers, or ordinary, distortive commodity
taxation.
Conclusion
The state has been defined as the application of authority, a set of legal
rights and duties which regulate the enforcement of social and economic
measures. The authority set may be established by a collective decision
process where the individuals deliberately place themselves in a Rawlsian
original position in order to choose authority rules from a broader set of
exogenously given choice alternatives. In the Rawlsian original position,
the individuals do not think strategically about their subjective economic
position. Hence it is easier to reach a social decision than it would be
if no restrictions were placed on the decision process. Economic authority
typically concerns the social welfare level in the economy, and institutes
e.g. the rights to tax and the right to control prices and production.
Such rights are used if an economy with rational public economic activity
is better than an entirely private economy, according to normative
criteria defined in the authority set.
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APPENDIX 1: SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCfIONS
The Arrow social welfare function
Define:
X a set of choice alternatives.
~ the set of all logically possible orderings of X. Any member ~i
of ~ is complete: V a.al € X. a ~l al or al ~i a; and transitive:
V a.al € X. a ~i al and al ~l a2 ~ a ~l a2• If it is not the case
that a ~l al' then we wri te al < l a. Hereafter the subscript i
denotes individual i. and there are I individuals.
a profile of I individualorderings of X.P
TI
~5 € ~
the I-dimensional set of all logically possible profiles.
a social ordering of X.
~: TI~ ~5 a social decision process specifying ~5 as a function of P; this
is the Arrow social welfare function. If there is a pair a.al in
X such that a ¢ al and a ~5 al for any profile P (where ~5
corresponds to P). then ~ is said to be imposed. If there is an i
such that for all a.al in X. a <1 al ~ a <5 al regardless of the
orderings of all other individuals than i. then ~ is said to be
dictatorial.
C(X) the set of alternatives a € X such that al ~5 a for all al € X;
this is the social choice.
Arrow (1963) makes the following assumptions:
(1) The domain of ~ is TI (unrestricted domain).
(2) Let <5 correspond to P; <~ to pt; a.aO.al.a2 € X; and let
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ao ~ a ~ al. If for all i.
ao :li al ~ ao :li al'
V al' a :li al => a :li al' and
Val' a <i al => a <i al' then
a <s a2 => a <5 a2 (positive association of social and individual
values).
(3) Let C (X) correspond to P and C' (X) to P'. If for all i and all
a.al in X. a :lial ~a :lial' then C(X) = C'(X) (independence of
irrelevant alternatives).
Arrow's possibility theorem is that a social decision process satisfying
conditions (1), (2) and (3) is either imposed or dictatorial.
The Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function
Samuelson (1947) defines the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function as
a real-valued function W = W(xl• x2 ••••• xl). where the xi, s are
individual consumption bundles. If it is required that "individuals should
count" (Samuelson. 1947. pp. 223 and 229). W takes the special form
W = V(Ul(Xl), U2(X2), ...• uI(xI)J. where the ui's are individual utility
functions. Thus. what makes the Bergson-Samuelson welfare function
individualistic, is that it is composed of individual uti! ity functions
and some function aggregating individual utility levels. The functions ui
express the economy's unique profile P of individualorderings of
different consumption bundles. The set X of choice alternatives consists
of all attainable sets of I individual consumption bundles. Therefore, the
precise connection between Arrow's ~ and Samuelson's W is:
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where C is the social choice corresponding to P. Maximization of the
Bergson-Samuelson individualistic social welfare function leads to the
Arrow social choice
individual preferences
values are the same).
corresponding to the
(provided. of course.
economy's unique
that fundamental
set of
ethical
Samuelson has argued that Arrow's possibi lity theorem is irrelevant to
welfare economics: "... the Arrow result is much more a contribution to
the infant discipline of mathemathical politics than to the traditional
mathematical theory of welfare economics. I export Arrow from economics to
politics because I do not believe that he has proved the impossibility of
the traditional Bergson welfare function of economics, even though many of
his less expert readers seem inevitably drawn into thinking so."
(Samuelson, 1967, p. 42). It is of course true that Arrow has not proved
the non-existence of W, his possibi lity theorem concerns ~, which has
individualorderings as its domain and not the set of choice alternatives.
But this does not necessarily imply that Arrow's result is irrelevant to
welfare economics. It is rather the other way around, that Arrow's
possibility theorem represents a limitation of the generality of a
Bergson-Samuelson individualistic social welfare function, since the
specification of the latter must be ad hoc relative to the economy's
preference profile P as long as this is not known. Put differently, the
point is that there is no way to specify how V should be altered when the
functions Ul, u2, ••• , ul change, without restrictions on the kind of
changes which are allowed. (This question has also been discussed by
Johansen (1969).)
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APPENDIX 2: VOTING GAMES
The defini tion of domination which is used in the essay reflects an
assumption that voting individuals are able to see through all possible
voting cycles and modify their own voting accordingly. This assumption may
seem strong, but if it is weakened, the stability set may be empty. Since
they are quite recent, some results on the non-emptiness of stability sets
are summarized below.
Define the Nakamura number as an integer h(E,D) such that
nh(E,D) = 00 if SED S ~ ø,
h(E,D) = min {ID'I: D' C D, nSED' S = Ø} if nSED S = ø.
Intuitively, the Nakamura number is the size of the smallest set of
winning coalitions with no veto players - a veto player being defined as
an individual who appears in every winning coalition. The voting game is
proper if and only if h(E,D) ~ 3.
The main theorem in this context is that the stabi li ty set of a proper
voting game is non-empty (Le Breton and Salles, 1986, Theorem 7). The
proof is so short and simple that it will be replicated here:
Assume that < has a cycle, i.e. there is an index k ~ ILsl and a
sequence at, a2, ••• , ak in Ls such that at <Ct a2 <C2
<Ck-t ak <Ck at, where <C signifies that one alternative is
preferred to another due to the voting of coalition C. According
to the definition of domination, this must imply that at ~1 ak
for all i E ct, and ak <1 at for all i E Ck. Since the voting
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game is proper. et n ek # ø. so there is an individual i € E to
whom at ~. ak and ak <. at. This is a contradiction. so it cannot
l l
be the case that < has a cycle. Hence < has maximal elements on
Weaker theorems are:
Le Breton and Salles. Theorem 5.
(i) If ILsI ~ 2h(E.D) - 3. then the stability set with first-order
domination is non-empty.
(ii) If ILsI ~ 2h(E,D) - 1, then there is a triplet (E',D,P)such that
the stability set with first-order domination is empty.
Le Breton and Salles, Theorem 1.
(i) If ILsI ~ h(E,D) - 1. then the stabili ty set with zero-order
domination is non-empty.
(ii) If ILsl > h(E,D) - 1. then there is a triplet (E.D.P) such that
the stability set with zero-order domination is empty.
The stability set in (i) and (ii) coincides with the core of the voting
game.
Le Breton and Salles, Theorem 4.
If every individual in a proper voting game has a preference ordering (and
not a preordering) on Ls - i.e. indifference as between alternatives is
precluded then the stability set with first-order domination is
non-empty.
- 67 -
REFERENCES
Arrow. K.J. (1963):
Social Choice and Individual Values.
Monograph 12. 2nd ed .. Cowles Foundation. Yale University. 1963.
Baumol. W.J. (1977):
On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Mul tiproduct
Industry.
American Economic Review. vol. 67. 1977. pp. 809 - 822.
Baumol. W.J .. Bradford. D.F. (1970):
Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing.
American Economic Review. vol. 60. 1970. pp. 265 - 283.
Bergson. A. (1938):
A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics.
Quarterly Journal of Economics. vol. LII. 1938. pp. 310 - 334.
Boiteux. M. (1956):
Sur la gestion des monopoles publics astreints å l'equilibre
budgetaire.
Econometrica. vol. 24. 1956. pp. 22 - 40.
Brennan. G .. Buchanan. J .M. (1977):
Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan.
Journal of Public Economics. vol. 8.1977. pp. 255 - 273.
Bos. D. (1987):
Privatization of Public Enterprises.
European Economic Review. vol. 31. 1987. pp. 352 - 360.
Coase. R.H. (1937):
The Nature of the Firm.
Economica. vol. 4. 1937. pp. 386 ff.
Coase. R.H. (1960):
The Problem of Social Cost.
Journal of Law and Economics. vol. III. 1960. pp. 1 - 44.
Debreu. G. (1959):
Theory of Value.
Monograph 17. Cowles Foundation. Yale University. 1959.
Diamond. P.A. (1975):
A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule.
Journal of Public Economics. vol. 4. 1975. pp. 335 - 342.
Elster. J. (1979):
Ulysses and the Sirens. Studies in rationality and irrationality.
Cambridge University Press. 1979.
- 68 -
Faulhaber. G.R. (1975):
Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises.
American Economic Review. vol. 65. 1975. pp. 966 - 977.
Hotelling. H. (1929):
Stability in Competition.
Economic Journal. 1929. pp. 41 - 57.
Johansen. L. (1969):
An Examination of the Relevance of Kenneth Arrow's General Possibility
Theorem for Economic Planning.
Economics of Planning. vol. 9. 1969. pp. 5 - 41.
Kay. J.A .• Thompson. D.J. (1986):
Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale.
Economic Journal. vol. 96. 1986. pp. 18 - 32.
Le Breton. M .. Salles. M. (1986):
Core and Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity
Results.
Discussion paper 8612. Faculte des Sciences Economiques. Universite de
Rennes. 1986.
Littlechild. S.C. (1970):
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Public Utility Pricing.
Western Economic Journal. vol. 8. 1970. pp. 162 - 166.
Mueller. D.C. (1979):
Public Choice.
Cambridge University Press. 1979.
Nakamura. K. (1979):
The Vetoers in a Simple Game with Ordinal Preferences.
International Journal of Game Theory. vol. 8. 1979. pp. 55 - 61.
Panzar. J.C .• Willig. R.D. (1977):
Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly.
Bell Journal of Economics. vol. 8. 1977. pp. 1 - 22.
Rawls. J. (1971):
A Theory of Justice.
Harvard University Press. 1971.
Roberts. K.W.S. (1980):
Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory.
Review of Economic Studies. vol. XLVII. 1980. pp. 421 - 439.
Rubinstein, A. (1980):
Stability of Decision Systems under Majority Rule.
Journal of Economic Theory. vol. 23. 1980. pp. 150 - 159.
Samuelson. P.A. (1947):
Foundations of Economic Analysis.
Harvard University Press. 1947.
- 69 -
Samuelson. P.A. (1967):
Arrow's Mathematical Politics.
Part I. ch. C. pp. 41-51 in Hook. S. (ed.): Human Values and Economic
Policy. New York University Press. 1967.
Sandler. T .• Tschirhart. J.T. (1980):
The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey.
Journal of Economic Literature. vol. XVIII. 1980. pp. 1481 - 1521.
Sandmo. A. (1976):
Optimal Taxation. An Introduction to the Literature.
Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 6. 1976. pp. 37 - 54.
Sharkey. W.W. (1982):
Suggestions for a Game-Theoretic Approach to Public Utili ty Pricing
and Cost Allocation.
Bell Journal of Economics. Vol. 13. 1982. pp. 57 - 68.
Varian. H.R. (1984):
Microeconomic Analysis.
2nd ed .• W.W. Norton &Co .• 1984.
Yarrow. G. (1986):
Privatization in Theory and Practice ..
Economic Policy. 1986. pp. 324 - 377.

Chapter 3.
November 1986.
Revised May 1987
and December 1989.
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ASPECTS OF
OPTIMUM TAXATION FORMULAE
"La propr Låce c'est le vol."
Pierre Joseph Proudhon
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ASPECTS OF
OPTIMUM TAXATION FORMULAE
Introduction
This chapter is an attempt to point out and clarify some of the general
equilibrium aspects of optimum taxation formulae. In Section 1 of the
essay the assumption of constant producer prices is examined. This
assumption has been discussed by several authors: Dixit (1970) argues that
the formulae obtained with constant producer prices are the same as those
obtained if we assume that there are constant returns to scale in
production. Atkinson and Stigli tz (1976. p. 102) wri te: "For ease of
exposi t Ion, it is ... assumed that producer prices are fixed for all
commodities and labour .... although the results in no way depend on this
assumption." Sandmo (1982. p. 93) says that "The assumption of constant
producer prices is obviously a strong one. However. it could fairly easily
be relaxed to an assumption of constant returns to scale. the important
point being zero profit for distribution to the consumers." Sandmo's point
is reformulated in Section 1. in order to discuss the sense in which it is
correct.
Section 2 examines the traditional interpretation of the formula for
optimal taxation and contains a brief consideration of its practical
usefulness. The focus is on the relationship between substitution effects
and income effects of taxation.
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The third main section deals with the significance of public production in
optimum taxation theory. One of the main results from this theory is the
inverse elasticity rule (Ramsey, 1927): Taxes should be relatively high in
markets where the elasticity of demand is relatively low (in absolute
value). Modern versions of the inverse elasticity rule are most often
calculated under the assumption that the composi tion and magni tude of
public expenditure are constant. In other words, the possible influence of
public production and consumption on the demand for private goods and
hence on tax revenues is only implicit in the theory. Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971, p. 271) touch upon this question, but seem to regard it as one of
little interest: the presence of alternative bundles of public
consumption does not alter the rules for the optimal tax structure." An
intuitive comment to this assertion could be that if additional tax
revenue is needed to finance an increase in public production, and this
increase results in greater demand for some private goods, then these
goods should be taxed more heavi ly than others to the extent that the
demand increase counteracts the own price effect. The purpose of Section 3
is to shed some light on this intuition.
Institutional set-up
Goods.
There is a finite set M of private goods and a finite set K of publicly
produced goods in the economy. K may contain both pure public goods in the
sense of Samuelson (1954) and ordinary private goods. However, any k € K
will be called a public good, and KnM = ø.
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Prices and taxes.
Corresponding to M there are two IMI-dimensional price vectors: consumer
prices q and producer prices p. Both are strictly posi ttve: q > O and
p > O. No public goods have prices. Tax rates are defined by t = q - p.
(The assumption that q > O and p > O may thus restrict the set of
permissible tax rates. Of course, more sophisticated tax systems are
conceivable. In principle the one outlined here can model any kind of
taxation of market transactions in a static context.) Good 1 is chosen as
the numeraire, so that qi = Pi = 1 and ti = O.
The state.
The state produces the set K of public goods, the production levels of
ht h . b h € IRIKI h IRIKI. th .w IC are gaven yte vector z +, were + IS e non-negat tve
orthant of IKI-dimensional Euclidean space. z is produced from inputs
bought in private markets at producer prices which are taken as given; and
public purchases are financed with the tax revenues. The public input
requirement vector is g(p,z), where g(p,z) € IR~MIdenotes the level of all
IMI inputs.1) The components of g are non-positive real numbers by
convention, so that 8gml8zk < O when m is used in the production of k.
(Otherwise, 8gml8zk is zero.) g as a function characterizes the public
production technology, which is given exogenously. There is free disposal
of z.
1)g is written somewhat imprecisely with p and z as arguments to signify
the possible importance of these variables in the public decision process
determining g. Technologically z implies an upper bound on gee). Later, g
will be regarded as a mathematically well-defined function of (p,z).
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The private producer.
For simplicity it is assumed that there is only one producer. All inputs
to and outputs from private production belong to M; and their levels are
given by the vector y € miMI. The producer maximizes profits py subject to
the restriction that y € y, the production possibilities set. Y and, from
the producer's point of view, p are given exogenously. Y is a convex cone,
so that py = O whenever y is optimal for p.
The consumer.
It will be assumed that there is only one consumer, whose final
consumption is given by the vector x € mIMI. Initial endowments are given
by an IMI-vector w ~ o. There are no initial endowments of public goods.
The consumer has a differentiable, strictly quasiconcave and increasing
uti lity function u, defined over all consumption bundles (x ,z). x is
chosen so as to maximize u subject to a budget constraint q(x - w) = b,
where q is taken as given and b is a positive, negative or zero lump-sum
transfer. The ensuing indirect utility function is v(q,z,w,b) and the
demand function x(q,z,w,b). It is assumed that these functions are
differentiable to any required order.
General equilibrium.
The analysis must apply to an economy where demand equals supply in every
private market;
x-w=y+g
Premultiplying both sides by q, we obtain
q(x - w) = (p + t)(y + g)
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and by the consumer's budget restriction (assuming that b = O) and the
fact that profits are zero, we have
tex - w) + pg = O
Thus, it is necessary that tax revenues equal public expenditure if
general equilibrium is to be maintained. This is simply Walras' law in a
three-agent economy.
1: Constant producer prices.
To elucidate the assumption of constant producer prices in optimum
taxation theory, a simplification of the institutional framework will be
introduced in keeping with the Samuelson-Diamond-Mirrlees approach
(Samuelson, 1951, and Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). Assume that z = O and
that public consumption is fixed at gO € !RiMI. (Note that some of the
components of gO are privately produced commodities.) Public expenditure
becomes _pgo, a constant (see below), and the economy can be partly
characterized by the following system, where the maximum utility function
v is taken as the measure of social welfare and market demand may be
positive, zero, or negative:
Welfare:
Market demand:
v(q,O,w,b)
x(q,O,w,b) - w
Private production: y such that y € Y and py is maximized
Public budget constraint: (q - p) (x - w) - b + pgo = O
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The problem is to find an optimal set of consumer prices. The vector q
appears thrice in the system above: in the consumer's utility function, in
the final demand function and in the public budget constraint, and a
reasonable formulation of the optimization problem would be to
maximize v(q,O,w,b) with respect to q,
subject to (q - p)[x(q,O,w,b) - w] - b + pgo = O.
For this problem to be well-defined something must be said about the
vector of producer prices p. The most important thing to note is that p
does not affect consumer welfare directly: it is not among the arguments
of v. The choice of producer prices only has a bearing on the existence of
general equilibrium in the economy (and in this respect p indirectly
influences welfare). p is less relevant for the optimal structure of
consumer prices, and the more interesting question is not whether p is
constant, but whether it exists. The existence of an optimal set of
producer prices will be taken up below: for the moment, however, let us
make the somewhat strong assumption that for each demand vector x(q,O,w,b)
and given public consumption gO there is a p which sustains general
equilibrium with a profit-maximizing producer. Let us also assume that
lump-sum transfers b are infeasible. Then the complete optimization
problem may be stated as follows:
Let the production possibilities set y, initial endowments
w l ° and public consumption gO ~ ° be given exogenously.
Then, among all permissible pairs (q,p), find (q*,p*) with
the following properties:
NORGES HANDELSH0YSKOU
BIBLIOTEKET
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(i) v(q·,O,w,O) is maximal subject to the restriction that
(q. - p·)[x(q·,O,w,O) - w] + p.gO = 0,
(ii) x(q· ,O,w,O) - w = y. + gO, where y. maximizes profits
p.y subject to the restriction that y € Y.
(i) is a constrained maximization problem where it is analytically
convenient to take p. as a given constant; whereas (ii) is an existence
problem. If there is an interior solution to the complete problem, the
maximum in (i) can be characterized by ordinary first-order conditions,
and the optimal consumer price vector is indicated by means of gradients
(see Section 2). However, the existence problem (ii) is more complicated,
and was analysed in detail by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971, pp. 273 - 276).
Indeed, Diamond and Mirrlees' "Optimal Taxation Theorem" is precisely a
demonstration of the existence of p•. Later, Mantel (1975) has established
a more general existence theorem for overall market equilibrium in
economies with a public sector. Mantel's results imply that by viewing the
problems (i) and (ii) as one, we may replace the assumption that there is
an equilibrium-preserving p for each demand vector x by a demonstration
that there is such a p for one specific demand vector, viz., x(q·,O,w,O).
Not all conceivable tax systems are necessarily consistent with general
equilibrium. Mantel (1975) and Gale and Mas-COlell (1975, 1979) emphasize
two particular requirements which seem difficult to avoid: No agent should
face negative market prices, and the consumer's (set-valued) budget
function should be lower hemicontinuous with convex values. Negative
market prices pose a problem if e.g. consumer preferences are monotonic,
since demand could be infinite if the consumer were paid to consume. With
limited resources and finite production possibilities it could be that no
equilibrium existed in this case. Unless the consumer is or may become
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satiated in some goods, it is therefore required of the tax system that no
subsidy exceeds 100%.
The set-valued budget function is defined as
B(p,s) - {x € xl q(p,s)x - Ø(p,s) ~ O},
where s is a parameterization of the tax system, X is a convex consumption
set, q(p,s) is the consumer price vector resulting from producer prices p
and taxation s, and Ø(p,s) is the consumer's income. If the tax system is
s = (t,b) as in the model above, s is fixed for all p and the consumer's
income is Ø(p,s) = Cp + t)w + b, then the budget function is both
continuous in p and convex-valued. (For b < O and Ibl sufficiently large,
B(p,s) may of course be empty.) Regressive taxation, on the other hand,
introduces non-convexities in the budget set, as illustrated in Figure
3.1. The consumer owns w1 of good 1 and nothing of good 2. If he sells
more than w1 - x1 he is not taxed. But if his supply is less than W1 - X1
he faces the tax vector t = Ct1 ,O), where t1 < O. His budget set is
therefore non-convex. We are not guaranteed that a general equi Iibrium
price vector exists, since it might be p if only the consumption function
is well-behaved at these prices.
To take p. as a given constant in (i) would be unacceptable if producer
prices were arguments in the indirect utility function v. This happens
when there are decreasing returns to scale and the positive profits from
private production are distributed to the consumer. Then, both an increase
in the consumer price and a decrease in the producer price of some
commodity will generally decrease consumer welfare. The former entails the
ordinary price distortion effects. and the latter has an income effect
Good2
Xl
Figure 3.1. Non-convex budget set with regressive taxation.
Good 1
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insofar as the producer's profits decrease. A similar question has been
discussed by Mirrlees (1972) and Hagen (1985), as well as by Dixit (1970)
and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). Except for Mirrlees these authors take a
primal approach, showing that the first-order changes in producer prices
which are relevant for optimal taxation vanish when the transformation
function (the surface of y) is linearly homogeneous. The interpretation
offered above may perhaps be viewed as a dual alternative.
2: Income effects
Let us now assume that there is posi tive public production: z ~ O. To
begin with, z , public inputs, g(p,z), and lump-sum transfers, b , are
determined by the state and are exogenous to the analysis. To solve the
maximization problem (i), form the Lagrangian
A = v(q,z,w,b) + ~{(q - p)[x(q,z,w,b) - w] - b + pg(p,z)}
where the Lagrange mul tiplier ~ may be interpreted as a measure of the
marginal cost of public funds.2) Given the existence of an appropriate set
of producer prices, the first-order condi tions wi th respect to consumer
prices can be written as
m,n € M
Since 8v/8qm = -A(Xm - wm), where A is the consumer's marginal utility of
2)This formulation implicitly presupposes that ~ exists, which is not
trivial since the expression in braces is a function of prices and public
production in general equilibrium. It is not certain that such a function
is concave or quasiconcave.
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lump-sum income, the condition can be rewritten for each m € M as
(1)
With non-negative initial endowments, the Slutsky equation is:
~ - ~ - (xm - )~a-a Wm abqm qm
where denotes compensated demand (Berg, 1987). Using this and the
symmetry of the Slutsky matrix the formula for optimal taxation becomes
xm - Wm m,n € M(2)
which is the well-known result from Samuelson (1951). If public production
is financed in its entirety with lump-sum taxation, i.e. b = pg, all tax
rates may be set equal to zero. In that case it is easy to see that A = ~,
the marginal cost of public funds equals the marginal utility of consumer
income. (A is defined to make ~ a positive number, although it is a cost
i tern.)
Expression (2) is often interpreted as follows: "The percentage reduction,
along the compensated demand curve, of the consumption of all commodities
be the same, relative to what they would have been had the consumer prices
been equal to the producer prices." (Stigli tz and Dasgupta, 1971, p. 156,
cf. Sandmo, 1976, p. 42.) Diamond and Mirrlees (1971, p. 262) have offered
more details: Assume that producer prices are constant in the rather
strong sense that aim/aqn = aim/atn. Assume also that aim/aqn is constant
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for all n. Then
mvn € M
This indicates two reasons why the traditional interpretation of equation
(2) is valid only when tax rates are relatively small. The first is that
the assumption that a tax increase is fully carried over into an increase
in the consumer price may be rather strong if m is an input to private
production and the tax increase is large. The second is that 8im/8qn
cannot be a constant for all n since ~n qnaim/8qn = O irrespective of q by
the zero-degree homogeneity of the compensated demand function (note that
the public production vector z is a constant in the utility function. and
that public goods do not have prices). Thus. when tax rates are no longer
small. formula (2) is only an approximate characterization of optimal
taxation. In itself it is also a characterization in quantity terms and
not in terms of tax rates since its right-hand side depends on the tax
vector t. Although it is often said to show that the efficiency aspect of
optimal taxation has to do with substitution effects. formula (2) does not
seem to be very useful as a prescription for practical determination of
tax rates.
To characterize tax rates it should be observed that the reason for
taxation is the public tax revenue requirement. and that income effects
may be relevant when this requirement is to be met. If a given revenue
must be raised. it may be that tax rates should be relatively high in
markets where their imposition has a moderate effect on the tax base.
These are markets where the gncompensated demand elasticities are low in
absolute value. Since the prices and the tax rate of the numeraf re are
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given exogenously, let x be the Jacobian matrix of first derivatives ofq
the demand function with respect to consumer prices with the first rowand
column deleted, and let x - w be the vector of net demand for goods 2,
IMI. Then for the optimal tax vector t == [t2,. •. ,tiMI] the IMI-1
first-order conditions of type (1) may be written as
tx
q
A - J.L - -= - (x - w)
J.L
- -1or, provided that (x) exists:
q
(3) -t = A - J.L - - -. -1;..;...._~[x(q·,z,w,~) - w] [x (q ,z,w,b)]J.L q
Formula (3) is probably the simplest characterization of optimal tax rates
that can be obtained in a general model where taxes are not necessarily
small and no special assumptions are made regarding the form of the
consumer demand functions.3) It shows that income effects matter for the
absolute level of tax rates, because x contains first derivatives of theq
uncompensated demand functions. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 373) note
that "... the income effect would arise wi th any form of taxation, ...",
which is quite true, of course; but the income effect does arise, and this
has implications for the level of tax rates.
The familiar inverse elasticity rule results from an assumption that all
; 4)cross-price effects are zero; i.e. that the matrix x is diagonal. Then
q
3) Note that wi thout the normalization of both consumer and producer
prices no formula like (3) could be obtained, since the ordinary Jacobian
of the consumer's demand is singular.
4)This may seem unrealistic, but in practice it is often found that the
absolute values of cross-price effects are quite small in comparison to
own-price effects.
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its inverse is very easily calculated (assuming that none of the own-price
effects are zero), and (3) may be restated as
O
O
O O
(4) =
X2-W2 O O 1 O Oq; ax2/8q;
O X~-W~ O O 1 O
A - l:!: q; ax3/8q;
Jl
O O
xIMI-wIMI
O O 1
qlMI axlMI/8qiMI
3: Public production
The importance of complementarity between public and private goods has
been emphasized by Atkinson and Stern (1914) and King (1986), who have
focussed on optimality rules for public goods rather than the formulae for
optimal taxation. Now the question is whether such a complementarity also
has a bearing on the optimal adjustment of tax rates. A private good m and
a public good k may be called complements ifaxm/8zk > O. and substitutes
ifaxm/8zk < O. Note that this definition differs from the usual one which
involves prices. Here. complementarity is interpreted as a more technical
or physical property.
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In the optimum taxation formula (1), publ ic production does not appear
explicitly, which is probably why Diamond and Mirrlees (1911) do not
elaborate on this point (see the Introduction). Whether z is zero or not
does not alter the formula. On the other hand, z is an exogenous variable
affecting final consumption, the responsiveness of demand to price
changes, the equilibrium prices, as well as the Lagrange multipliers. The
role of public production must therefore be illustrated by differentiating
equation (1):
+ +
(5) =
Ad(-)(xm - wm)Il + +
There is not much to be said in general from this expression about the
direction of change in each tax rate when the publ ic production level
increases. The second term on the left-hand side represents the effect on
the price responsiveness of demand from changes in general equilibrium
consumer prices. The third term shows the same kind of impact from the
production levels of the public goods. On the right-hand side, the first
term reflects the change in the (inverse of the) marginal cost of public
funds in terms of private income, and will be discussed below. The first
term in the braces is the direct change in demand caused by the consumer
price differentials. Finally, the second term in braces is the effect of
complementarity between public and private goods: Ceteris paribus, the
taxation of complements to a public good normally tends to increase with
the production level of that good; and the taxation of substitutes tends
to decrease. "Normally" means that the conclusion holds if the own-price
derivative Oxm/8qm is negative, cross-price effects do not outweigh the
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own-price effect. and the marginal cost of public funds exceeds the
private marginal utility of income. ~<1.Il Condition (5) could be
interpreted as an earmarking condition for public funds. saying e.g. that
it may be optimal to finance an increase in road construction by
increasing the taxation of petrol more than the taxation of other goods.
Still. two qualifications must be kept in mind: The first is that this is
not earmarking in the usual sense which would only mean that restrictions
were added to the state's optimization problem; the second is that the
result only applies ceteris paribus; direct and indirect price effects may
well neutralize the impact from complementarity between public and private
goods.
If the public revenue requirement is T. then the Lagrange multiplier in
the state's optimization problem is given by Il= -av/Of. The consumer' s
marginal utility of income is of course A = av/Bb. As noted above. if
lump-sum taxation is feasible. public expendi tures can be financed by
reducing b , and the marginal welfare loss of taxation wi 11 be Il= A.
Assuming that lump-sum taxation is infeasible. however. we find that
Il> A ~ -av/Of > av/Bb
This equivalence will be taken as a definition of the efficiency loss from
distortive taxation: A given tax system entails an aggregate. marginal
efficiency loss if and only if the decrease in social welfare caused by a
marginal increase in the tax revenue requirement is greater in absolute
value than it would have been under lump-sum taxation. Hence. if there is
a marginal loss of efficiency in the aggregate. then Ilwill exceed A. and
if Ilexceeds A. then there is a marginal. aggregate efficiency loss.
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To discuss the sign of (A-~) further. write the first-order condition (2)
as follows:
=
If we multiply by tm and sum over all m € M. we have:
(~- l + "" t ~) "" t ( )~ Gn n Bb Gm m Xm - Wm
by the negative semi-deflni teness of the Slutsky matrix. Since the tax
revenues are positive. this yields another necessary condition for optimal
taxation:
(6) "" ~l - Gntn ab
Atkinson and Stern (1974) use this inequality to observe that depending on
tax rates and the normality or inferiority of different goods. A may be
greater or less than ~. But then it must be remembered that the tax rates
in (6) are supposed to be optimal. Thus if A is greater than~. then an
increase in the wedges between producer and consumer prices is better. on
the margin. than an increase in lump-sum taxation. Wi thout denying the
possibility of such a result. it seems rather implausible. If. on the
other hand. there is a marginal efficiency loss from distortive taxation
in the aggregate. then A <~; and (6) is consistent with a tax system
where normal consumption goods have positive tax rates and normal goods
which are supplied to factor markets by the consumer have negative tax
rates.
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Optimal public production
In order to complete the model and illustrate the role of the inefficiency
indicator ~, the main result from the literature on optimal production
of public goods will be reviewed. To produce efficiently, the state must
determine the optimal input requirement in public production. An ad hoc
argument in this connection is that if taxation reduces welfare and public
goods increase it, the state should minimize production costs:
minimize -pg with respect to g, subject to z(g) = z,
where z(g) is public production as a function of public inputs, and z is
any non-negative output vector. A more precise discussion of the publ ic
efficiency problem has been carried out by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971, pp.
19-23). Their argument is very simple: If a welfare-increasing change in
consumer prices exists in the general equilibrium with optimal taxation,
and aggregate demand functions are continuous, then the optimum must be on
the frontier of the production set. Since social welfare may be increased
by changing the consumer prices, the only reason it is not done must be
that the resulting demand would lie outside the production set. Diamond
and Mirrlees conclude that aggregate production efficiency is desirable.
An assumption of public cost minimization at given producer prices is
consistent with their conclusion, at least as long as there are no other
imperfections than optimal taxes in the economy. The minimization of costs
yields a public input requirement vector g(p,z).
As several authors have observed, the fact that publ ic production is
financed by distortionary taxation may modify the elementary optimal ity
rule for public goods (Atkinson and Stern, 1974; and King, 1986; cf.
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Samuelson, 1954). Suppose that the state wishes to choose Z optimally.
given the input requirement g(p,z) and exogenous lump-sum transfers b. The
first-order conditions are:
(7) aAaZk = 0, k E K, nEM,
where t~ and p~ are determined for all n in the optimization problem in
Section 1. Following King (1986) we can define the marginal willingness to
pay for public good k as
- ~~kl-v=v
where v is a given maximum utility level. Differentiating with respect to
Zk in v(q,z,w,b) = V, we find:
av
aZk = av 8h I- ab aZk -v=v = A ( : I -)k v=v
Substituting for av/aZk, the first-order condition (7) can be rewritten as
- a8hzI = - ff (~n t~ ~a8xZk+ ~nP~ ~aZk)k - I\.v=v
or in matrix notation:
(8) - bV = - ~ (t*x + p*g )Z A Z Z
where -b: is the consumer's marginal willingness to pay for the IKI public
goods at utility level v, x is the IMI·IKI-matrix of first derivatives of
Z
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x w.r.t. z, and g is the IMI·IKI-matrix of first derivatives of g w.r.t.z
z. Formula (8) is analogous to equation [3] in Atkinson and Stern (1974,
p. 122) and to equation [21] in King (1986, p. 279). p·gz is the vector of
marginal costs in the production of each public good, and formula (8)
states that the marginal willingness to pay for public goods should be
proportional to their marginal cost, adjusted by the change in tax
revenues following an infinitesimal variation in the provision of each
pub lic good.
In real terms, p.g is the marginal opportunity cost of public inputs, andz
t·x is the marginal resource cost (positive or negative) due to thez
wedges between consumer and producer prices. However, there is also the
general equilibriun aspect that the public budget must balance, and in
that sense p.g may be called an expendi ture effect and t·x a revenuez z
effect of the increase in public production.
An important point is that the marginal willingness to pay for public
goods may exceed the marginal production costs measured as the net change
in the public budget equation brought about by the increase in z. This
happens when distortive taxation causes a marginal efficiency loss in the
aggregate, in which case J.J./A > 1. Then the marginal willingness to pay
must be sufficient to outweigh the decrease in social welfare resulting
from the increase in taxation needed to finance the marginal uni t of
public production.
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The complete second best equilibrium
It is clear that the first-order condition (8) cannot determine both the
optimal production level for public goods and the inefficiency indicator ~
at the same time. Mathematically, ~ and A are determined along with all
the other endogenous variables in the private and publ ic optimization
problems: consumer and producer prices, consumption and production of
private and public goods. To describe this system mathematically, it
should be noted that the optimum taxation problem concerns the optimal
selection of two sets of general equilibrium prices, viz., p and q. A
first-order condition which differs slightly from equation (1) then seems
more convenient: Since tt = O and t = q - p, (1) may be rewritten as
axt ~ ~ A 1) (xm - wm)tt + tn = (--8qm n=2 8qm ~
~
~ qn ~ ~ ~ + (xm - wm) A (xm - wm)8qm Pn 8 =n=t n=t qm ~
By the consumer's budget restriction,
+ = O
so that
+ Ho ~ Pn ~ = OA n=t 8qm
Thus, given the exogenous variables w, z and b, as well as the technology
implicit in the private production possibi lities set Y and the public
---------------------_ .._-------------
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production function z(·). the endogenous variables q. p. x. y. g. A and ~
are determined by the following conditions and simultaneous equations:
u(x.z) is maximal subject to q (x - w) = b , for any z and q; thus
determining x and A.
py is maximal subject to y € Y. for any p.
-pg is minimal for any p and every z such that z(g) = z; thus
determining g.
Pi = qi = 1; thus defining the numeraire and its tax rate.
xn - Wn = Yn + gn. for n = 2 ..... IMI; (market equilibrium).
(q - p) (x - w) + pg = O; (the public budget equation).
~ = -A(X2 - W2)/[n~iPn8xn/aq2]; (the marginal cost of public funds).
(xm - wm) + ~ ~ Pn ~a8x = O. m = 3 ..... IMI; (optimal taxation).
1\ n=i qm
If the public production level is to be optimal. and K only contains pure
public goods. then z· may be determined by the first-order condition (8).
Conclusion
This chapter discusses some features of a three-agent general equilibrium
model. General equilibria with consumers and producers being well known.
the focus is on the behaviour of the public sector. or the state. The
state's purpose is to provide public goods to the consumers. financing its
production by imposing taxes on the private sector. Therefore it must
solve three optimization problems: how to tax optimally. how to produce
efficiently. and how to supply an optimal amount of public goods. Three
points are made in the note. The first is that the existence of an optimal
set of producer prices is a more interesting question than whether these
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prices are constant or not. The second is that income effects are relevant
for the determination of the absolute level of tax rates. The third is
that comp lementar ity between public and private goods influences the
change in optimal tax rates and the optimal level of production of pure
public goods.
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GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM TAX INCIDENCE:
ANALYTICAL FORMULAE AND TIIREE NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
It is no joke to have to analyze the incidence of
anything, a tax change or a factor-supply change, in a
full general equilibrium model."
Paul A. Samuelson
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM TAX INCIDENCE:
ANALYTICAL FORMULAE AND THREE NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
PART 1: ANALYSIS
Introduction
In comparison with the literature on optimal taxation. general equilibrium
incidence analysis seems a relatively small branch of public economics.
One reason why the number of contributions in this field appears to be
moderate. is perhaps that the original Harberger model (Harberger. 1962)
was not only a pioneering work but offered simple and intuitively
appealing answers to most of the questions which seem natural to pose in
this context. It was not until 1976 that one of the main weaknesses of
Harberger .s model - the assumption of zero ini tial taxes - was amended
(Vandendorpe and Friediaender . 1976). In addi tion. minor modifications
were introduced by Mieszkowski (1967) and McLure (1970. 1972): In the
Harberger model. it is assumed that the demand pattern (i.e. marginal and
average propensities to consume) is the same for all private consumers and
the government. Mieszkowski (1967) relaxed this assumption and studied the
implications of differing preferences as between workers (those who
receive wages) and capitalists (those who receive returns to capi tal) .
McLure (1970) emphasized the change in absolute as opposed to relative
prices in the Harberger model by adding a monetary equation where total
factor payments equal money supply times its veloci ty. In his second
article (1972). McLure focussed on the incidence of public expendi ture
rather than taxes; public expenditure being defined as the government' s
purchases of factors and final goods. Both authors use a model with only
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two factors and two final goods. This assumption is certainly crucial to
the analysis, and it may also be essential for the results.
The purpose of the present essay is to discuss a traditional tax incidence
model in view of the reflections on the role of the state in preceding
chapters. Some attention will also be devoted to the close connection
between incidence analysis and the so-called Laffer curve. The emphasis
wi Il not be so much on the kind of economic variables which determine
price changes (such as factor intensities, elastici ties of substi tution
etc.) as on the kind of economic changes following increases and decreases
in taxation or public production. The chapter has two main parts. In part
1 a general analytical model is presented. It has many goods, exogenously
given initial taxes, and significant differences between private and
public production. Part 2 presents the results of simulations with three
different numerical models, the first of which illustrates the analytical
formulae in part 1, where the tax rates are exogenous. In the other two
numerical models, tax rates are optimal and thus endogenous.
A general equilibrium model with exogenous taxation
Some aspects of the model which will be used to analyse the incidence of
publ ic economic activi ty have already been discussed at some length in
previous chapters. The modifications of the model in Chapter 3 which will
be introduced mainly lie in the formulation of private production, since
explicit factor demand functions will be needed, and in the tax system.
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Private production and consumption.
Assume that M private commodities are produced in the economy. and that
there are N production factors. There are no initial endowments of the
private commodities. Each of them is produced by one private firm under
constant returns to scale. The minimum cost function of producer m can
then be written as Ymcm(p). where p is the N-vector of factor prices taken
as given by the producer and Ym is the production level.1) Since there is
no well-defined supply function. Ym is determined from the demand side.
Given cm and p. the firm's conditional demand for input n is Ym8cm/8Pn.
The input coefficients for producer and commodity m are defined as
a~(p) n = 1, ...• N, m = 1, ... ,M
Hence the private production technology is completely characterized by the
matrix of input coefficient functions
a( )
_ [a~;) · . ·
a~ ( ) •••
M equations relating producers' commodity prices P to unit costs close the
production side of the private sector:
m = 1 ••••• M
where am is the N-vector of input coefficients in firm m.
1)The cost functions are assumed to be independent of public production.
Note also that the activity level of a firm. its production level and the
market supply are the same because one and only one firm produces each
good.
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As regards the consumer, y denotes his demand for commodities and x his
demand for factors which can also be used as inputs. x and yare functions
of an N-vector of consumer's factor prices, q, an M-vector of consumer's
commodity prices, Q, the K-vector of public goods, z, lump-sum transfers
from the state, b, and the N-vector of initial endowments, w. The budget
restriction equating income and expenditure is
The public sector.
The public production level, z, is a function of an N-vector g of inputs
which the state buys in private factor markets at given producer prices.
In order to simplify it is assumed that there is only one public good. In
accordance with the conclusions in Chapter 3, the state is assumed to
minimize public production costs, given p and z, and the resulting factor
demand function g = g(p,z) will be homogeneous of degree zero in p. Factor
tax rates are given by an N-vector t, and commodity taxes are given by the
M-vector s. The tax rates drive wedges between consumer and producer
prices: q = p + t, Q = p + s. Note that tn will be negative if factor n is
taxed. Both public production and tax rates are exogenous, but the level
of lump-sum tran~fers to the consumer, b, will be regarded as an
endogenous variable and is thus determined in general equilibrium.
General equilibrium.
With the defini tions above, general equilibrium is characterized by the
following system:
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(1) w - x(q,Q,b,z,w) = y(q,Q,b,z,w)·a(p) + g(p,z)
(2) P = p·[a(p)]'
(3) [q, Q]= [p, P] + [t, s]
(4) q·[w - x(q,Q,b,z,w)] + b = Q·y(q,Q,b,z,w)
(5) s·y(q,Q,b,z,w) - t·[w - x(q,Q,b,z,w)] = p·g(p,z) + b
Equation (1) describes the equilibrium in factor markets, and (2) is the
clearing condition for commodity markets. (3) formalizes the tax system,
(4) is the consumer's budget restriction, and (5) is the government budget
equation.2) The exogenous variables of the system are t, s, z and w, and
the endogenous variables are p, P and b. Al though a simple counting rule
does not apply here, it may be noted that the N+M+1 unknowns are matched
by N equations in (1), M equations in (2) and one equation in (5). (1),
(2), and (5) can only be solved for relative prices, and one equation in
the system is redundant if (4) holds (which it does, since the consumer
maximizes his utility). The price system may therefore be normalized, e.g.
by setting Pl = 1. Given Sl' this also implies a normalization of consumer
prices.
Differential tax incidence formulae
Upon solution of equations (1)-(5) the lump-sum transfers and each market
price wi 11 in general be functions of all the exogenous variables. If
prices and lump-sum transfers given by these functions are substituted
2)Vectors and matrices will be enclosed in brackets, whereas arguments of
functions are put within parentheses or braces. Prices and tax rates are
always row vectors, and their differentials are column vectors. g, w, x, y
and z will be regarded interchangeably as row or column vectors, depending
on the context in which they appear, but their differentials are always
column vectors.
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back into (1), (2) and (5), the latter become identities which are assumed
to be differentiable with respect to tax rates and the public production
level. Thus, in general equilibrium the differential form of an equation
from (2) is
}: md }: }:~= n an Pn + n Pn k Opk dpk (dP1 = O)
Since the cross price effects are symmetric (i.e. 8a~/åpk = 8a~/8Pn) and
the input coefficient functions are homogeneous of degree zero, the double
sum is zero. Hence the price differentials become
(6) dP = a(p)·dp (dP1 = O)
(7) dq = dp + dt
(8) dQ = a(p)·dp + ds (dQ1 = ds)
Assuming that initial endowments are fixed, we can write the differential
of equation (1) as
}:dx + m Ym·dam + a'·dy + dg = O .
Let subscripts (except m) indicate first partial derivatives, i.e. xQ is
the NxM-matrix of first partial derivatives of x with respect to Q, Yb is
the column vector of first partial derivatives of y with respect to b etc.
Then
dx = xq.[dp + dt] + ~.[a.dp + ds] + ~·db + xz·dz
dam = am.dp
p
dy = Yq·[dp + dt] + yQ.[a.dp + ds] + Yb·db + Yz·dz
dg = g ·dp + g ·dzp z
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so that
(9)
[
}: m
X + xQa + m Ymaq p
[1> + a'yb]db +
[xq + a'Yq]dt + [xQ + a'yQ]ds + [xz + a'yz + gz]dz
= O
+ a'y + a'yQa + g ]dp +
q p
To close the system, we must express db by the differential of the state's
budget equation, (5):
y·ds + s·dy - [w - x]·dt + t·dx = g·dp + p·dg + db
[txq + txQa + sYq + syQa - g - pgp]dp +
(10) [sYb + t1> - l]db +
[txq - [w - x] + sYq]dt + [txQ + sYQ + y]ds + [syz + txz - pgz]dz
= O
In (10) the factors in front of dp and dt are row vectors with N elements,
those in front of db and dz are scalars, and the one in front of ds is a
row vector with M elements. pg = O by the symmetry of cross price effectsp
and the zero-degree homogeneity of the public factor demand functions. (9)
and (10) may now be compiled in one matrix expression:
[
[Xq + a'Yq + xQa + a'yQa + ~ Yma~ +~] [1> + a'y] ] [ dp ]
[txq + sYq + txqa + SYd" - g] ['"b + sYb ~ 1] db
(11) =
[x + a'y ]
q q [ , ]] [ dt ]x +ay +g dz z z s
[txz + syz - pgz] dz
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Equation (11) is the fundamental differential tax incidence formula, where
the endogenous variables dp and db are such that the changes they cause in
factor markets and the public budget equal the direct effects of small
variations in tax rates and public production. In the next paragraph these
direct and indirect effects are interpreted in closer detail.
Interpretation
As already observed, the right-hand side of equation (11) may be viewed as
the direct effects of changes in factor taxes t, conunodity taxes s and the
public production level z. When t increases, consumer's factor prices q
also increase, since q == p + t. Therefore, the consumer's factor demand
changes by the rate x and his conunodity demand by the rate y , and the
q q
latter effect causes private firms' factor demand to change by a'y . Thus,
q
the first term on the right-hand side of (11) is [x + a 'y ]dt. Theq q
reasoning behind the two other terms in the first row, [xQ + a'YQ]ds and
[x + a'y + g ]dz, is quite similar. E.g., when z increases, the factorz z z
demand changes are x dz (the consumer), a'y dz (private firms) and g dzz z z
(the state). In the second row on the right-hand side of (11) are the
direct effect on the government budget of a small variation in t, s and z.
Since an increase in a (negative) factor tax rate increases the consumer
price of the factor, the direct revenue impact is tx dt + [x - w]dt from
q
the factor markets and syQdt from the conunodity markets. Likewise, the
direct revenue effects of an increase in commodity taxes are tXQds from
the factor markets and syQds + yds from the commodity markets. Finally, an
increase in public production entails a net change in tax revenues which
is the sum of commodity market effects sy dz, factor market effects tx dz,z z
and public expenditure effects pgzdz.
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The main point in the differential tax incidence equation (Il) is that the
changes in factor prices and lump-sum transfers must be such that the
direct effects of dt. ds and dz mentioned above are outweighed. Thus. the
le.ft-handside of (11) may be interpreted along much the same lines as its
right-hand side. The first term in the upper row represents the factor
causes factor adjustment
changes. An increase in producers' factor prices
effects !Ymam dp in private firms and g dp inp p
market reactions to price
the public sector. The terms xQa and a'yQa are a little more complicated:
When Pn rises. uni t costs and the commodi ty price increase by a~dPn in
firm k (k ~ 1). Then consumer price Qk also increases. inducing a change
in the demand for factor 1. say. which is (8x1/8Qk)a~dPn on the part of
the consumer and a~ (Bym/8Qk)ahdPn in firm m. Both are summed over k =
2 •...•M since uni t costs increase in all firms except firm 1. and the
producers' factor adjustments are added together to yield the total
increase or decrease in demand for the input. The two terms xQadp and
a'yQadp reflect the fact that equation (2) (commodity market equilibrium)
has been substituted into equation (1). It is the assumption of constant
returns to scale which makes this substitution possible. since commodity
prices are related to unit costs in a simple way when production functions
are linearly homogeneous.
The second term in the upper row on the left-hand side. [~ + a'Yb]db. is
an income effect in the factor markets. When lump-sum transfers increase.
the consumer alters his factor demand by ~db and his commodity demand by
Ybdb. The latter effect causes producers' factor demand to change by
The second row on the left-hand side shows the impact of dp and db on the
public budget. tx dp and sy dp are the revenue effects from factor andq q
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commodity markets when factor prices vary, and txQadp and syQadp are the
corresponding effects from commodity price variation caused by the changes
in factor prices. gdp is the change in public expendi tures apart from
lump-sum transfers. Finally, [t~ + sYb - l]db is the net income effect on
tax revenues from the endogenous increase or decrease in the lump-sum
transfers.
The role of the state
The presence of public production alters the traditional tax incidence
formulae. To illustrate this, a few simplifying assumptions will be
introduced. First, let the consumer's factor demand be identically zero
(x == O) and assume that his demand for private goods is insensi tive to
factor prices (y = O). Then equation (11) can be written as
q
~] [a'Yb] ] fdP]
[SYb - 1] db
Furthermore, assume that there are only two factors and two private goods
(N = M = 2); that all tax rates except t1 are zero (S1 = S2 = t2 = O); and
that only t1 is changed in order to finance an increase dz in the public
production level (ds, = dS2 = dt2 = O). Thus the matrix equation above
becomes:
where
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}:l ~ ~ ~] ~ h.i = 1.2ehi - m a~ aQ2 a + ym Bpi + Bpi
}: ~ h 1.2eh3 - m a~ ab . =
}: ~ +~ h 1.2eh - m a~ 8z 8z =
e3 }: ~- - n Pn 8z
(Note that dPl = O.) Define E as the matrix of left-band side coefficients
in (12):
Provided that lEI ~ O. the solution to (12) is:
dpl = I~I (el(e22-e23g2) + e12(e23e3-e2) + e13(e2g2-e22e3)]dz
1- TET(e12e23-e13e22)Wl dtl
dp2 = I~I (e2(ell-e13gl) + e2l(e13e3-el) + e23(elgl-elle3)]dz
1
+ TET(elle23-e13e2l)wl dtl
db = I~I (el(e2lg2-e22gl) + e2(e12gl-ellg2) + e3(elle22-e12e2)]dz
1- TET(elle22-e12e2l)Wl dtl
where
It is fairly clear that the signs of dpl' dp2 and db are ambiguous.
Indeed. in the original Harberger model, which is even simpler tban the
one above, the signs of the factor price differentials depend on the
relative magnitudes of factor intensities, elasticities of substi tution
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and demand elasticities (Atkinson and Stiglitz. 1980. pp. 165 - 170). One
could perhaps generalize the stability argument from partial equilibrium
analysis; assuming that excess demand falls in each market when the market
price increases and that cross price effects are not large enough to
outweigh such direct effects (see e.g. Dixit and Norman. 1980. p. 131).
But we could just as well assume directly that lEI> O etc .• the more so
since referring to stability appears to be reasoning outside a model where
there is no price adjustment mechanism.
The solutions for dpi' dp2 and db are simple only if dz = gi = g2 = O. in
which case lEI = e11e22 - ei2e2i and db = -widti. Then. under "normal"
circumstances • itseems reasonab le to conjecture that dp i/dti < O and
dp2/dti > O since dt , > O means that the taxation of factor market 1
becomes less severe. If gi or g2 are posi ttve , but dz = O. db may be
smaller or greater than -widti' depending on whether public expenditures
increase or decrease with ti' If dz # O. the solution is considerably more
complex. with several counteracting effects. The price variation caused by
changes in tax rates or public production wi 11 therefore be further
discussed in the second part of this chapter.
The Laffer curve
The Laffer curve depicts total tax revenues as a function of some measure
of the degree of taxation in the economy. often defined as the average or
marginal tax rate on labour income. This functional relationship was
mentioned by Adam Smith (1776) and described explicitly by Jules Dupui t
(1844. p. 370):
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"Si on augmente graduellement un Impå t depuis O jusqu 'au
chiffre qui equivaut å une prohibition, son produit commence
par etre nul, puis croit insensiblement, atteint un maximum,
decroit ensuite successivement, puis devient nul. Il suit de
lå que quand l'etat a besoin de trouver une somme donnee au
moyen d'un impot, il y a toujours deux taxes qui satisfont å
la condi tion, l'une au-des sus , l'autre au-dessous de celle
qui donne Ie maximum de produit."
In more recent years the Laffer curve has been analysed by several
authors, notably Canto, Joines and Laffer (1981), Fullerton (1982), Bender
(1984) and Malcolmson (1986). The emphasis has been on the curve's slope,
the existence of revenue-maximizing levels of taxation, and whether there
are two or more values of each tax rate which will yield the same revenue.
It is difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions to these questions in a
general equilibrium model. However, they are closely related to the
incidence analysis. Let T be the total revenues from taxation of market
transactions. Then from equation (5) we have that
T(t,s,z,w) - s·y*(t,s,z,w) - t·[w - x*(t,s,z,w)] ,
where x* and y* are the consumer' s factor demand and commodi ty demand
considered as functions of the exogenous variables in general equilibrium.
The graph of T can be defined as the Laffer curve in general equilibrium.
(It is a matter of opinion whether the lump-sum transfers, b, should be
included in this definition. In principle, b may be negative, since it is
the difference between two independent numbers; tax revenues and public
expenditures.) Assuming that w is constant, the differential of T can be
found in equation (10):
dT - [txq
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where [dp db] is the solution of the fundamental incidence formula (11).
In general. the sign of dT is ambiguous. On the other hand. if we make the
same simplifying assumptions as above. Le. x == O. y = O. N = M = 2.q
Sl = S2 = t2 = O. and ds, = dS2 = dt2 = O. the differential is trivial:
dT = -wldtl. The significance of public production comes to the fore if
e.g. Sl -;.O. Retaining the other simplifying assumptions (and dPl = O).
the differential of Tis:
(13) ~1 a~ dp + ~1 db + ~1 dZ]
aQ2 2 ab az
where dpl' dp2 and db solve a modified version of (12):
e21dpl + e22dp2 + e23db = e2dz
(sl~~a~ - gl)dpl + (sl~~a~ - g2)dp2 + (s ~1 - l)db =lab
Now there is a logical possibility that the state's revenues first
increase and then decrease. since each of the five terms in (13) may be
either negative or positive. Suppose. e.g .• that dt, < O. Then we will
normally expect dPl to be positive and dP2 to be negative. so the terms
addition. (8yl/8b)db is positive only if Yl is normal and b increases, or
Yl is inferior and b decreases; whereas 8yl/aZ may be positive or negative
according to whether Yl and z are complements or substitutes in the sense
of Chapter 3. Thus. T may increase as well as decrease. In the first
numerical simulation in part 2 it turns out that a bell-shaped Laffer
curve is easily generated when a factor tax rate is increased. but not
when commodity taxes rise.
PART 2: TIIREE NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Parameterization of the model in part 1
There are several ways to simplify the model in part 1 so as to make the
interpretation of the incidence formulae easier. One approach, which has
been used by Harberger (1962), Shoven and Whalley (1972) and Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980), is to introduce a simpler economic structure. Harberger's
main assumptions may serve as an example (the other analyses are not
identical with the Harberger model, but similar to it):
- There are two factors (N = 2), two commodities (M = 2), no public
goods (K = O) and no public consumption (g = O).
- Factor supply is independent of factor prices (x = O).
- Initially all tax rates are zero, and there is no efficiency loss
from taxation. Then one of the factor tax rates is increased:
[t,s] = [0,0,0,0], [dt,ds]' = [dt1,0,0,0] ~ O.
- The state spends tax revenues in the same way as consumers would
do if faced with the same prices. Public expendi ture is taken
into account by considering consumer demand as compensated. (As
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 173) put it, "the proceeds are
returned to the consumers as a lump-sum subsidy".)
In the present chapter a different approach will be chosen, by using a
computer to simulate small changes in general equilibrium prices. The
analytical validity of the simulation approach of course depends on how
flexible the parameterization of the model is. The main restriction of
this kind in the present model is that elasticities of substitution are
assumed to be constant in all productive activi ties. In addition the
- 113 -
results of course depend on the actual numbers chosen for the parameters
and exogenous variables.
Simple CES production functions.
A simple. single-level CES form will be assumed for private and public
production functions. The minimum unit cost function of firm m can thus be
written as
where um is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of inputs. If
fl and f2 denote the optimal input levels of two production factors. then
Um is defined as the negative of the relative rate of change in f1/f2 as
the marginal rate of substitution changes:
Um = -
The input coefficients are the derivatives of cm(p):
aW(p) = {cm(P)/Pn}um• m = 1•...•M. n = 1•...•N
For simplici ty it is assumed that there is only one public good (K = 1).
On the other hand the public production function z(g) expressing z as a
function of the vector of public inputs can be formulated so as to allow
for decreasing. constant or increasing returns to scale. This may be done
by introducing the elasticity of scale through a monotone transformation
of the simple CES functional form. Cost minimization in the public sector
will then yield conditional factor demand functions:
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= [~ (EP) 1-'Y)'Y/(l-'Y) •
n Pk
l/cz k = 1•...• N
where 'Y is the constant elastici ty of substitution between any pair of
public inputs and c is the scale elasticity.
A single-level CES function is strongly separable and the elasticity of
substitution is the same for any pair of private goods. so substitutes and
complements cannot occur simultaneously in the production functions. It is
convenient to assume as simple a production structure as possible since
the main focus is on the consumer's behaviour. As regards the consumer's
uti lity function. however. both substi tutes and complements should be
allowed. It is also interesting to examine different ways in which the
consumer's demand for private goods may be made to depend on the level of
public production.
The utility function.
As already indicated. a CES function must have (at least) two levels
before it is sufficiently flexible to allow for both substi tutes and
complements. Furthermore. if we are to define complementarity and
substitution between public and private goods as in Chapter 3. the CES
utility function must not be strongly separable in all its arguments. One
of the simplest functional forms satisfying these requirements seems to be
where p == (a - l)/a and a is the elasticity of substi tution at the top
level. i.e. between any pair in the set {x1 •...•XN.y1 •...•{yhZ} ....•yM}.
Since it is increasing in all its arguments. the utility function will be
- 115 -
strictly quasi-concave if a > O. The Lagrange function for maximization of
u subject to the budget constraint (4) is
and the first-order conditions are
1 1
~ xnP + }: YmP + YhP zpJ'P - p-l = Aql i 1, .... Nxi . =m;eh
1 1
~ xnP + }: YmP + YhP zpJ'P - p-l AQJ i 1•...• M. j #- hYJ = . =m;eh
1 1
~ xnP +}: YmP + YhP zpJ'P - p-l zP AQh .Yh =m;eh
xj can be expressed as a function of Yh by eliminating A. the marginal
utilityof income:
With the corresponding function for YJ. the budget restriction can be
rewritten as
so that
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w + b
i = 1 •...• N
Let the consumer' s budget shares be defined as ~n == qnxn/(qw + b) and
am == QmYm/(qw + b). Then the most important partial derivatives are:
axi = (a - 1) ~i (9.i)a~i + ~i !J< i = 1•...• N. i ,#k8qk qk ql ql
axi = [a(~l - 1) - ~ir~i + ~i !.i i = 1•...• N8ql qi ql
axi = (a - 1) ~i (9.1)a ~1 i = 1•...• NaQJ QJ ql j = 1•...• M. j '# h
axl (a - 1) (9.1)a ~1 a-l i 1•...• N= ~1 z =aQh Qh ql
i = 1 •...• N
a-2z i = 1•...• N
(a - 1) ah (~)a ~ zl-a + a!J< k 1 Nqk Qh h Qh' = •...•
j = 1•...• M. j '# h
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From these it is easily seen that the own price derivative of Yh is
unambiguously negative. as is that of Xl if the wealth effect 9IWI/ql is
not too large. (Note that this is not the same as the income effect in a
Slutsky equation. All goods are normal here.) The sign of the cross price
derivatives is the same as the sign of (a - 1). Equalling b/(qw + b).
elastici ties with respect to lump-sum income depend on prices. but are
-identical for all private goods. Finally. 8XI/8z and Byh/8z have opposite
signs which are determined by the sign of (a - 1). so if Xl and z are
complements in the sense of chapter 3. then Yh and z are substitutes. and
vice versa.
In principle. it is now possible to find the parameterized versions of the
analytical results from part 1. However. the resulting expressions would
be completely intractable unless employed in a numerical simulation. For
this purpose the numerical modelling tool COMPAK (Lensberg and Rasmussen.
1986) will be used.
A numerical model of a 5-good economy with exogenous taxes
The point of departure for the numerical simulation is a simple model with
two production factors. two private commodities and one public good. To
determine an equilibrium. some taxation rules must also be introduced. In
the basic equilibrium of the first model presented here. the rule is to
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let all tax rates be equal. In the <X>MPAK algori thm the model must be
formulated as a complementar ity problem. This is done by introducing a
slack variable in each equation along with a complementary sIackness
condition involving the slack variable and its dual variable corresponding
to the equation. Choosing commodi ty 1 as a numera tr-e, the model thus
becomes
Wl - Xl ~ m - gl - Wl = O wl ·Pl = O- m alYm
w2 - x2 ~ m - g2 - w2 O W2·P2 = O- m a2Ym =
P2 - c2 - 'iJ2 = O 'iJ2·P2 = O
~ ~ tn(wn-xn) ~ - bl + b2 O bl ·b2 Om smYm - n - n Pngn = =
where Wl' w2 and 'iJ2 are the respective slack variables for factor market
1. factor market 2. and the profits per unit in firm 2. Either bl or b2
may be the slack variable for the public budget. depending on the sign of
the lump-sum transfers to the consumer. If b > O. then b2 = O. and bl will
be equal to b. If b < O. then bl = O. and b2 will be equal to lb l . The
normalization rule is Pl = Ql = 1. and the taxation rule is tl = t2 = S2'
(All tax rates are non-negative in the numerical model. the computer
program for which is reproduced in Appendix A.) The utility function is
given by:
Exogenous variables and parameters are listed as a reference case below.
along with market prices. tax revenues and lump-sum transfers. supply and
demand. the consumer's budget shares. supply and demand elasticities. the
value shares of the inputs and factor intensities in the initial general
equilibrium. From now on the <X>MPAK variable names will be used in order
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to facili tate the interpretation of the diagrams wi th the simulation
results. The COMPAK variable names are defined in the following list of
initial equilibrium values for exogenous and endogenous variables:
Initial equilibrium and reference case
Parameters
Consumer's substitution parameter (a): ALF = 1.1
Private firms' substitution elasticity (um): SIGI = 0.5
SIG2 = 0.5
Public substitution elasticity (~):
Public scale elasticity (e):
GAM = 0.5
EPS = 1.0
Exogenous variables
Initial factor endowments (wn) WI = 10.000
W2 = 10.000
Z = 1.000
Sl = 0.000
S2 = 0.104
Tl=O.l04
T2=0.104
PYl = 1.000
Public production level (z):
Tax rate on commodity 1 (Sl):
Tax rate on commodity 2 (S2):
Factor tax rates (tn):
Producer price of commodity 1 (Pl):
Main endogenous variables
Producers' factor prices (Pn): PXl = 0.250
PX2 = 0.250
PY2 = 1.000
QXl = 0.146
QX2 = 0.146
QYl = 1.000
QY2 = 1.104
TRAN = 0.000
Producer price of commodity 2 (P2):
Consumer's factor prices (qn):
Consumer price of commodity 1 (Ql):
Consumer price of commodity 2 (Q2):
Lump-sum transfers (b):
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Other endogenous variables
Consumer's factor demand (xn):
Consumer's demand for commodity 1 (Y1):
Consumer's demand for commodity 2 (Y2):
Public factor demand (gn):
(-åx1/8q1)(q1/(W1-X1»:
(-åx2/8q2)(q2/(W2-X2»:
(-åx1/8q2)(q2/(W1-X1»:
(-åx2/8q1)(q1/(W2-X2»:
(-åx1/8Q1)(Q1/(W1-X1»:
(-åx2/8Q1)(Q1/(W2-X2»:
(-åx1/8Q2) (Q2/(W1-X1»:
(-åx2/8Q2) (Q2/(W2-X2»:
(8y1/8q1)(q1/Y1):
(8y1/8q2)(q2/Y1):
(8y2/8q1)(q1/Y2):
(8y2/8q2)(q2/Y2):
(8y1/8Q1)(Q1/Y1):
(8y1/8Q2)(Q2/Y1):
(8y2/8Q1)(Q2/Y1):
(8y2/8Q2) (Q2/Y2):
Xl = 5.492
X2 = 5.492
Yl = 0.661
Y2 = 0.593
Gl = 2.000
G2 = 2.000
ESXlXl = 0.698
ESX2X2 = 0.698
ESXlX2 = -0.643
ESX2Xl = -0.643
ESXlYl = -0.028
ESX2Yl = -0.028
ESXlY2 = -0.027
ESX2Y2 = -0.027
EDYlXl = 0.527
EDYlX2 = 0.527
EDY2Xl = 0.527
EDY2X2 = 0.527
EDYl Yl = -1.077
EDYlY2 = 0.022
EDY2Yl = 0.023
EDY2Y2 = -1.078
Since ALF = 1.1 > 1, the cross price derivatives will be positive, and the
factor (ALF - 1) will be rather small. The demand for Y2 increases with Z,
as does the supply of both production factors, since Xl and X2 decrease
with Z. The substitution elasticities SIGl, SIG2 and GAM are moderate, so
that the economy will probably be quite well-behaved. Numerically there is
no difference between the two production factors, and their prices are
equal in the initial equilibrium. Since the tax rate S2 makes QY2 somewhat
higher than QYl, the demand for Y2 is slightly lower than the demand for
Yl. The absolute values of the own price and cross price factor supply
elasticities are perhaps larger than one would have expected to see in an
empirical model, but still not too unrealistic. On the other hand, there
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are negligible cross price elastici ties of factor supply and commodi ty
demand wi th respect to commodity prices. The level of public production
being equal to 1, all goods enter symmetrically in the utility function.
The exogenous tax rates S2, Tl and T2 have been adjusted so that lump-sum
transfers are approximately zero.
Harberger incidence
Several exercises in comparative statics are now possible. We start with a
series of 1% increments of Tl, in the spirit of the Harberger model.3) Tl
is increased until the consumer price QXl is so low that it is no longer
possible to find an equilibrium. This happens at Tl = 0.454. The level of
public production, Z, is held constant, and excess tax revenues are
returned to the consumer as a lump-sum transfer. The main results of these
tax changes are shown in Figures 4.1-4.8. Note that the origins of the
diagrams are not in the point [0,0].
Figure 4.1 demonstrates what is usually meant by tax incidence; the effect
on the market prices of increasing the tax rate in the market (all tax
rates are defined as non-negative numbers in the diagrams). The general
equilibrium result here is as expected. The producer price of factor 1,
PXl, increases, and the consumer price, QXl, decreases. It is also clear
that the slope of the PXl curve is greater than the negative of the slope
of the QXl curve. In this sense the greater part of the tax incidence is
on the producers.
3)In the Harberger model, a factor tax rate is increased in one of the
firms. Here it is increased in one of the markets. The point, however, is
that tax rates are exogenous and that the revenues are returned to the
consumer as lump-sum transfers.
Paths of PXI and QXI as Tl increases
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the price changes in factor market 2 when the tax
rate is increased in factor market 1. There are several counteracting
effects behind the downward-sloping curves for the producer price PX2 and
the consumer price QX2. E.g .. when PXl increases. there is a substitution
effect which increases the producers' demand for factor 2 and thus works
towards an increase in PX2. On the other hand. there is a scale effect
working in the opposite direction. As figure 4.2 shows. the net effect of
these and other adjustments is a decrease in PX2 and QX2. The distance
between the two curves is of course constant since T2 is not changed.
In Figure 4.3 a rather surprising result is displayed: When Tl increases.
total tax revenues TREV first rise. then fall. exactly as described by
Dupuit (1844). The resul t is surprising for two reasons. First. many
authors have argued that total tax revenues fall only if tax rates and/or
supply elasticities are very high. Second. it is often seen that such
effects are somewhat greater in partial equil ibrium than in a general
equilibrium model because of the dampening repercussions of the latter. In
Figure 4.3. which depicts a general equilibrium result. maximum tax
revenues are 1.217 (or 21.7% above the reference case) at the tax rate
Tl = 0.256 (or 78.5% of the producer price. which is PXl = 0.326). At the
maximum the own price supplyelasticity of factor 1 is ESXlXl = 1.555, and
the two cross price elasticities are ESXlX2 = -1.158 and ESX2X1 = -0.657.
It seems that the magnitude of the cross price elasticities in factor
supply is an important cause of both the Dupui t-l..affereffects and the
declining prices in factor market 2. As Tl increases and QXl falls. the
consumer wi thdraws his supply of factor 1 and increases his supply of
factor 2. He also reduces his commodity demand (the cross elasticity is
0.435 at the maximum). The rising supply of factor 2 induces a downward
Dupuit -Laffer curve as TI increases
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pressure on PX2 and QX2, and the greater tax revenues from this market do
not outweigh the decline in revenues from factor market 1 and commodity
market 2.
The variations in different elasticities as Tl rises are shown in Figures
4.4-4.8. We see that the own price supplyelasticity of factor I, ESXlXl,
increases, and its cross price supplyelasticity, ESXlX2, decreases. The
cross price supplyelasticity of factor 2, ESX2Xl, first rises slightly,
then it falls. This factor's own price supplyelasticity rises at first,
but seems to attain a maximum just before the equilibrium breaks down. The
cross price supply elastici ty of factor 2 wi th respect to QYl, ESX2Yl,
falls initially, but clearly reaches a minimum and starts to increase
before the breakdown of equilibrium. Note, however, that the interval of
variation is very small: [-0.0409, -0.0276].
If T2 were changed instead of Tl, exactly the same results would occur,
since numerically there is no difference between the production factors in
the model. Therefore only the effects of increasing the commodity tax rate
S2 remain to be seen. Some of them are illustrated in Figures 4.9-4.10.
First and foremost. Figure 4.9 shows that the incidence of taxation is
entirely on the consumer. since the producer price PY2 is not affected by
S2 at all. Thus. even though increases in QY2 could have repercussion
effects in factor markets through cross elastici ties and the consumer' s
real income. this does not appear to have any impact on the firm's total
costs. (The reason may be that such an impact is numerically negligible.
since the cross elasticities are small: -0.03. But as will become clear
later. there is a remarkable "separability" between the commodity side and
the factor side of this particular model.) Figure 4.10 demonstrates the
Dupuit-Laffer curve for an increase in S2: tax revenues do not decline at
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any point. (The simulation was stopped after incrementing S2 by 1% 200
times. without any breakdown of equilibrium.) It also turns out that the
own price and cross price supply elasticities develop in a straighforward
manner. and that all factor prices remain constant at their initial
levels.
A modified model with endogenous tax rates
The purpose of this section is to compare the results from the Harberger
incidence analysis wi th those obtained when the taxation level increases
and tax rates are endogenous. The numerical model in the previous section
can of course not be used to compute optimal tax rates unless completed
with a set of equations representing the new tax rules. These equations
will be the first-order conditions for optimal taxes which were discussed
in Chapter 3. Thus. equation (3) in part 1 of this chapter is replaced by
(3' ) Pl = Ql = 1
(3' ') Xk - Wk + ~~ Pn ~ + ~ Pm ~] = O. k = 1, .... N
(3' , ') YJ + ~~ Pn ~ + ~ Pm ~] = O. j = 2 •..•• M
Here ~ is the consumer's marginal utility of income. determined by utility
maximization:
v = max u(x. z) subject to q(w - x) + b = Qy ~ ~ = av/Bb
As indicated in Chapter 3. ~ is the marginal cost of public funds. i.e. if
T is the public revenue requirement and the consumer's indirect utility
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function v is taken as a measure of social welfare, then ~ = -av/aT. ~ is
determined along with p, p, q and Q by equations (1), (2), (3')-(3"'),
(4), and (5). In equation (5), the tax vectors are defined by
[t, s] - [q, Q]- [p,. P]
Finally, lump-sum transfers (or taxes) are exogenously given. Normally, b
will equal zero, since if lump-sum taxation were feasible, there would be
no need for other optimal taxes. The computer program for this model is
reproduced in Appendix B.
If all the remaining exogenous variables are held at the same levels as in
the previous section (including the public production level), the main
endogenous variables in the equilibrium with optimal taxation are:
Equilibrium with optimal tax rates
Producers' factor prices (Pn): PXl = 0.250
PX2 = 0.250
PY2 = 1.000
QXl = 0.139
QX2 = 0.139
QY2 = 1.000
Xl = 5.492
X2 = 5.492
Producer price of commodity 2 (P2):
Consumer's factor prices (qn):
Consumer price of commodi ty 2 (Q2):
Consumer's factor demand (xn):
Consumer's commodity demand (Ym): Yl = 0.627
Y2 = 0.627
There are only two important differences between this equilibrium and the
reference case. First, the optimal tax rates are Tl = 0.1109, T2 = 0.1109
and S2 = O. Second, the demand for Yl equals the demand for Y2, and their
prices are now the same. This symmetry between the two commodi ties is
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reflected in the consumer' s demand and supply elastici ties. which also
differ very li ttle from the reference case. It is not obvious why the
optimal commodity tax rate S2 is equal to zero. but it may be related to
the fact that as long as Z = 1. the commodities enter symmetrically into
the consumer' s uti lity function. and the tax rate Sl is constrained to
equal zero. In the same way we may note that factor tax rates are equal
and that the two factors also enter symmetrically in the utility function.
In the numerical simulations which follow. the public production level is
repeatedly increased by 1% until the consumer's factor prices are so low
that it is no longer possible to £ind an equilibrium. It is assumed that
the returns to scale in public production are constant: EPS = 1. Some of
the main results are shown in Figures 4.11-4.16. In Figure 4.11 we see
that the factor tax rates are always equal. and they appear to increase
almost linearly until Z approaches the level where the general equilibrium
breaks down (the end point is at Z = 1.891). In Figure 4.12 the paths of
the optimal factor prices are displayed to demonstrate the incidence of
optimal factor taxes. It turns out that the incidence is entirely on the
consumer; the producers' factor prices remain constant when Tl and T2
increases. As will become clear later. this is due to the specification of
this particular numerical example.
Figure 4.13 shows that under optimal taxation and constant returns to
scale. tax revenues increase in exact proportion to the public production
level. In general equilibrium. tax revenues are always equal to public
expenditures. which in this case are the total costs of public production.
Since the public sector minimizes costs (by assumption). the tax revenue
function will be an ordinary minimum cost function. provided that the
producers' factor prices are constant. Figure 4.12 shows that they are.
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and we can therefore use the public factor demand functions to express the
public cost function and the tax revenues as
'Y 'Y
T = Pigi + P2g2 = Pi (1+(~) 1-'YP-'Y zl/e + P2 (1+(~~)1-'YP-'Y zl/t
Since Pi = P2 = 0.25 and 'Y= 0.5. we have that
T = 0.25(1 + l)'Y/(l-'Y)+ (1 + l)'Y/(l-'Y)]zl/t
Ilc= z
Thus. as long as producers' factor prices remain constant at their initial
level. the curvature of the tax revenue function is determined by the
public scale elasticity.
There is no Dupui t-l.a.ffercurve in this model. since the tax rates are
endogenous. However. for the sake of comparison with Figure 4.3. total tax
revenues are plotted against Tl in Figure 4.14. We see that revenues rise
almost linearly with Tl. but with a slight. concave curvature towards the
breakdown of the equilibrium.
Figure 4.15 depicts the development of the two Lagrange multipliers. LAM
(A) and MU (~). No clear conclusion was drawn in the discussion in Chapter
3 of how the consumer's marginal utility of income and the marginal cost
of public funds develop when the public production level rises. Here we
see that ~ exceeds A everywhere. and it becomes very large as Z approaches
its end point 1.891. The consequences of this for NU (v). the coefficient
(A - ~)/~. are shown in Figure 4.16. NU is the percentage marginal loss
from not using lump-sum taxes instead of distortive tax rates and appears
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in the optimal tax formula (1) in Chapter 3. NU is negative. and its
absolute value grows progressively with Z. This indicates that the real
cost of optimal taxation increases with the overall tax level.
Other results of the simulation (not shown ~n the diagrams) are that all
four commodity prices. PYI. PY2. QYl and QY2. remain constant at their
initial level (which is 1) when Z is increased and taxation is optimal. In
other words. the optimal S2 is stillO. although Y2 and Z are complements
in the sense of Chapter 3: The demand for Yl falls as taxation increases.
and so does the demand for Y2; but less rapidly.
Simulation 3: Optimal taxes and non-constant producer prices
The third numerical simulation model is included here just to show that
the constancy of optimal producer prices in the previous section is
probably a coincidence of numbers and not a theoretical property. In
addition the example will serve to point out that producer prices are not
necessarily constant in a comparative statics sense when the tax rates are
optimal. The model is taken from Berg (1989). but will be sketched briefly
below.
There are 6 goods in the model: 2 production factors denoted Xl and X3; 3
privately produced commoditites. denoted xo. X2' and X4; and one public
good. denoted by z. The consumer prices of the private commodities are Qn.
n = 0 •...•4. and the producer prices are Pn. n = 0.1 •...•4. Commodity O is
chosen as a numeraire. so that QO = PO = 1. The three private production
functions are of the single-level CES type. with substitution elasticities
0.5. 0.6 and 0.4 for good O. 2 and 4. respectively. The public production
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function is also single-level CES, with the elastici ty of substi tution
equal to 0.2. Returns to scale are constant in all production·activities.
The one representative consumer has a two-level CES utility function which
is independent of the public production level:
u(x)
where p = 1.2, ~ = 0.7 and ~ = 0.3. The consumer's initial endowments of
the production factors are W1 = W2 = 5, and the public production level is
equal to 1. Then the optimal taxation equilibrium is:
Pl = 0.9392 Ql = 0.8392
P2 = 1.1312 Q2 = 1.1655
P3 = 1.0627 Q3 = 0.8870
P4 = 1.0585 Q4 = 1.1775
The marginal cost of government funds in terms of private income is 1.0044
in this initial equilibrium. Now the public production level is repeatedly
incremented by 1% from 1.0000 to 3.0177, and the corresponding paths for
optimal producer and consumer prices in the model are computed. The most
important results are displayed in Figures 4.17-4.22. Figure 4.17 shows
that the producer price of factor 1 rises from 0.9392 to 0.9554 when z is
increased. The incidence is mainly on the consumer price, however, as is
evident form Figure 4.18. In the same way, the producer price of factor 2
falls wi th increasing public production (Figure 4.19), but less so than
the consumer price of that factor (Figure 4.20). Figures 4.21 and 4.22
depict the equilibrium paths of the conunodity prices. The producers'
output prices turn out to be constant, and the incidence is entirely on
the consumer.
Path of optimal PI as Z increases
0.956
0.955
0.954
0.953
0.952
0.951
0.95
0.949
0.948
0.947
0.946
0.945
0.944
0.943
0.942
0.941
0.94
0.939
Z
Figure 4.17
Paths of optimal PI and QI as Z increases
0.96
0.94
Pl
0.92
0.9
0.88
0.86
0.84
0.82
0.8
0.78
0.76
0.74
0.72
0.7
0.68
0.66
0.64
Z
Figure 4.18
Path of optimal P3 as Z increases
1.063
1.062
1.061
1.06
1.059
1.058
1.057
1.056
1.055
1.054
1.053
1.052
1.051
1.05
1.049
1.048
1.047
1.046
1.045
Z
Figure 4.19
Paths of optimal P3 and Q3 as Z increases
1.1~----------------------,
1
P3
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5 -'-- ___~
z
Figure 4.20
Paths of optimal P2 and Q2 as Z increases
1.28
1.26
1.24
1.22
1.2
1.18
1.16
1.14 P2
1.12
1.1
1.08
1.06
1.04
1.02
1
Z
Figure 4.21
Paths of optimal P4 and Q4 as Z increases
1.55 ~---------------------,
P4
1.05 ...1::=======================1 z
Figure 4.22
- 141 -
Concluding remarks
Any numerical simulation result depends critically on the values chosen
for the exogenous variables of the model. as well as on the functional
forms being used. The present models are no exception. and the diagrams in
this chapter can only be taken as demonstrations of what is possible in
general equilibrium. There are several ways to assess whether the results
are plausible. One is to investigate the sensitivity with respect to the
functional specification and the values of exogenous variables and
parameters. This is a demanding task. and will not be attempted here.
Another possibili ty is to formulate a model with empirically plausible
estimates of the parameters. Such a model will be discussed in the next
chapter.
Appendix A: Computer program for the model with exogenous tax rates
C This is a COMPAK V2.1 input file.
C Programmer: Morten Berg, Centre for Applied Research.
C WI and W2 are initial endowments; of which the consumer
C demands Xl and X2, producers demand Fl and F2, and the
C state demands Gl and G2. Private firms and the state face
C factor prices PXI and PX2, the consumer faces QXI and QX2.
C The consumer's commodity demand is Yl and Y2 at prices QYI
C and QY2. Producers' commodity prices are PYI and PY2. Tl,
C T2, Sl and S2 are the factor and commodity tax rates, and
C Z is the level of public production. TRAN is a lump-sum
C transfer from the state to the consumer, and LUMP is a
C lump-sum tax.
C Commodity 1 is the numeraire, so that PYI=QYI=1 and SI=O.
MODEL
FCTRI,XSWI,QXI,2
FCTR2,XSW2,QX2,2
DFCT2, PY2,XSC2, 1
BUDG,TRAN,LUMP,1
PARAMETERS
C ALF is the elasticity of substitution in the utility
C function, SIGI, SIG2 and GAM are the elasticities of
C substitution in firm I, firm 2, and public production.
C EPS is the public scale elasticity.
ALF=I.1
SIGI=O.5
SIG2=O.5
GAM=O.5
EPS=1.0
C The level of initial endowments is an origin for the model:
WI=10
W2=10
C Choice of numeraire involves one producer price and
C its slack variable:
PYI=I.O
XSCl=O
C The level of public production is 1 at the outset,
C making Z a dummy parameter:
Z=l
C The tax system is exogenously given by the level of
C each tax rate; or half endogenously by some tax formula:
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Tl::O.l04l
T2::O.1041
Sl::O
S2::O.1041
DEFINITIONS
)()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()(
C The consumer
)()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()(
C Consumer's commodity prices:
QYl=PYl
QY2=PY2+S2
C Value of initial endowments and lump-sum transfers:
GRIN=(QXl)(Wl)+(QX2)(W2)+TRAN-LUMP
C Consumer's demand:
A=l-ALF
PRC=(QY2AALF)*«QXlAA)+(QX2AA)+(QYlAA»
Y2=GRIN/«PRCJE(ZAA»+QY2)
Yl=«QY2/QYl)AALF)*Y2*(ZAA)
X2=«QY2/QX2)AALF)*Y2*(ZAA)
Xl=«QY2/QXl)AALF)*Y2*(ZAA)
C Consumer's budget shares:
PHIl=(QXl*Xl)/GRIN
PHI2=(QX2*X2)/GRIN
ZETl=(QXl*Wl)/GRIN
ZET2=(QX2*W2)/GRIN
THEl~(QYl*Yl)/GRIN
THE2=(QY2*Y2)/GRIN
C Consumer's demand derivatives:
DXlXl=«(ALF*(PHIl-l»-PHIl)*(Xl/QXl»+(PHIl*(Wl/QXl»
DXlX2=«-A)*PHIl*«QXl/QX2)AALF)*(Xl/QXl»+(PHIl*(W2/QXl»
DXIYl=(-A)*PHI1*«QXl/QYl)AALF)*(Xl/QXl)
DXlY2=(-A)*PHI1*«QXl/QY2)AALF)*(Xl/QXl)*(ZA(-A»
DX2Xl=«-A)*PHI2*«QX2/QXl)AALF)*(X2IQX2»+(PHI2*(Wl/QX2»
DX2X2=«(ALF*(PHI2-l»-PHI2)*(X2IQX2»+(PHI2*(W2/QX2»
DX2Yl=(-A)*PHI2*«QX2/QYl)AALF)*(X2IQX2)
DX2Y2=(-A)*PHI2*«QX2/QY2)AALF)*(X2/QX2)*(ZA(-A»
DYlXl=(ZETl-(A*THE1*«QXl/QYl)AA»)*(Yl/QX1)
DYlX2=(ZET2-(A*THEl*«QX2/QY1)AA»)*(Yl/QX2)
DYlYl=«ALF*(THEl-l»-THEl)*(Yl/QYl)
DYlY2=(-A)*THEl*«QY1/QY2)AALF)*(Yl/QY1)*(ZA(-A»
DY2Xl=(ZETl-(A*THE2*«QXl/QY2)AA)*(ZAA»)*(Y2/QXl)
DY2X2=(ZET2-(A*THE2*«QX2/QY2)AA)*(ZAA»)*(Y2/QX2)
DY2Yl=(-A)*THE2*«QY2/QYl)AALF)*(Y2/QY2)*(ZAA)
DY2Y2=«ALF*(THE2-l»-THE2)*(Y2/QY2)
C Consumer's factor SUPPLY elasticities:
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ESX1X1=DX1X1*(QX1/(X1-W1»
ESX1X2=DX1X2*(QX2!(X1-W1»
ESX1Y1=DX1Y1*(QY1/(X1-W1»
ESX1Y2=DX1Y2*(QY2/(X1-W1»
ESX2X1=DX2X1*(QX1/(X2-W2»
ESX2X2=DX2X2*(QX2/(X2-W2»
ESX2Y1=DX2Y1*(QY1/(X2-W2»
ESX2Y2=DX2Y2*(QY2/(X2-W2»
C Consumer's commodity demand elasticities:
EDY1X1=DYIXIMQXl/y1
EDYIX2=DYIX2MQX2/Y1
EDYIY1=DY1Y1MQY1/Yl
EDYIY2=DYIY2MQY2/Y1
EDY2Xl=DY2XlMQXl/Y2
EDY2X2=DY2X2MQX2/Y2
EDY2Y1 =DY2Y1MQY1/y2
EDY2Y2=DY2Y2MQY2/Y2
)()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()(
C The producers
)()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()(
C Producers' factor prices:
PXl=QX1+Tl
PX2=QX2+T2
C The production functions are single-level CES, with
C constant returns to scale. Unit cost functions:
Cl=«PXlA(1-SIGl»+(PX2A(1-SIGl»)A(1/(1-SIG1»
C2=«PXIA(1-SIG2»+(PX2A(1-SIG2»)A(1/(1-SIG2»
C Input coefficient functions:
A11=(Cl/PXl)ASIGl
Al2=(Cl/PX2)ASIGl
A21=(C2/PXl)ASIG2
A22=(C2/PX2} ASIG2
C Factor demand:
Fll=All*Yl
F12=A12*Yl
F21=A21*Y2
F22=A22*Y2
C Factors' value shares:
KSIFll=(PXl*All)/Cl
KSIFl2=(PX2*A12)/Cl
KSIF21=(PXl*A21)/C2
KSIF22=(PX2*A22}/C2
C Factor intensities:
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IOTA1=FIIIF12
lOTA2=F211F22
)()()()()()()()()()()()()(
C The state
)()()()()()()()()()()()()(
C The public production function is single-level CES.
C Contingent factor demand functions:
G=I-GAM
Gl=«l+«PX2IPXl}AG}}A(GAMlG}}*(ZA(I/EPS}}
G2=«1+«PXl/PX2}AG}}A(GAMlG}}*(ZA(1/EPS}}
C Tax revenues and public expenditure:
TREV=(Sl*Yl}+(S2*Y2}+(Tl*(Wl-Xl}}+(T2*(W2-X2}}
PEXP=(PXl*Gl}+(PX2*G2}
)()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()(
C General equilibrium
)()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()(
FCTRl=Wl-Xl-Fll-F2l-Gl-XSWl
FCTR2=W2-X2-F1 2-F22-G2-XSW2
DFCTl=Cl-PYl+XSCl
DFCT2=C2-PY2+XSC2
BUDG=TREV+LUMP-PEXP- TRAN
INITIAL GUESS
QXl::O.1459
QX2::O.1459
PY2=1.
TRAN::O.
RUN DATA
1'MAX=147
DT=l
PR INT= l
LOGFIL--O
BDR::O
DYNAMICS
Tl=Tl*l.Ol
OUTPUf
Wl.Wl
ALF.SIGl.SIG2.GAM.EPS
Tl.T2.Sl.S2.LUMP
PXl.QXl. PX2.QX2
PYl.QYl. PY2.QY2
Xl.X2. Yl. Y2
PHIl.PHI2.ZETl.ZET2.THEl.THE2
ESXlXl. ESXlX2. ESXl Yl. ESXl Y2
ESX2Xl. ESX2X2. ESX2Yl. ESX2Y2
EDYlXl.EDYlX2.EDYlYl.EDYlY2
EDY2Xl. EDY2X2. EDY2Yl. EDY2Y2
Cl.C2.Fll.F12.F2l.F22
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KSIFll,KSIF12,KSIF2l,KSIF22,IOTAl.IOTA2
Z.Gl.G2.TREV.PEXP.TRAN
END
Appendix B: Computer program for the model with optimal tax rates
C This is a COMPAK V2.l input file.
C Programmer: Morten Berg. Centre for Applied Research.
C WI and W2 are initial endowments; of which the consumer
C demands Xl and X2. producers demand Fl and F2. and the
C state demands Gl and G2. Private firms and the state face
C factor prices PXl and PX2. the consumer faces QXl and QX2.
C The consumer's commodity demand is Yl and Y2 at prices QYl
C and QY2. Producers' commodity prices are PYl and PY2. Tl.
C T2. Sl and S2 are the factor and commodity tax rates, and
C Z is the level of public production. TRAN is a lump-sum
C transfer from the state to the consumer.
C Commodi ty 1 is the numerat re , so that PYl=QYl=l and Sl::O.
MODEL
EQUI •PXl •RFSI'1.1
EQU2. PX2. RFSI'2.1
EQU3, PY2.RFSI'3. 1
EQU4,QXl.RFSI'4.l
EQU5,QX2.RFSI'5.1
EQU6.QY2,RFSI'6,1
PARAMETERS
C ALF is the elasticity of substitution in the utility
C function. SIGl. SIG2 and GAM are the elasticities of
C substitution in firm 1. firm 2. and public production.
C EPS is the public scale elasticity.
ALF=l.l
SIG1::O.5
SIG2=O.5
GAM::O.5
EPS=1
C The level of initial endowments is an origin for the model:
Wl=lO
W2=lO
C Choice of numeraire involves th~ producer and consumer price
C of one good:
PYl=l
QYl=l
C The level of public production is 1 at the outset.
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C making Z a dummy parameter:
Z=l
DEFINITIONS
M)(MMMMM)()(M)(M)(MMM
C The consumer
C Value of initial endowments and lump-sum transfers:
GRIN={QX1*Wl)+{QX2*W2)
C Consumer's demand:
A=l-ALF
PRC={QY2AALF)*{{QXIAA)+{QX2AA)+{QYIAA»
Y2=GRIN/{{PRCM{ZAA»+QY2)
Yl={{QY2/QY1)AALF)*Y2*{ZAA)
X2={{QY2/QX2)AALF)*Y2*{ZAA)
Xl={{QY2/QX1)AALF)*Y2*{ZAA)
C Marginal utility of income (times lOA-6):
RHO={ -A)/ALF
L={{XIARHO)+{X2ARHO)+{YIARHO)+{{Y2*Z)ARHO»A{1./{-A»
LAM={L*{XIA{l./{-ALF»»/QXl
LM6=LAM/{lOA6)
C Consumer's budget shares:
PHI1={QX1*Xl)/GRIN
PHI2={QX2*X2)/GRIN
ZETl={QX1*Wl)/GRIN
ZET2={QX2*W2)/GRIN
THEl={QY1*Yl)/GRIN
THE2={QY2*Y2)/GRIN
C Consumer's demand derivatives:
DXIXl={{{ALF*{PHIl-l»-PHI1)*{Xl/QX1»+{PHIl*{Wl/QX1»
DXIX2={{-A)*PHIl*{{QX1/QX2)AALF)*{Xl/QX1»+{PHIl*{W2/QX1»
DXIYl={-A)*PHIl*{{QX1/QY1)AALF)*{Xl/QX1)
DXIY2={-A)*PHIl*{{QX1/QY2)AALF)*{Xl/QXl)*{ZA{-A»
DX2Xl={{-A)*PHI2*{{QX2/QXl)AALF)*{X2/QX2»+{PHI2*{Wl/QX2»
DX2X2={{{ALF*{PHI2-1»-PHI2)*{X2/QX2»+{PHI2*{W2/QX2»
DX2Yl={-A)*PHI2*{{QX2/QYl)AALF)*{X2/QX2)
DX2Y2={-A)*PHI2*{{QX2/QY2)AALF)*{X2/QX2)*{ZA{-A»
DYIXl={ZETl-{AMTHEl*{{QXl/QYl)AA»)*{Yl/QXl)
DYIX2={ZET2-{AMTHEl*{{QX2/QYl)AA»)*{Yl/QX2)
DYIYl={{ALF*{THEl-l»-THEl)*{Yl/QYl)
DYIY2={-A)MTHEl*{{QYl/QY2)AALF)*{Yl/QYl)*{ZA{-A»
DY2Xl={ZETl-{A*THE2*{{QXl/QY2)AA)*{ZAA»)*{Y2/QXl)
DY2X2={ZET2-{A*THE2*{{QX2/QY2)AA)*{ZAA»)*{Y2/QX2)
DY2Yl={-A)MTHE2*{{QY2/QYl)AALF)*{Y2/QY2)*{ZAA)
DY2Y2={{ALF*{THE2-1»-THE2)*{Y2/QY2)
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)()E)E)E)()E)()()()()()()()()()()(
C The producers
)()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()(
C The production functions are single-level CES. with
C constant returns to scale. Unit cost functions:
C1=«PX1A(1-SIG1»+(PX2A(1-SIG1»)A(1/(1-SIG1»
C2=({PX1A(1-SIG2»+{PX2A{1-SIG2»)A{1/{1-SIG2»
C Input coefficient functions:
A11={C11PX1)ASIG1
A12={C11PX2)ASIGl
A21={C2lPX1)ASIG2
A22={C2/PX2) ASIG2
C Factor demand:
F11=A11*Y1
F12=A12*Y1
F21=A21*Y2
F22=A22*Y2
)()E)()()()()()()()()()()(
C The state
)()()()()()OE)()()()()()(
C The public production function is single-level CES.
C Conditional factor demand functions:
G=l--GAM
G1={{1+{(PX2IPX1)AG»A(GAMlG»*(ZA(1/EPS»
G2={(1+{{PX11PX2)~»A{GAMlG»*{ZA(1/EPS»
C Optimal tax rates:
Tl=PX1-QXl
T2=PX2-QX2
Sl=QYI-PYl
S2=QY2-PY2
C Tax revenues and public expenditure:
TREV={Sl*Y1)+{S2*Y2)+(T1*{W1-X1»+(T2*{W2-X2»
PEXP={PX1*G1)+{PX2*G2)
C Optimal tax formula coefficients and marginal cost of
C public funds (times 10A-6):
SUMX1={PX1*DX1Xl)+{PX2*DX2X1)+{PY1*DYlX1)+(PY2*DY2Xl)
SUMX2={PX1*DXIX2)+{PX2*DX2X2)+{PY1*DYIX2)+{PY2*DY2X2)
SUMY2={PX1*DXIY2)+{PX2*DX2Y2)+{PY1*DYIY2)+{PY2*DY2Y2)
MU=(LAMM{WI-Xl»/SUMXl
MU6=MU/{lOA6)
NU={LAM-MU)/MU
- 149 -
)()( )()()()()()()()OOOOE)E)()()()()()()()E)E)()()( )E)E)()()()()()()()()()()()()()( )()(
C General equilibrium with optimal taxation
)()()()( )()()()E)()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()( )()()(
EQU1=X1-W1+Fll+F2l+Gl+RESTl
EQU2=X2-W2+F1 2+F22+G2+REST2
EQU3=C2-PY2+REST3
EQU4=PEXP-TREV+TRAN
EQUS=RESTS-X2-{{MUILAM}*SUMX2}+W2
EQU6=REST6-Y2-{{MUILAM}*SUMY2}
DFCTl=Cl-PYl+XSCl
INITIAL GUESS
PXl::O.25
PX2::O.25
PY2=1
QXl::O.1391
QX2::O.1391
QY2=1
RUN DATA
TMAX=63
DT=l
PRINT=l
LOGFIL::O
BDR::O
DYNAMICS
Z=Z*l.Ol
OUTPUT
C Wl,W2
C ALF.SIGl.SIG2.GAM.EPS
Tl,T2.S2. TREV
LM6.MU6.NU •PEXP
PXl.QXl. PX2.QX2
PYl.QYl. PY2.QY2
Xl.X2. Yl.Y2
Fll.F12.F2l.F22.Gl.G2
C DXlXl.DXlX2.DXlYl.DXlY2
C DX2Xl. DX2X2. DX2Yl. DX2Y2
C DYlXl.DYlX2.DYlYl.DYlY2
C DY2Xl.DY2X2.DY2Yl.DY2Y2
END
- 150 -
References
Atkinson. A.B .• Stiglitz. J.E. (1980):
Lectures on Public Economics.
McGraw-Hill Book Co. Ltd., Maidenhead. 1980.
Bender. B. (1984):
An Analysis of the Laffer Curve.
Economic Inquiry. vol. 22.' 1984. pp. 414 - 420.
Berg. M. (1989):
Diamond-Mirrlees Optimal Taxation of Capi tal and other Production
Factors.
Paper presented at "Workshop on Capi tal Income Taxation". Gei lo,
Norway. August 22-23. 1989; Centre for applied Research. Institute of
Economics. University of Oslo.
Canto. V.A .• Joines. D.H., Laffer, A.B. (1981):
Tax Rates. Factor Employment. and Market Production.
pp. 3-32 in Meyer, L.H. (ed.): The Supply-Side Effects of Economic
Policy. Proceedings of the 1980 Economic Policy Conference, Center for-
the Study of American Business. Washington University in St. Louis and
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 1981.
Dixit. A.K., Norman, V.D. (1980):
Theory of International Trade. A Dual. General Equilibrium Approach.
J. Nisbet &Co. Ltd. and Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Dupuit. J. (1844):
De la mesure de l'utilite des travaux publics.
Annales des ponts et chausees. 2e serie. ler semestre, 1844, pp. 332 -
375.
Fullerton: D. (1982):
On the Possibility of an Inverse Relationship between Tax Rates and
Government Revenues.
Journal of Public Economics. vol. 19. 1982. pp. 3 - 22.
Harberger. A.C. (1962):
The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax.
Journal of PoH tical Economy. vol. 70, 1962. pp. 215 - 240.
Lensberg. T .• Rasmussen. H. (1986):
O>MPAK Version 2.0. User Manual.
Working paper MU09. Centre for Applied Research. Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration. 1986.
Maleolmson. J.M. (1986):
Some Analytics of the Laffer Curve.
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 29. 1986, pp. 263 - 279.
McLure. C~E. (1970):
Tax Incidence. Macroeconomic Policy. and Absolute Prices.
Quarterly Journal of Economics. vol. 84. 1970, pp. 254 - 267.
- 151 -
McLure. C.E. (1972):
The Theory of Expenditure Inc~dence.
Finanzarchiv. vol. 30. 1972. pp. 432 - 453.
Mieszkowski. P.M. (1967):
On the Theory of Tax Incidence.
Journal of Political Economy. vol. 75. 1967. pp. 250 - 262.
Shoven. J.B .• Whalley. J. (1972):
A General Equilibrium Calculation of the Effects of the Differential
Taxation of Income from Capital in the U.S.
Journal of Public Economics. vol. 1. 1972. pp. 281 - 321.
Smith. A. (1776):
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
Reprinted by Campbell. R.H .. Skinner. A.S .. Todd. W.B. (eds.).
Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1976.
Vandendorpe. A.L .• Friediaender. A.F. (1976):
Differential Incidence in the Presence of Initial Distorting Taxes.
Journal of Public Economics. vol. 6. 1976. pp. 205 - 229.

Chapter 5
April 1990
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WIrn OPTIMAL TAXATION:
A COMPLEMENTARIlY FORMAT AND A NORWEGIAN MODEL
"The world is all that is the case."
Ludwig Wittgenstein
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WIrn OPTIMAL TAXATION:
A roMPLEMENTARITY FORMAT AND A NORWEGIAN MODEL
Introduction
In the last sections of the previous chapter, the incidence of optimal tax
rates was illustrated in a simplified general equilibrium model. In the
present chapter, an empirical optimum taxation model will be developed and
described in detail. It is called GEMPS, general Equilibrium Model with a
£Ublic §ector. No references have been found in the literature to models
with exactly the same tax structure as GEMPS, even though much of the work
in this field is especially aimed at the analysis of tax systems. (Surveys
are given by Shoven and Whalley (1984), Bergman (1985), Whalley (1987) and
Pereira and Shoven (1988).) In existing empirical models tax rates are
often given exogenously, or perhaps by an extremely simplified tax rule
(e.g. uniform income or commodity taxes), and not by necess~ry conditions
for maximum social welfare. One reason for this is of course that these
models are built for practical purposes and thus attempt to incorporate
real-world tax systems which are rarelyoptimal.
There are a few articles on th~ computation of optimal taxes. Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1972) discuss a model with labour as the only production factor
and constant returns to scale in production, where all producer prices are
fixed. They are then able to analyse optimal taxes which only depend on
the properties of a representative consumer's utility function. They also
present two numerical illustrations based on empirical estimates of the
parameters in a direct addilog utility function as well as in the linear
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expendi ture system (LES). Similarly. in a many-consumer model. Deaton
(1977) uses utility functions associated with the linear expenditure
system. He assumes that the supply of labour is exogenously given. that
there are constant returns to scale in production. and that all producer
prices are fixed. Finally he presents illustrative calculations of optimal
tax rates in the United Kingdom. based on empirical estimates of the LES
parameters.
Apart from the practical considerations mentioned above. there is also a
more technical reason for the lack of numerical optimum taxation models.
To deduce the ordinary first-order conditions for optimal tax rates one
has to choose a numeraire and determine one of the tax rates exogenously.
Then the resul ting formulae are not directly appl icable if prices are
normalized to the simplex {p € m~ I I1Pl = I}. where n is the number of
goods having a market price. To solve numerical models. one often uses
some kind of fixed point algorithm where the price simplex is searched for
a set of equilibrium prices. Thus. the optimum taxation formulae are not
easily implemented in models with fixed point solution algorithms. This
problem is discussed by Harris and MacKinnon (1979) and Heady and Mi tra
(1980). who present algorithms for the computation of general equilibrium
with optimal tax rates. (Their algorithms are not implemented in GEMPS.)
Harris and MacKinnon illustrate their results with numerical examples very
much like those of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and Deaton (1977). One of
their main conclusions (Harris and MacKinnon. 1979. pp. 211-212) is that
"optimal tax rates can be extremely sensi tive to the specification of the
model used to derive them".
Several numerical models with optimal taxation are described by Heady and
Mitra (1980. 1982. 1986). In their 1980 article. they present an algorithm
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to solve a general equilibrium model with optimal taxation. illustrating
their results by two numerical examples. Only the first example is based
on empirical data. establishing the parameters in a Stone-Geary utili ty
function. There are eight consumer goods. and labour is the only input.
Thus. with constant returns to scale in private production. relative
producer prices are fixed.
The computable general equilibrium model developed by Heady and Mi tra
(1982) is quite similar to GEMPS from a theoretical viewpoint. although
empirically it is much simpler. Again. the linear expenditure system is
used. but private firms use both labour. capital and intermediate goods as
inputs. so that producer prices are not necessarily constant when public
revenue requirements change. Two numerical examples are presented. The
first is based on a mixture of data for Brazil and the United States.
whereas the second "draws on illustrative figures from Indian data" (Heady
and Mitra. 1982. p. 18). In the first example there are three consumption
goods. capital and labour; in the second there are two consumption goods
and labour in each of the two sectors Urban and Rural.
There are many articles investigating the marginal cost of public funds
within the framework of a numerical general equilibrium model. e.g. Stuart
(1984). Ballard. Shoven and Whalley (1985). Hansson and Stuart (1985).
Clarete and Whalley (1987) and Ballard (1988). The approach in these works
is typically to model the real-world tax system of a particular benchmark
year. and change one or more of the exogenous tax rates. The (marginal)
excess burden of each tax rate may then be computed as an equivalent
variation. or there may be more direct estimates of the reductions in
different consumers' utility levels. In principle it would be possible to
find optimal tax rates in this way. by a trial and failure process leading
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to equalization of the marginal excess burdens of all tax rates.
A recent paper by Vennemo (1990) may perhaps be seen as an extension of
these works. With a primal approach (i.e. with quantities and not prices
as the control variables) Vennemo analyses optimal tariffs in a general
equilibrium model where the parameters are estimated from Norwegian data.
The supply of labour and capital is given exogenously. and there are 31
production sectors. Several numerical experiments are carried out. notably
a comparison of different tariff structures. Lump-sum taxes are endogenous
in the model.
GEMPS differs from the models above in that optimal consumer and producer
prices are computed endogenouslyas part of the solution of a complex
general equilibrium equation system. Thus. there will be only one number
for the marginal cost of public funds. equal for all tax rates; and it is
not found by a numerical experiment. but is given by the value of one of
the first-order conditions for optimal tax rates in general equilibrium.
The first section of this chapter describes the complete set of equations
consti tuting the general equilibrium wi th optimal taxation. Then in the
next section the main structure of GEMPS is sketched. i.e. its sectoral
division. the social welfare function. the export demand functions. and
the production functions for intermediate and final goods. After this the
basic general equilibrium with optimal tax rates is computed. Finally.
three comparative. static analyses are carried out. the results of which
are presented in diagrammatic form.
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The non-linear complementarity problem of optimal taxation
The basic theoretical structure of the empirical model presented here is:
There is one consumer. who maximizes a direct uti lity function u. His
consumption vector is [x.z] € JRN+K. where x is his demand for private
goods and z is his consumption of publicly produced goods. The consumer's
budget equation is q[x - w] = O. where q is the vector of consumer prices
taken as given by the consumer. and w is the vector of initial endowments.
q is endogenous in the model. whereas w is exogenous.
There are J private firms. with at least one firm producing each traded
commodity. Private production exhibits constant returns to scale. and the
production levels are therefore determined from the demand side provided
that profits are non-negative. Each producer maximizes profits. taking the
vector of producer prices. p. as given. Since the production functions are
homothetic. private minimum cost functions are separable in prices and the
production level. Indeed. if vJ denotes profits per unit produced. total
profits in firm j may be written as
j = 1. .... J
where a~ (p) is the input-output 'coefficient of good n in firm j and yJ is
the firm's activity level. If good n is an input. the input coefficient is
negative: a~ < O. If n is an output. on the other hand. the output
coefficient is positive: a~ > O. Both output and input coefficients may in
general depend on prices. but in the empirical model below. only the
latter do. In order to simplify notation in the first part of this chapter
it is assumed that there is only one producer of each commodity. i.e. firm
j produces commodity j. (In the numerical model some of the commodities
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are produced by two or more firms at the same time.) Commodity markets are
numbered from 1 to J and factor markets from J+1 to N.
The vector of public production levels. z E æK• is exogenously given. for
instance by some political decision process. Interpreting the state as a
producer. it faces producer prices in private markets. and it minimizes
its production costs taking these prices as given. The publ ic factor
demand vector g is thus determined by p and z. and all elements of g are
non-positive: g(P.z) € æ~. The tax system is defined by qn = Pn + tn. n =
1•...• N. Each tn may be negative. positive. or zero. If good n is an
input. tn < O means that it is taxed; if good n is an output. tn < O means
that it is subsidized. The public budget equation is:
The non-linear complementarity problem (NLCP) has five sets of equations.
Even though the system is simultaneous and non-linear. it is convenient to
think of each endogenous variable as assigned to a particular equation.
First. one of the goods. e.g. commodity 1. is chosen as a numeraire; and
the other commodity prices are assigned to the second set of equations:
(1) Pi = 1
(2)
If 'lrJ< O. I.e. if there is a deficit in firm j. then the first part of
(2) implies that ~J < O. This is impossible since ~J is constrained to be
a non-negative variable. If 'lrJ> O. the second part of (2) ensures that
PJ = O. Thus. a firm with a positive commodity price earns zero profits.
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In the third set of equations, excess demand is assumed to be zero in all
commodity markets. The activity levels are assigned to this set:
(3)
The interpretation of the variable wn ) O in condition (3) is: If there is
excess supply of commodity n, the activity level of firm n should be zero.
If, on the other hand, Yn ) O, then Wn = O and demand equals supply.
In the fourth set of equations excess demand is assumed to be zero in all
factor markets, and the assigned variables are the factor prices:
(4) Wn·Pn = O, n = J+1, ... ,N
The interpretation of the variable Wn now is: If there is excess supply of
factor n, its market price should be zero. If Pn ) O, then Wn = O and (4)
implies market equilibrium.
To close the system, producer prices must be related to consumer prices.
This will be done by introducing the ordinary formulae for optimal tax
rates (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). It should be observed that two
assumptions in the model implici tly restrict the optimali ty of the tax
rates. First, it is an assumption that the state minimizes production
costs and that it faces producer prices in factor markets; and there is no
claim that this is optimal. Second, a (public or private) producer faces
producer prices in all markets. Thus if both the consumer and some firm
demand commodity n, the consumer pays Pn + tn per unit whereas the firm
pays Pn' From a computational viewpoint this restrictive assumption could
easily be relaxed so that all buyers pay the same price irrespective of
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whether they are consumers or producers. However, Diamond and Mirrlees'
formulae for optimum taxation do not seem to be immediately applicable to
the more general case where tax rates vary from one individual to another.
Diamond and Mirrlees may be said to impose a social structure on the
economy, where producers are in one "tax sector" and consumers are in
another. But there are many other logically possible social structures.
One could for instance place all sellers in one sector and all buyers in
another, or consumers could be grouped according to a progressive income
taxation scheme. There is of course one truly optimal form of taxation,
viz., lump-sum taxes which do not distort prices. If it is assumed that
lump-sum taxation is impossible, then a social structure must be chosen
explicitly or implicitly in order to construct an optimum taxation model.
Economists often believe, e.g., that initial endowments cannot be (and
that market transactions can be) taxed directly. In comparison to lump-sum
taxation, the optimality of any tax system is in general restricted by the
socio-economic structure implied by the model.
Let u· be the consumer's indirect utility function, and choose good 1 as a
numeraire so that qi = Pi = 1 and ti = o. The optimum taxation problem is
to find consumer prices qm, m = 2, ...,N, which maximize u· subject to the
public budget restriction and given the existence of producer prices that
sustain the equilibrium. The Lagrangian for this problem is:
where T is the public revenue requirement. From the first-order conditions
m = 2, ... ,N
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where A is the consumer's marginal utility of income and ~ is the marginal
cost of public funds; and using the fact that
~ ~ ( )L. qna + xm - wm
n= i qm = O
from the budget restriction. we have:
(* ) m = 2 •...• N
Here the magnitude of the coefficient ~ depends on the public revenue
requirement. In the NLCP. optimal consumer prices may thus be assigned to
the following N equations. where ~ is found by using (*) with m = 2:
(5)
m = 3 •...• N
The optimal tax rates will be given implicitly by tm = qm - Pm for each m.
and the dual variables Cm will be zero in an interior solution. The system
of equations (1)-(5) is the nonlinear complementarity problem of general
equilibrium with optimal taxation.
GEMPS: A numerical model with optimal taxation
The empirical model developed in this chapter is called GEMPS (Qeneral
~quilibrium Model with a ~blic §ector). GEMPS is a modification of
another empirical model of the Norwegian economy: MISMOD (Mathiesen.
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1986). MISMOD is a static, one-period Walrasian model wi th 3 geographic
regions. It has 12 different production activities which produce 12
commodities and foreign currency under constant returns to scale. There
are three types of labour, and each firm's capital stock is given
exogenously. (Capital stocks r~sult from depreciation and investment in
some previous period, and do not depend on investment demand in the period
analysed.) MISMOD has four different households: households with children
under lO, households where individuals are between 16 and 45, households
where individuals are between 45 and 70, and households where individuals
are more than 70 years old. The households are the consumers of the model,
and they demand 5 consumption goods in addition to bonds and leisure. A
household's income is the sum of wages and a share of the total capital
income in the economy. The five consumption goods are aggregates of the 12
produced commodities and imports. In MISMOD the public sector is modelled
as a household consuming services which are produced by a public firm. The
public firm maximizes profits, and the public household's income is simply
the net revenue from taxation of private producers and consumers. In
addition to domestic demand, each producer faces an export demand curve.
Just a few of the parameters in MISMOD are econometric estimates. Instead,
the Norwegian economy in 1984 is used as a benchmark, and it is assumed
that the Norwegian economy in 1984 can be described by a Walras model.
Given estimates of the elasticities of substitution in production and
consumption, other coefficients are then defined so that all sellers'
prices are equal to 1. The method of benchmarking can be criticized from a
methodological point of view. First and foremost, there is no test of the
hypothesis that a Walras model is a valid description of the economy.
Second, the entire system of equations should be estimated on time-series
data instead of being based on one single year, since aspects of the real
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economy which are not captured by an ordinary general equi librium model
may appear as random fluctuations. Thus, in using MISMOD, one implicitly
assumes that 1984 was in some sense a normal year.
GEMPS has the same production structure as MISMOD, but only one region.
The sectors aggregating the 12 produced commodities into 5 consumption
goods in MISMOD are interpreted as firms in GEMPS, so that GEMPS has 5
main products. Furthermore, GEMPS has only one kind of labour input, only
one private household, and no public household (i.e. no public utility
function). In what follows, the formal equation system of GEMPS is
described. The motivation for the model is discussed along with some of
its weaknesses after the formal presentation.
The utility function.
Since it may be impossible to find explicit demand functions from a nested
CES utility function with given consumption levels for public goods, the
consumer's utility function is assumed to be separable in the consumption
of private and public goods. Then the maximum attainable utility, but not
the demand for private goods, will depend on the public production level.
Let the consumer's utility level U be a nested CES function of consumption
X, leisure L, wealth B (interpreted as bonds), and public goods Z:
e::.!. e::.!. e::.!. e::.!...L
U = (aiX p + a2L p + a3B p + a4Z p ]P-1
where the a's are constants and p is the consumer's top-level substitution
parameter. X is a CES function of five goods: Xl (Food and beverages), X2
(Clothes), X3 (Housing), X4 (Transport) and Xs (Services):
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where n is the substitution parameter at the second level. The consumer's
preference structure can be illustrated as follows:
Utili ty
(CES)
Consumption
(CES)
Leisure Bonds Public goods
Food Clothes Housing Transport Services
The utility maximization problem is solved in two steps. First, utility is
maximized with respect to consumption, leisure and bonds, given the
provision of public goods, Z, initial endowments of leisure and bonds, Lo
and Bo, a consumer price index QX and market prices QL and QB. This yields
the Lagrangian function
l =
r e::!. e::!. e::!. P-l].e:
La
1
X p + a2L p + a3B p + a4Z p p-l
- A [QX.X + QL(L - Lo) + QB(B - Bo)]
and demand functions
x = QL·Lg + QB·Bg
(QX/a1)P(a~QXl-p + ag QLl-p + a~ QBl-p)
L = QL·Lg + QB·Bg
(QLla2)P(a~QXl-p + ag QLl-p + a~ QBl-p)
B = QL·Lg + QB·Bg
(QB/a3)P(a~QXl-p + ag QLl-p + a~ QBl-p)
Next, consumption expenditure is minimized, given X and the consumer's
market prices of the five products, Q1' ..., Qs:
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5
~minimize n=i QnXn s.t.
yields the conditional demand functions
n = 1....• 5
The solution is completed by defining the price index QX as the minimum
unit cost of X:
The expressions for the partial derivatives of the consumer' s demand
functions resemble those in the previous chapter and will not be reported
here. They are given in the computer program in Berg (1990).
The production functions.
There are two kinds of producers in GEMPS. First. the five main goods are
nested Cobb-Douglas functions of 12 intermediate products as well as
imports (the role of which will be discussed below):
Y AA n yy Pnmn = n m nm n = 1..... 5
YYnm
Ri l_Ri= AB -rn ,.,nm.VD ,.,nm- nm nm nm m € {Ol.02 •....12}
where AAn• ABnm and the P's are constants. Yn is producer n's supply; YOnm
is his demand for intermediate product m. and VDnm denotes his currency
demand. Let the market price of intermediate good m be PYm. define the
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price index PYYnm as the minimumunit cost of YYnm' and let PV be the
price of foreign currency. Then the condi tional demand functions for
inputs in sector n are:
z
- m VDnm =
where the assumption of profit maximization (and hence cost minimization)
implies that
and
The list of main products and producers is:
1 Food and beverages
2 Clothes
3 Housing
4 Transport
5 Services
Second, the activity levels in the 12 intermediate production sectors,
IAoo, ..•• IA12• are ei ther CES or Cobb-Douglas functions of capital.
labour and other products. The top-level elastici ty of substi tution in
activi ty 00 (which corresponds to "Shipping" in MISMOD)is for instance
0.5. whereas activity 01 (Electrici ty) is formulated as a Cobb-Douglas
function with the top-level elasticity of substitution equal to 1. Taking
sector 00 as an example. the production function is given by
IAoo =
0'00-1[6001 Iloo 0'00
0'00-1
+ 6002Kloo 0'00
~
-1 0'00
+ 1: NI 0'00 0'00-1U003 00
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where uoo is the top-level elastici ty of substi tution in sector 00, the
o's are constants, Kloo is the input of capital, Nloo the labour input,
and Iloo the input of other intermediate products as well as imported
goods (foreign currency). Let the prices of these three inputs be PK, PN
and PIloo, respectively, and write u wi thout subscripts for notational
simplicity. Then minimization of total costs in sector 00 yields the
following minimum unit cost and conditional input demand functions:
1
cr,; [ u l-u u l-u 0~03PN1-U]l-U= 0oolPlloo + °002PK +
Iloo = (Cloo·oool/Plloo)u Yloo
Kloo = (Cloo·oo02/PK}u Yloo
Nloo u= (Cloo·oo03/PN) Yloo
On the next level 1100 is a Leontief function of three intermediate goods
and currency, and the price Plloo is interpreted as the minimum unit cost
in the activity producing 1100:
loom = o~om 1100, m = 03, 07, 11
Plloo - !o~om·Ploom, m = 03, 07, 11
where loo. is a Cobb-Douglas function of currency and product m and Ploom
is the minimum unit cost of loom. In other sectors than Shipping, there
may be a Cobb-Douglas function instead of a Leontief function. All CES and
Cobb-Douglas functions in the model are linearly homogeneous. Each
intermediate sector produces one or more of the 12 products, with fixed
output coefficients. Their cost structures are sketched in the Appendix.
The intermediate products and producers are:
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V Currency
Ol Electricity production
02 Electricity distribution
03 Petroleum
04 Primary goods
05 Food
06 Textiles
01 Ships and rigs
OS Chemicals
09 Metals
10 Manufactured goods
Il Private services
12 Public services
00 Shipping
Ol Electricity
03 Petroleum
04 Primary industries
05 Food
06 Textiles
01 Shipbuilding
OS Chemicals
09 Metals
10 Manufacture
Il Private services
12 Public services
The formulation of imports in the 11 production sectors in GEMPS may seem
odd. since the good "Currency" appears in numerous aggregates in the
production functions. First. all kinds of imported goods are regarded as
currency because the model only incorporates the trade balance effects and
not the actual commodity flows from (and to) the world market. Second.
when currency appears in some aggregate on a low level in the nested cost
structure. it should be interpreted as the foreign counterpart of the
domestic good in the same aggregate. This formulation has been chosen so
parameters in the production functions.
as to facilitate the empirical estimation of coefficients and substitution
Saving. investment and depreciation.
The formulation of saving and investment decisions is extremely simple in
GEMPS. The consumer. foreigners and the state demand bonds. which are
supplied by a producer. In MISMOD. this production sector uses currency.
oil investment goods and other investment goods. The latter two are
outputs from other sectors which in turn demand the twelve intermediate
products in the model as inputs. In GEMPS. all these activities are
formulated as a single firm. with the following structure:
- 170 -
Cobb-Douglas
Currency Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
I I I I I I I I I I I I
V 06 07 10 11 V 03 07 09 10 11
I I I I I I I I I
Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
I
I
i I
I
i
Product Currency Product Currency
GEMPS is a static. one-period model. so the production of investment goods
does not increase capital stocks in the economy. The consumer. foreigners
and the authorities presumably have some idea about future consumption.
since they demand bonds. but such expectations are not explicit in GEMPS.
Cap ital is not an argument in the consumer' s utili ty function. and the
supply of capital to each sector is completely inelastic. Depreciation is
exogenously given. and is deducted from capital income. It results in an
immediate demand for bonds which may be interpreted as investment for
replacement. The state owns all the capital in sectors 01 Electricity and
12 Public services. and 29.5% of the capital stock in sector 03 Petroleum.
Foreigners own 28% of the capital in sector 03 Petroleum. and the consumer
owns all other capital stocks.
Exports and foreigners' demand.
There are 13 foreigners in GEMPS. Twelve of the export demand functions
are each directed towards one intermediate good. and are simple CES or
Cobb-Douglas functions of this good and its foreign counterpart. Domestic
and foreign goods are thus not perfect substitutes. It is assumed that all
foreign currency world market prices are constant and equal to 1. so that
the foreign demand for an intermediate good is determined by its domestic
(I.e. Norwegian) price and the domestic price of foreign currency. The
13th function corresponds to foreigners' demand in Norway in MISMOD. and
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has the following structure:
Cobb-Douglas
Cobb-Douglas
I I
Bonds
I
05
I
I
06
I
10
I
Cobb-Douglas
I
I
11V 03
I
I
Product
I
Currency
The state.
The most important part of the state's economic activity, viz., public
production, has already been described as intermediate sector 12. It has
constant returns to scale and minimizes costs. Some of its production is
sold to private firms at unit cost, some is distributed to the consumer.
Any deficit is financed by optimal taxation. The (ad valorem) tax rate on
domestic capital income is an exogenous constant TC. Thus, the state keeps
a fraction TC of returns to capital which are not paid to foreigners and
distributes a fraction 1 - TC to the consumer as lump-sum transfers. As in
the private sector, public saving decisions result in public demand for
bonds. Both the demand for bonds and the demand for public services are
exogenously given.
Discussion of the model
The motivation behind the choice of MISMOD as a point of departure for the
design of GEMPS is that MISMOD seems to be the only genuine Walrasian,
numerical model of the Norwegian economy. Its purpose is to describe and
analyse the Norwegian system of taxes and subsidies as of 1984, with
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special emphasis on changes in industry structure as a consequence of tax
changes. Al though MISMOD is not necessarily well suited for analyses of
optimal taxation, GEMPS has exactly the same production structure and the
same parameters. In part, the reason is that this makes it possible to
interpret the transition from MISMOD to GEMPS as a comparative statics
exercise. All parameters and the main economic framework being the same,
the results from the two models are comparable.1) The 1984 benchmark of
MISMOD is described in general terms by Mathiesen (1986), but there is no
published documentation of the exact values of all the model's exogenous
parameters. All exogenous variables in GEMPS are given in Berg (1990).
There are a few differences between MISMOD and GEMPS. The three types of
labour in MISMOD are represented by one variable in GEMPS, there is only
one geographic region instead of three, and the two commodities
"Electrici ty production" and "Electricity distribution" are regarded as
one intermediate commodity in GEMPS. The aggregation of labour has simply
been done by regarding the three types of labour in MISMOD as one good.
The geographic aggregation is then insignificant because MISMOD' s three
regional production functions for each good have the same parameters as
soon as labour is aggregated into one factor. The aggregation of
electricity has been done by equalizing prices and summing up demand and
supply, respectively, across all sectors.
Another difference is that GEMPS has only one household, whereas MISMOD
has four private utility functions. The consumer's utility function in
GEMPS, however, has the same substitution parameters as the MISMOD
1) However, the main focus in this chapter is not on such a comparison.
Another reason for the present approach is that the construction of a new
computable general equilibrium model is an extremely demanding task.
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households (viz., 1.2 at the top level and 0.48 at the second level), and
the endowments of leisure and bonds are the sum of the households'
endowments in MISMOD. A more important difference is that the MISMOD
households have posi tive or negative endowments of consumption goods in
order to induce empirically plausible demand elasticities. For theoretical
reasons there are no such endowments in GEMPS. (The elasticities would not
be the same anyway, since equilibrium prices are quite different in the
two models. As will be shown below, the consumer's demand and supply
elasticities in GEMPS are not unreasonable.)
Al though the levels of public consumption and saving are the same, a
further difference between GEMPS and MISMOD is that these levels are
exogenously given in GEMPS, and do not vary with market prices as in
MISMOD. Finally, the tax system in GEMPS is of course completely different
from that of MISMOD.
The main weaknesses of GEMPS lie in formulations that are inherited from
MISMOD and implici tly restrict the optimali ty of the tax system. In
particular, the taxation of the consumer' s income is subject to three
rather restrictive assumptions. First, there is no progressive taxation of
labour income. The labour income tax is simply a wedge between the wage
rate firms pay and the wage rate the consumer receives, and the tax base
is total labour supply. Secondly, the taxation of capital income is
exogenous and not necessarily optimal. The reasons are that capital supply
is fixed, and that capital is not an argument in the consumer's utility
function. Consequently, the formulae for optimal taxation do not apply (at
least not directly) to capital. The tax rate on capital income in GEMPS,
TC, is an exogenous parameter in the interval [0,1]. In the equilibrium
below, TC = 0.5.
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The third restriction is the formulation of saving, which is extremely
simplified. Saving is to some extent regarded as a residual in GEMPS and
MISMOD, even though the consumer' s wealth is formally represented by a
variable in the utility function. This formulation is intended as a
substitute for a more realistic (and more complex) model with several time
periods. In the present version of GEMPS, wealth is viewed as bonds, and
has a market price. There is also a bond producer facing two kinds of
demand: bond demand from the consumer, foreigners and the state: and
investment demand due to depreciation, which is given exogenously. A
possible interpretation of this firm is that it provides investment goods
which will be available in a hypothetical future period, issuing bonds now
as claims on future returns on that investment. The good "Bonds" is chosen
as a numeraire.
The balance of payments may perhaps seem a little obscure, since it is not
explici t in the model. If the value of exports, i.e. the net supply of
currency, exceeds the value of imports, i.e. the demand for currency, then
the bond producer's currency demand will cover the difference in general
equilibrium. At the end of the market period. the consumer, the state and
foreigners hold bonds. some of which are financial claims on foreigners.
The model does not keep track of the ownership of such claims.
As already mentioned. there are 12 export demand functions in GEMPS. but
the actual flows of physical goods to foreigners are not recorded. Exports
are generated because foreigners have initial endowments of currency. The
currency endowments are not the same in GEMPS as in MISMOD. however. In
the transition from MISMOD to GEMPS. it turns out that the average price
level of intermediate goods falls sharply and export demand increases
accordingly. In fact, it seems to be impossible to find any equilibrium
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solution of GEMPS unless the currency endowments are substantially lower
than in MISMOD. The initial endowments of currency in MISMOD are chosen
arbi trarily to generate the actual Norwegian export levels of 1984. In
GEMPS, the endowments are also arbitrary, and generate approximately the
same physical volumes as in MISMOD. The export value will differ between
the two models, however, since the equilibrium prices do.
The basic equilibrium
GEMPS is fully documented in the computer program in Berg (1990). Computer
programs being difficult to read, some of the exogenous variables will be
listed here as well:
Public consumption
Publ ic saving
Consumer's labour endowment
Consumer's bond endowment
Capital stocks:
00 Shipping
01 Electricity
03 Petroleum
04 Primary industries
05 Food
06 Textiles
07 Shipbuilding
08 Chemicals
09 Metals
10 Manufacture
11 Private services
12 Public services
83.9714
49.6614
353.6990
53.9804
4.6543
10.2750
62.1820
11.5289
2.0635
1.4679
0.9654
2.8474
5.6765
5.8351
37.6629
3.4111
Let us now turn to the endogenous variables in the basic equilibrium of
GEMPS. The producer prices of currency and the 12 intermediate goods are:
Currency
Electricity production
Electricity distribution
Petroleum
Primary goods
Food
Textiles
Ships and rigs
Chemicals
Metals
Manufactured goods
Private services
Public services
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PV = 2.1355
PYOl = 0.2454
PY02 = 0.2454
PY03 = 0.6846
PY04 = 0.4218
PY06 = 0.3766
PY06 = 0.5275
PY07 = 0.6793
PY08 = 0.6151
PY09 = 0.8423
Py 10 = 0.4935
Py 11 = 0.3945
Py 12 = 0.4573
The equilibrium prices of capital in GEMPS are:
Shipping
Electricity
Petroleum
Primary industries
Food
Textiles
Shipbuilding
Chemicals
Metals
Manufacture
Private services
Public services
PKoo = 7.4611
PK01 = 0.4298
PK03 = 0.9407
PK04 = 0.3178
PK06 = 0.1679
PK06'= 0.6633
PK07 = 0.7733
PK08 = 0.7455
PK09 = 0.8838
PK10 = 0.7816
PK11 = 0.6798
PK12 = 0.4516
If capital were a homogeneous good. these prices would indicate where the
marginal return on investment is the largest. The most profitable sector
is Shipping. mainly because the price of its product. foreign currency. is
relatively high. The least profitable sectors seem to be Food production.
Primary industries and Public services. Note that depreciation allowances
have not been deducted from the prices listed here.
Perhaps the most important part of the equilibrium is the solution for
resulting optimal tax rates:
producer and consumer prices of labour and the five main goods. and the
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Labour PL = 0.8532 QL = 0.8311
Food Pi = 0.3312 Qi = 0.5094
Clothes P2 = 0.8468 Q2 = 1.3024
Housing P3 = 0.3676 Q3 = 0.5654
Transport P4 = 0.6915 Q4 = 1.0636
Services Ps = 0.4172 Qs = 0.6417
Labour TL = -0.0221 TUPL = -2.59% TL/QL = -2.66%
Food Ti = 0.1782 Ti/Pi = 53.81% Ti/Qi = 34.99%
Clothes T2 = 0.4557 T2/P2 = 53.81% T2/Q2 = 34.99%Housing T3 = 0.1978 T3/P3 = 53.81% T3/Q3 = 34.99%Transport T4 = 0.3721 T4/P4 = 53.81% T4/Q4 = 34.99%Services Ts = 0.2245 Ts/Ps = 53.81% Ts/Qs = 34.99%
Two results are worth noting in the table above. The first is that the tax
rate on labour is quite small in absolute value, perhaps contrary to what
is commonly assumed" or estimated in the literature. The second is that the
percentage tax rates on the 5 main commodities are exactly the same. The·
uncompensated demand and supplyelasticities are also quite similar:
QL Qi Q2 Q3 Q4 Qs QB
EL 0.5465 -0.0172 -0.0134 -0.0207 -0.0546 -0.0171 -0.2991
EXi 0.8832 -0.5708 -0.0707 -0.1094 -0.2877 -0.0902 0.1734
EX2 0.8832 -0.0908 -0.5507 -0.1094 -0.2877 -0.0902 0.1734
EX3 0.8832 -0.0908 -0.0707 -0.5894 -0.2877 -0.0902 0.1734
EX4 0.8832 -0.0908 -0.0707 -0.1094 -0.7677 -0.0902 0.1734
EXs 0.8832 -0.0908 -0.0707 -0.1094 -0.2877 -0.5702 0.1734
EB 40.5519 0.4581 0.3568 0.5520 1.4520 0.4551 -47.1347
We see that the labour supplyelasticity is 0.5465, and that the own-price
demand elasticities for consumption goods are between -0.55 and -0.77. The
elasticities of the demand for bonds are difficult to interpret from an
empirical viewpoint, since the model's price of bonds does not have an
obvious counterpart in the Norwegian economy. The relatively large numbers
for the own-price elasticity and the cross elasticity with respect to the
price of labour partly reflect the fact that the consumer' s net market
demand for bonds is only 1.2019.
The compensated elasticities of consumption (not market demand) are:
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QL Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Qs QB
CL -0.6045 0.0599 0.0466 0.0721 0.1897 0.0595 0.1766
CX1 0.5955 -0.5209 -0.0318 -0.0493 -0.1296 -0.0406 0.1766
CX2 0.5955 -0.0409 -0.5118 -0.0493 -0.1296 -0.0406 0.1766
CX3 0.5955 -0.0409 -0.0318 -0.5293 -0.1296 -0.0406 0.1766
CX4 0.5955 -0.0409 -0.0318 -0.0493 -0.6096 -0.0406 0.1766
CXs 0.5955 -0.0409 -0.0318 -0.0493 -0.1296 -0.5206 0.1766
æ 0.5955 0.0599 0.0466 0.0721 0.1897 0.0595 -1.0234
The two relevant compensated market elasticities are:
QL Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Qs QB
CL' 1.0428 -0.1033 -0.0804 -0.1244 -0.3273 -0.1026 -0.3047
æ' 27.3435 2.7489 2.1406 3.3120 8.7119 2.7307 -46.9875
The consumer's net market demand (supply) is:
Labour
Food
Clothes
Housing
Transport
Services
Bonds
(129.7909)
36.7222
11.1853
39.8678
55.7472
28.9629
1.2019
The demand for labour is distributed as follows among the intermediate
sectors:
00 Shipping
01 Electricity
03 Petroleum
04 Primary industries
05 Food
06 Textiles
07 Shipbui Iding
08 Chemicals
09 Metals
10 Manufacture
11 Private services
12 Public services
10.5253
1.4482
4.6399
3.5299
1.9484
3.9920
5.3369
2.6705
3.3639
18.8221
47.4605
26.0533
The final endogenous variables in the basic equilibrium of GEMPS are the
marginal cost of public funds. Jl. the consumer' s marginal utili ty of
income. A. and his maximum utility level. U. They are Jl = 0.002931; A =
0.001766; and U = 49763.0654. This means that the marginal cost of public
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funds in terms of private income. ~. is equal to 1.6598.
Comparative statics
1. Increasing public consumption under optimal ~tion.
The empirical validity of any numerical model. viewed as a description of
the real economy. can be questioned. GEMPS is no exception. and it would
be unwarranted to assert that the Norwegian economy would have looked like
GEMPS if only tax rates had been optimal. This does not mean. however.
that a model such as GEMPS is empirically worthless. Even though it may
not describe each static equilibrium in a fully satisfactory way. it may
nevertheless be useful in the analysis of change; f .e, in comparative
statics.
In this section. three comparative analyses are considered. First. the
level of public consumption is increased while being financed by optimal
taxation until it is no longer possible to compute an equilibrium. Next.
the transition from the basic equilibrium reported in the previous section
to a situation with only lump-sum taxation is analysed. This is done by
increasing exogenous lump-sum taxes gradually. covering the public budget
deficit with decreasing, optimal tax rates. In the third simulation the
level of public consumption is increased once again. but this time there
are only lump-sum taxes.
Large amounts of data may be output from these comparative analyses. The
focus here being on the general equilibrium aspects of optimal taxation.
however. only a few of the solution paths of different variables have been
selected and are displayed in the following diagrams.
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Figure 5.1 shows the equilibrium paths of the consumer price QL and the
producer price PL in the labour market. Both prices increase wi th the
public consumption level Z; the producer price almost linearly, and the
consumer price progressively. In this sense the greater part of the
incidence is on the consumer ..The paths stop at Z = 181.78 because no
equilibrium could be found when incrementing Z by 2% beyond this point.
The solution paths of the prices of commodity 1 are drawn in Figure 5.2.
The consumer price Q1 rises progressively, but contrary to the case of
labour, the producer price PI now falls slightly. The solution paths of
the other commodity prices are quite similar. except for commodity 5. the
prices of which are shown in Figure 5.3. Here the producer price grows
wi th the level of public production. al though the increase is not very
great.
The most interesting resul t of the present simulation. the optimal tax
rates. are depicted in Figure 5.4. The tax rate on labour is negative by
definition: TL = QL - PL. We see tbat all tax rates rise with the public
consumption level, no paths crossing each other. It also seems that the
rise in the overall taxation level is evenly distributed among the five
commodi ty tax rates. whereas the increase in the absolute value of the
labour tax rate is more modest.
The development of percentage tax rates is shown in Figure 5.5. It turns
out that the five main commodities continue baving equal percentage tax
rates when the public consumption level increases. Since the percentage
tax rate on labour differs from the commodity rates. the equality of the
latter is likely to be due to the specific functional forms which are used
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in the model. Tn/Qn rises from 34.99% to 75.06% in the simulation. and
TL/QL varies between -2.66% and -29.31%.
Figure 5.6 demonstrates that the normalized marginal cost of public funds.
~. increases progressively with Z. from 1.6598 to 8.6033. This reflects
the growing marginal welfare loss due to distortive (although optimal)
taxation. The marginal cost of public funds in terms of private income
becomes very high as the level of public consumption approaches the point
where the equilibrium breaks down. In this context the beneficial side of
government production should not be neglected. however. Al though the
marginal cost of public funds increases. so does public consumption. thus
yielding a higher utility levelon the part of the consumer. The effect is
shown in Figure 5.7. where the consumer's (maximum) utility level is seen
to rise with Z. from 49763.07 to 55362.38: before falling towards 53857.74
at the end point. The first-order conditions for optimal public production
which were discussed briefly in Chapter 3 imply that the maximum point is
reached when the marginal utility of Z is equal to the marginal cost of
public funds (~) times the marginal increase in the public deficit when Z
increases. Therefore the progressive increase in J.L/A depicted in Figure
5.6 may well bring about an interior maximum such as the one in Figure
5.7.
2. Transition from optimal tax rates to lump-sum taxation.
The next comparative analysis is to investigate the development of taxes
and prices if the optimal tax rates are gradually replaced by lump-sum
taxation. This is interesting because lump-sum taxation is often regarded
as a yardstick against which the welfare effects of various tax regimes
are compared. In GEMPS this comparative statics exercise has been carried
out by incrementing lump-sum taxes 100 times. from zero to the level where
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all optimal market tax rates are zero. viz .. 39.1083. The level of public
consumption is the same as in the basic equilibrium. Some of the results
are reported in Figures 5.8-5.12.
In Figure 5.8 we see that the distance between the two prices of labour
stays almost constant until lump-sum taxes have grown to 70% of their
final level. then it starts to diminish. In addition it turns out that
both the producer price and the consumer price of labour are lower under
lump-sum taxation than under optimal market taxation. In the commodity
markets. things are different, as Figure 5.9 demonstrates. The consumer
price of commodity 1 declines sharply. and the producer price increases
only slightly. The picture is the same in the other commodity markets,
except for market 5. where the producer price falls (although by small
amounts; from 0.4172 to 0.4105). Judging from the diagrams. the incidence
of optimal taxes is mainly on the consumer. at least in the five commodity
markets.
In Figure 5.10 the paths of the optimal market tax rates are drawn. In
accordance with the two previous diagrams. the tax rates on the five main
commodities decrease smoothly towards zero; whereas the absolute value of
the labour tax rate first increases before it starts to fall. Figure 5.11
shows the consequences as far as the normalized marginal cost of public
funds is concerned: ~ decreases monotonically from 1.6598 to 1. Of course,
with only lump-sum taxation. the marginal welfare cost of raising public
revenue is equal to the consumer's marginal utility of (lump-sum) income.
Figure 5.12 displays the path of the consumer's maximum utility level in
the transition from optimal market taxes to lump-sum taxation. The result
here is unexpected, but not inexplicable. Since there is a welfare loss
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from distortive taxation even if tax rates are optimal. we would expect
that the representative consumer's utility level would increase when
lump-sum taxation is introduced. So it does. but only up to a point where
market tax rates are still non-zero. In fact. in this point. we have that
TL = -0.0225 TL/QL = -3.06%
Tl = 0.0357 Tl/Ql = 9.42%
T2 = 0.0882 T2/Q2 = 9.42%
T3 = 0.0385 T3/Q3 = 9.42%
T4 = 0.0721 T4/Q4 = 9.42%
T5 = 0.0429 T5/Q5 = 9.42%
A possible explanation is that optimal taxation has a terms-of-trade
effect which may outweigh the welfare loss due to price distortion. The
mechanism is: Levying domestic market taxes indirectly reduces tmpor ts "
which in the case of GEMPS are used as inputs in intermediate sectors. A
reduction of imports means that the demand for foreign currency falls. If
domestic and foreign export goods were perfect substitutes. the supply of
foreign currency would be perfectly elastic, and the reduced currency
demand would have had no effect on the exchange rate. But in GEMPS foreign
and domestic export goods are not perfect substitutes, and there is an
upward-sloping currency supply curve. Taxation of imports will induce a
downward pressure on the exchange rate, and the terms of trade improve. It
turns out that the price of foreign currency increases throughout the
simulation, from 2.1355 to 2.1798.
3. Increasing public production under lump-sum taxation.
The third comparative statics analysis is carried out to shed more light
on the differences between lump-sum and optimal taxation. Now the level of
public consumption is increased in the same way as in simulation I, but
government expenditures are financed with lump-sum taxes. Some of the main
results are given in Figures 5.13-5.15. Figure 5.13 shows that all main
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consumer and producer prices are nearly constant when Z rises; and in
Figure 5.14 the consumer's utility level increases monotonically. Finally,
we see in Figure 5.15 that the tax revenues required to finance Z are
greater and rise more rapidly under optimal market taxation than under
lump-sum taxation.
Concluding remarks
This chapter describes a computable general equilibrium model, GEMPS, that
can be used to analyse the likely behaviour of optimal market tax rates in
Norway when the consumption of public goods increases. The model has one
representative consumer who supplies labour and demands 5 main commodities
in addition to bonds, 5 main producers and 12 intermediate sectors as well
as a bond producer. Exports follow from export demand functions in which
foreign and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes. The level of public
consumption and saving is given exogenously, and government revenues may
be raised by either optimal market taxes or lump-sum taxation.
From a numerical viewpoint, the simulations carried out seem to indicate
that the general equilibrium with optimal taxes is quite well-behaved. For
instance, comparative statics solution paths for optimal tax rates appear
to be continuous. The incidence of optimal taxation is mainly on the
consumer in GEMPS, in the sense that consumer prices change more than
producer prices when taxes increase. But taxation is evenly distributed
among the five main commodities and labour; indeed, percentage commodity
tax rates are always the same.
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The model obviously has its weaknesses. For one thing. the formulation of
saving is not very sophisticated. and no conclusions about the optimal
taxation of interest and cap i tal income have been drawn. Secondly. the
foreign sector plays a more important role than one would perhaps expect
in practice. In particular. the, welfare effects of the tax system seem to
depend on the specification of the export demand functions. since some
degree of market taxation may improve the terms of trade.
Coming as no surprise. the latter point may lead to a conclusion. The
foreign sector is a difficult part of the formulation of most computable
general equilibrium models. One reason is that there is no easy way to
describe the imperfect competi tion in export markets without making it
possible for a small country to influence world market prices. At the same
time. the theory of optimal taxation is developed within the framework of
a closed economy - there is only one government or authori ty with the
abili ty to tax in the model. Thus. more work could be done to develop
theories of optimum taxation in open economies. aiming at implementation
in computable general equilibrium models.
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Appendix
There are several cost structures in the 12 intermediate production
sectors. The different structures are illustrated below, wi th partial
elasticities of substitution given in parentheses and the numbers in the
Cobb-Douglas or Leontief aggregates indicating the products that each
sector demands as inputs.
00 Shipping:
CES (0.5)
Leontief
I
Capital Labour
I I i
03 07 11
I I I
.... Cobb-Douglas
I
I I
Product Currency
v
01 Electricity:
Cobb-Douglas
Leontief
I
Capital Labour
I I
10 11
I I
.. Cobb-Douglas
I
01
i I
Product Currency
03 Petroleum:
Cobb-Douglas
Cobb-Douglas
I I
Capital Labour
I
07
I
I I
10 11
I I
. Cobb-Douglas
I
i
Currency
V 03
I
I
Product
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04 Primary industries:
CES (0.2)
Leontief
I
Capital Labour
02
05 Food:
I
03
I
I
04
I
I
05
I
I
07
I
I
08
I
I I
10 11
I I
Cobb-Douglas
I
CES (0.2)
I
Product
I
Currency
Cobb-Douglas
I I
Capi tal Labour
V 02
06 Textiles:
I
03
I
I
04
I
I
05
I
I
08
I
I I
10 11
I I
. Cobb-Douglas
I
Cobb-Douglas
I
Product
I
Currency
Cobb-Douglas
I I
Capital Labour
02 03
I
07 Shipbuilding:
I
04
I
I
06
I
I
08
I
I I
10 11
I I
. Cobb-Douglas
I
Cobb-Douglas
I
Product
I
Currency
Cobb-Douglas
I I
Capital Labour
02 03
I
I I I
06 07 08
I I I
I I I
09 10 11
I I I
Cobb-Douglas
I
I I
Product Currency
Cobb-Douglas
08 Chemicals:
09 Metals:
- 196 -
Cobb-Douglas
CES (0.2)
I
Labour
I I
Capi tal Cobb-Douglas
I I I
03
I
Cobb-Douglas
I
01 02
I I
Petroleum Currency
v os
I
10 11
I I
Cobb-Douglas
I
04
I
06
I
I
Product
I
Currency
Cobb-Douglas
CES (0.4)
I
LabourCobb-Douglas
I I
Capi tal Cobb-Douglas
I
I
01
I
03
I
Cobb-Douglas
I
I I
Petroleum Currency
v 04
I
os
I
09
I
10 11
I I
Cobb-Douglas
I
I
Product
I
Currency
10 Manufacture:
Cobb-Douglas
Cobb-Douglas Capital Labour
I I I I I I I
V 02 03 04 06 OS 09
I I I I I
I I
10 11
I I
Cobb-Douglas
I
I
Product
I
Currency
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11 Private services:
CES (0.3)
Leontief Capital Labour
I I I I I I I I
V 02 03 04 05 06 08 09
I I I I I I
I I I
10 11 12
I I
. Cobb-Douglas
I
I
Currency
I
Product
12 Public services:
CES (0.39)
Leontief
I
Capital Labour
I
02
I
03
I
I
05
I
I
06
I
I
08
I
I I I
10 11 12
I I
. Cobb-Douglas
I
I
Currency
V
I
Product
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<X>Na...USION
As a whole, the five main chapters in this thesis may be seen as an
argument about how the public sector can be modelled within a Walrasian.
microeconomic framework. The theoretical idea underlying much of the
argument is that if the public sector (or "The State", which is the term
used here) meri ts its own formulation in economics, the reason must be
that it has or may be given a real economic significance apart from that
of the traditional private agents, the consumer and the producer. This
comes out clear ly if one thinks in terms of al ternatives. If the state
could perform no economic task of importance or significance, then there
would or should be no economic state. 'If the state could perform some
economic tasks, but all of them were better left to the private sector,
then there would or should be no economic state. (The qualification
"economic" is introduced because there might still be political, social or
even historical reasons for the state's existence, of course.)
The thesis is also a discussion of how elements of economic theory within
the Walrasian framework can be added or modified on a general level, and
not so much a presentation of theorems on logical relationships between
such elements. Thus, the chapters following the first reflections on the
role and modelling of the public sector try to shed some light on a few of
the consequences of the steps taken towards a Walrasian concept of the
state. Special interest is devoted to the formulation of the state in
so-called computable general equilibrium models. One reason is that models
must be related to empirical data in order to improve insight into complex
economic phenomena. Another reason is that the types and extent of the
economic tasks that the state is best suited to perform, cannot be easily
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determined from theoretical considerations alone. What the public sector
should do depends on the specific consumer preferences and the production
technology available in the economy. It seems difficult to obtain general
theorems on privatization.
The argument in the thesis ends with a computable general equilibrium
model with optimal taxation. Apart from demonstrating the existence of
such an equilibrium, the contribution of this model is first and foremost
to indicate that the optimum taxation equilibrium is well-behaved as long
as utility and production functions are. The comparative statics solution
paths of endogenous variables bear every sign of being continuous if
judged by their geometric appearance. In addition, however, the model is
in fact an empirical description of the possible effects on the Norwegian
economy of introducing and changing optimal tax rates. To be sure, the
model is simplified and not ideal for optimum tax analysis. But it is
important to note that any empirical model must be enormously simplified
as a description of real-world phenomena. Otherwise it would simply not be
tractable in practical decision-making. The third contribution of the
model is that it illustrates theoretical results some of which are most
often only discussed in an intuitive manner. The actual magnitudes of the
changes in the marginal cost of public funds when government consumption
increases are for instance not easy to express analytically. Likewise, the
consumer and producer prices as dependent on exogenous variables and
parameters in general equilibrium are complicated functions.
Obviously, not all the work that could have been done, has been done in
this thesis. The discussion of the economic role of the state in Chapter 2
could no doubt be extended into theorems on privatization; and it is also
possible to say more about internal efficiency in the public sector. Both
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administration and direct production costs should in general be brought to
a minimum. and even the computation of optimal tax rates is not a trivial
question in practice. As already noted in the discussion of the numerical
model GEMPS in Chapter 5. the model specification could be altered in many
ways. To analyse the optimal t~tion of savings one would e.g. prefer a
model with at least two time periods. To investigate the effects on the
income distribution of changing tax rates we would have to include several
households in a more general social welfare function. One could question
the relevance of the Walrasian framework itself. arguing that tax analysis
in oligopolistic or monopolistic markets is more interesting. And there
are numerous other questions and problems that have not been mentioned.
They will have to be taken up in future work.
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